Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment No. 56, in clause 39, page 22, line 18, leave out ‘two’ and insert ‘four’.

Christopher Chope (Christchurch, Conservative)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 57, in clause 39, page 22, line

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

We now come to an interesting part of the Bill. The Minister has indicated that he will respond, so we hope that he has been refreshed by his break and we look forward to hearing what he has to say. If we are to believe contributions that the Committee has already heard from witnesses and Back Benchers, as well as from Back Benchers on Second Reading, there is plenty of scope for amendment and reconsideration by the Government of this part of the Bill.

A couple of amendments to the clause have been tabled. I will not steal the thunder of hon. Gentlemen representing the Liberal Democrats, who have more fundamental objections than we do to the concept of an elected executive, but I will be interested to join the debate on the next set of clauses. There is plenty of generic interest in the measures.

Perhaps the most difficult thing that the Minister will have to deal with is the sense that this is a top-down reform. For all the Government’s talk about devolving power and giving people more responsibility locally, the clause is another example that shows that the Bill is intended confine local government to a particular set of models at the Government’s insistence. From what we have already heard in relation to previous clauses from colleagues on both sides of the Committee, there is a feeling of concern that goes to the heart of what we talked about during the witness session, which is the sense outside of a degree of separation between the elected and those who elected them, and a concern that there is control from the top down. That sits uncomfortably in a mass participative democracy, in which people every day have more and more opportunity to express their views. The approach that the Minister is taking to the Bill on the back of the White Paper is not quite doing what he would like it to do. I think that we will have a number of discussions on a similar theme.

The limitations of participative democracy have been illustrated over the past few days, as we have seen the interest taken by the general public in the opportunity to petition No. 10. They have taken that opportunity in great numbers, only to have their desire for involvement slapped down by the very people who created the opportunity. There are people out there who are involved and interested, who want to say to the Government, “There are more ways of doing things than you are letting us believe, and your attempt to nanny us and corral us strikes us as an attitude of concern.”

The amendments are relatively small and I will not go into the larger issues affecting the concept of elected executives until we debate the next set of clauses. The amendments propose increasing from three to five the number of councillors who can be involved in the executive, so that the leader of a council would operate with four or more councillors, instead of the two or more councillors suggested in the Bill.

The spirit of the amendment is clear. It is recognition of the sense that things are more likely go wrong in a local authority when matters have been held by a small  group of people and not disseminated to the rest of the council than when more people are involved. We maintain that a group of three people, invested with executive authority in a system that does not involve a directly elected mayor, is too small.

That should appeal to the Government’s general sense of control. In theory a group of one is by far the best number to make decisions—preferably the Secretary of State in a Labour Government. How easy decisions are in those circumstances. Great debates can be held. The issues can be examined fairly and objectively and weighed up and of course, the right decision will inevitably be reached. In the real world, however, more people have to be involved in decision making. I am reminded of the story about John F. Kennedy’s dinner for Nobel laureates at the White House. He stood up to address the dinner and said:

“I think this is the most extraordinary collection of talent, of human knowledge, that has ever been gathered together at the White house, with the possible exception of when Thomas Jefferson dined alone.”

In theory, one can create a special model where a very small number of people may hold control, but unless those people are exceptional it is usually wiser to expand the group. Just two or more councillors, as under the Bill, are not sufficient. We have tabled our amendment, which would make it four or more councillors, to diffuse that executive control. There is a greater risk of cabals when there are only three councillors. When things go wrong in local councils, it is usually caused by a small number of people acting in a clique, often in one-party areas where over time corruption has got in. The smaller the number of people making the decision, the easier it is for such problems to arise.

Andrew Stunell (Shadow Secretary of State for the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Communities and Local Government), Department for Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)

I have been following the hon. Gentleman’s argument carefully. I think I understand it well. Does it lead him to the conclusion that a mayoral system is potentially more open to corruption than other systems?

