Clause 12
Offender Management Bill
3:15 pm
Gerry Sutcliffe (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Bradford South, Labour)
On that final point, what the Government are concerned about is what works. I have a great deal of respect for Martin Narey’s work in the posts that he has held and in his current post at Barnardo’s, where he is doing some excellent work on the provision of support for children and is involved in giving expert advice on the sex offender review that is taking place. We should listen to him. He has said interesting things about the respect and decency agenda in prisons, and the cultural changes that have taken place there. It takes somebody who is very keen and involved with the issues to be able to change his mind in the way that Martin did. That means that we should all show a great deal of respect to the detail of what he has said.
I explained to the Committee what clauses 11 to 15 set out, and we have just had an hour’s discussion on clause 11, PCOs, the criminal offences that may be committed and the ability to carry out the searches that are required. Clause 11 sets out how we want to extend the effective search powers to PCOs, which is likely to increase the detection of potential criminality via visits. Accordingly, it is sensible that PCOs’ increased ability to detect potential criminal acts is matched by provision of a specific power to detain an offender at the point of detection until a police officer can arrive at the prison in question and take over. The hon. and learned Gentleman asked if that power would be extended to public places. No, it will be confined to the grounds of the prison or secure training centre.
These difficulties do not exist in public sector prisons, because we know that prison officers working there are Crown servants who have been given constabulary powers by the Prison Act 1952. We do not consider it necessary or desirable to give such powers to a non-Crown servant to achieve the aim of the clause. However, we feel that this is an appropriate time to resolve the difference in the power to detain. In recognition of the concerns expressed over the granting of such detention powers to employees of private companies, we have been careful to ensure that the power does not provide more than is necessary to achieve our desired aims. The clause does not create an unfettered power to detain, and includes a number of important safeguards that should ensure that it is used only when absolutely necessary.
First, the power to detain can only ever be used by a PCO in relation to a visitor to a prison. Secondly, the detention power will be available only to a PCO working at a contracted-out prison. Thirdly, we propose that the PCO will have the power to require a visitor to wait with him or her only when that officer has reason to believe that an offence against section 39, 40 or 42 of the 1952 Act has been committed, or that the person has attempted, incited or aided and abetted such an offence.
Finally, we propose limiting the period of detention permitted under the clause to what is necessary to allow a police officer to attend the prison and take over the arrest of the suspected offender. To remove any ambiguity that that test might create, we have provided that the period of detention should not exceed, as the hon. and learned Gentleman has said, two hours in any event. The two-hour period was chosen to allow reasonable time for the police to get to a remotely located prison at peak times. Consequently, detention under the two-hour power would be, we hope, very much the exception rather than the rule.
In our view, the time limitation and the requirement that there be reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed ensure that any detention under the clause either does not engage or is entirely compatible with article 5 of the European convention on human rights. To ensure that the power to detain is fully effective in those circumstances where it is needed, the clause also makes it an offence to attempt to make off from such a period of detention and allows for reasonable force to be exercised in support of the detention.