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

There has to be a check on the power of the elected mayor. Certain safeguards are built in about how much power a mayor has when dealing with a local council elected at the same time and to which he must refer. It is the concentration of executive authority that is worrying. There is a balance to be struck. There are some cases where the public have spoken and directly elect a mayor. The mayor is subject to ultimate accountability by the people and in some cases we want to try that model, provided that the public have an opportunity to express their support and to change that system.

Another of our concerns about the Bill is that it is too much of a one-way street and does not give people enough power to move back from a system that they find uncomfortable. There is always the issue of the concentration of individual power, but directly electing a mayor and the way in which a directly elected mayor must work with the rest of his team make that less likely.

Peter Soulsby (Leicester South, Labour)

Does not the hon. Gentleman accept that it is the strength of the checks and the  scrutiny that are most important, rather than the numbers of those who are being checked and scrutinised?

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

No, it is a balance between the two. There is a real danger in having a group of only three invested with the powers. Widening the number to five seems a better balance between scrutiny and numbers than the Bill’s provisions.

There was much discussion on Second Reading and among witnesses of the sense that councillors were out of the loop. We will discuss that more when we get around to considering whether there should be an option to allow authorities to go back to a committee system or an enhanced committee system if they want. We will support the amendments moved at that time to ensure that local authorities are given that option. Much of the evidence from witnesses and many of the comments made by Members expressed concern that in local government people came on to councils, but then found that they were out of the loop and not involved, so they did not stay long. They did not feel that the council was something in which they could participate. The smaller the number of people invested with authority, the more likely that is to be the case.

The amendment is a simple, straightforward mechanism to widen the number of people involved; it is safer to have five rather than three. I hope that the Minister will consider the amendment appropriate to the spirit of the Bill, as it would increase the number of people involved in executive authority and involve more people in participatory local democracy.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

Thank you, Mr. Chope. I also thank the hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire for the manner in which he has spoken to his amendment, which strikes at the heart of what three of the amendments in the group seek to do. It gives me a good opportunity to explain the Government’s thinking on the executive arrangements.

Members have referred to the Bill as devolutionary. It is indeed a devolutionary Bill, and it is a decentralising Bill. However, I place caveats on that, on behalf not only of the Government, but of Parliament. One could take a completely devolutionary attitude and say that it is up to a council to make its own government arrangements and to do whatever it wants, but Parliament would want some limits to that.

The hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire made a point about political disconnection, which also featured on Second Reading. As well as devolving power, we believe that it is equally important that local authorities are given power over significant sums of public money that cover not only local authority spending, but strategic direction over other public spending in the area through the duty to co-operate that the Bill provides, and through the local area agreement process on which it builds. Strong leadership is not merely a phrase or propaganda slogan. Strong leadership, or what can best enhance strong leadership, goes alongside the devolutionary powers.

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

While we are on the philosophy and strategy behind the Bill, I fully understand the reason why local authorities are the creation of Parliament  and primary legislation, but is not the problem that because the public have become concerned about the centralisation of power—a process in which the Conservatives have played their part over the past 20 years—

Robert Syms (Shadow Minister (Local Government), Communities and Local Government; Poole, Conservative)

A small part.

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

How good it is to have a colleague who gets to the nub of the issue at just the right moment.

The issue now presents a different problem for Government. It is not only about the curtailing of central power to make sure that local government works, but about bending over a little further and taking a bit more risk to allow the public the sense that centralism is genuinely being withdrawn. When they see the Government’s desire to enforce leadership structures, the public do not feel that that necessary risk is being taken. That point is at the heart of the clauses that deal with executive arrangements.

[Mr. Joe Bentonin the Chair]

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Benton.

The hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire makes an important point about philosophy. I was trying to describe the process. It is necessary and right for Parliament and Government to set a framework. Obviously, we are discussing the best model and the best series of options for local councils. If we reflect on a previous debate about all-out elections and elections by thirds, we can see that strong leadership can be provided by either system. That was the most persuasive argument as far as the Government are concerned, which is why the Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon, responded as she did.

To add force to my argument: so important does my party think that council leadership is that it is mentioned on page 107 of our manifesto. I can claim, too, a spectrum of political support for strong leadership, although not necessarily using the boundaries in the models that we have proposed. I often refer in public to the examples of Manchester and Kent where, whatever one’s views on party politics in those areas, there has undoubtedly been strong leadership, not just of the council as an institution, but of the place being represented—that is the crucial point. The leader of Manchester council is the leader of that city, not just of the council. I would argue the same for Kent—I use that area because it is a bipartisan example, but I could probably think of some for the Liberal Democrat party, too. In fact, I am desperately trying to do so.

Andrew Stunell (Shadow Secretary of State for the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Communities and Local Government), Department for Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)

I am sure that Liverpool was on the tip of the Minister’s tongue. I draw his attention to the fact that, of his examples of strong leadership, one council was elected by thirds and the other by an all-out election, so I hope he will take back his comments.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

That was exactly my point and why I responded as I did when I pointed the Committee to the answer given by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary. The criteria would be met, not of devolution, but of an executive and electoral governance model that can provide strong leadership to satisfy the hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire, and achieve his goal of better connection, which I think is shared by the whole Committee.

I do not suppose that you will allow me, Mr. Benton, to go into the history of the centralising forces of local government, so I shall not do so.

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

Just cover the last 10 years.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

It was the 1945 Government who nationalised the utilities and did most to take financial powers from local government. But hey ho! Herefordshire—I think—is joining its primary care trust and local authority budgets. That is a significant move back from the other great centralising measure against local government—the national health service.

I shall set out the proposed legal changes because authorities and their executive officers will look at this debate, and before responding to the amendment, I shall comment on clause 39 more generally. It provides for changes to the executive arrangements that local authorities in England can adopt—the provisions refer to England only—and does so by amending section 11 of the Local Government Act 2000, which provides that the executive of a local authority shall take one of three forms: a mayor and cabinet executive, a leader and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive.

For the record, in Wales, all things being equal, those three forms of executive arrangement will remain unchanged, subject to any future decisions by the Welsh Assembly and parliamentary approval of this Bill. Clause 39 will provide for those three models in England: a mayor and cabinet executive, a leader and cabinet executive or an elected executive, which we will come on to when we debate the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove.

The arrangements for a mayor and cabinet executive will be the same as they are at present. A person will be elected mayor of an authority and will then appoint two or more councillors of the authority to make up the executive. That is the case at the moment. Changes to the arrangements for a leader and cabinet executive made by clause 39 will strengthen the role of the leader of the council. As happens now, the council will elect a councillor to be the leader of that authority, but whereas the existing legislation allows the executive to be appointed by the leader or the council, in future, that decision will be in the hands of the leader only.

The Bill puts the executive power of the authority in its constitution into the office of the leader. In practice, whether a council is run by majority control or is subject to arrangements if there is no overall control, the process will not change much, if at all, in how the leader is chosen and how his or her power is exercised. The clause provides for the executive power to be in the hands of the person who is accountable to the public  through the overview and scrutiny arrangements, an important point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, South. Those arrangements are the other side of the coin and are not covered in these clauses.

The other significant change is that in future English authorities will no longer be able to adopt the mayor and council manager model of executive. I correct my background briefing paper, which says that there is little support for such a model: there is no support for that model. The intention was to provide for strong executive power to be put in the hands of a mayor and his or her council manager when circumstances required it. In England, there is only one such example: the fine city of Stoke-on-Trent. That is why I made the recent ministerial statement to Parliament and why I am engaged in discussions with Stoke-on-Trent about the interim arrangements should we pass the Bill.

As I said, there is little or no enthusiasm for the model, which has the effect of concentrating power in the hands of an unelected official. Instead, we will make available the option of an elected executive whereby the whole executive is directly elected by the electorate of a council area. We may return to that point later.

The changes develop further the executive arrangements introduced in the 2000 Act, which have done much to speed up and improve the transparency and accountability of the decision-making process. The proposed changes draw on the lessons of research into governance and delivery in local councils, which shows strongly that the single biggest factor driving local government performance is effective and dynamic leadership. The need for such leadership can only grow; the ambitious agenda in which local authorities develop a clear local vision for the future of their area and have the ability to work with the partners we described in the Bill to shape their local economies and social and environmental circumstances can happen only if there is strong, stable and visible leadership.

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

The Minister is touching on issues that are covered in the White Paper under the heading “Stronger leadership” in paragraphs 3.15 onwards, which discuss the research he mentioned and the stronger leadership and effectiveness of leadership models. However, paragraph 3.17 states that

“many local authorities have adopted a cautious approach to change.”

Has the Minister or his Department done any research on why, in councils dragging their feet and allowing their feet to do the talking, councils have expressed a preference for not doing things his way? We come back to the sense of giving councils the choice to do things rather than forcing models on them. Why does the Minister think that the councils have been so reluctant?

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

Like the hon. Gentleman, I suspect, I have never believed that radicalism and structural change are the same thing. Some of the best councils have a traditional model of leadership. The Audit Commission’s comprehensive performance assessment scores for the current round will be made available later this week. There is no necessary cause and effect between an executive model and strong leadership; it can depend on the individuals involved and the body  politic. New York is often quoted as an example of strong leadership with a mayoral model. Under Giuliani, arguably, it was, but it also went bankrupt under the same electoral model—or nearly bankrupt, but I will not go there. I am not saying necessarily that there is a cause and effect, but I am trying to create the circumstances in which that would be most likely.

Secondly, I believe that the Government are not, as the hon. Gentleman implied, imposing a model. We are trying to give a range of options within a framework within which strong leadership is most likely to come about.

Alison Seabeck (PPS (Rt Hon Geoff Hoon, Minister of State), Foreign & Commonwealth Office; Plymouth, Devonport, Labour)

On the options that are going to be made available, most members of this Committee will have been lobbied by a number of groups, including the Local Government Information Unit, which expressed concerns that the Government have ruled out an option whereby the councillors themselves can choose to elect the executive. Would my hon. Friend be good enough to explain why that option was not favoured?

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

In practice, a council will be able to do that. The changes that we are making put the statutory executive power of the council into the hands of the office of the leader of the council. The process by which the council leader and the executive are appointed will, I imagine, be in practice as it is at the moment, through the decision of the majority group and the delegation of power to that leader and his or her executive.

What, therefore, is the purpose of suggesting this change? It is to ensure accountability. It is accountability for the policies and the delivery of the council and, crucially, accountability for the policy and delivery of the council’s services and activities through its partner organisations. They involve huge sums of money and require such accountability. With devolution—and this is an important point at the heart of the Bill—comes responsibility. To ensure that responsibility, it is quite right that accountability to the electorate and the back-bench councillors is there, more so than is currently the arrangement where there is a greater balance of accountability through the Audit Commission process and through Whitehall powers.

Bob Neill (Bromley & Chislehurst, Conservative)

The Minister will also be alert to the comments of the Local Government Information Unit that leadership does not necessarily mean the leader. My particular concern is this: he will have seen the submission from the Commission for Racial Equality, particularly paragraph 11, which expresses concern that the proposed mayoral or elected executive model would make even worse the current under-representation of ethnic minorities at council leadership or cabinet member level. Is not a cabinet of at least five, with opportunities for a leader to balance portfolios to reflect diverse communities, better than one of three?

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

One of the interesting political and policy developments as a result of the Bill is the failure of central and national bodies to realise that when we say we are devolving, we mean it. If Mr. Trevor Phillips  writes to me about that point, I will redirect him to send his letter to the leader of a council. It is the council that will have to take such decisions and be accountable for them. I can see circumstances in which the hon. Gentleman is right and where there is a fall away in diversity among executives. If that happens, who is it that should hold that decision to account? Is it me, or more likely, my successor, or the electorate and the elected councillors of that area? I know what is more likely to be effective; I believe that it would be the people and the elected executive.

John Pugh (Shadow Minister, Health; Southport, Liberal Democrat)

Assuming a scenario in which a leader is appointed, and he then appoints, with the tacit agreement of the council, an executive, is it possible during his term of office for him to change entirely that cabinet or executive, perhaps even picking people from a different political party and for the council to be powerless to do anything about that?

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

It is possible, as is the case at the moment. There are councils in which executive power is shared even when a majority group is in control. On Second Reading, we had a debate about East Riding. The hon. Member for Beverley and Holderness (Mr. Stuart) intervened, and I pointed out that East Riding was—at the time he was referring to—a very successful Tory-Labour coalition. That coalition now involves the Liberal Democrats and the independents as well. To answer the hon. Member for Southport, that circumstance arises because of the accountability that the council feels to the local electorate, particularly when geographical areas within the local authority have different political traditions. Many members of the Committee will be familiar with that. Therefore, such accountability is more likely to come forward in those circumstances.

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

We do not wish to hear talk about the hon. Gentleman’s successor. May the king live for ever. He deserves it.

I want to bring the hon. Gentleman back to his earlier comment about the models of leadership and his not believing that he was offering a prescriptive model. I bring him back to my central contention—I do not think that others see it as he and the Government see it. The LGA brief states:

“The aim of the executive arrangements is clearly to enable strong leadership. While we support that objective, we believe that there is no single model or set of models suitable everywhere. Councils should have the discretion to put in place arrangements to suit their circumstances, including exploring new types of arrangements not currently on the face of the Bill.”

The LGA does not feel that it is having a free and open choice even though the Minister believes he is not being prescriptive about strong leadership. I ask him to reconsider the point that the nature of the Bill is less devolutionary than he thinks it is.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He referred to the LGA brief. I think what I said previously—and certainly what I intended to say—was that the Bill was not unduly prescriptive. It  is quite right that there are limits to the devolution. One could envisage circumstances in which some authorities may go for a kibbutz-type of executive arrangements or perhaps even rolling referendums by text message every day. Some of the proposals that I have seen—

Andrew Stunell (Shadow Secretary of State for the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Communities and Local Government), Department for Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)

Petitions on websites?

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman chides me by saying petitions. His party would try to govern the country—God forbid if it was ever given the opportunity—by decision through petition. That would mean contradictory decisions every hour of the day. I was not going to mention which party was responsible for some of the local authority governance models that would result in the clogging up of decisions. One can imagine what I am talking about.

I am teasing the hon. Gentleman, but there is a serious point. If one was serious about devolving power over executive decisions and public finances without putting conditions on what executive arrangements there should be, the majority of authorities would opt for an indirectly elected leader and executive. In practice, the process of choosing that leader and executive will be the same as it is at the moment. However, there is an important change on accountability, which strikes at the heart of what the hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve when he talks about reconnecting or connecting executives with the public. That is why I refer to being unduly prescriptive.

Regarding the new types of executive models, we again have to strike a balance between allowing authorities to make innovative suggestions and not allowing the irresponsible devolution of powers. As we will consider later, the directly elected executive model, one of the three options in the Bill, has come from local authorities. It did not come directly from the debates within the Department, but from within the local authority family.

Andrew Stunell rose—

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

I will give way once more but, Mr. Benton, I think that you will insist that I address the amendment, which is what I am meant to be speaking about.

Andrew Stunell (Shadow Secretary of State for the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Communities and Local Government), Department for Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)

I am interested in the point that the Minister has just made about the model coming from local government. Does he recall the look of bafflement on the face of the LGA deputation when they were asked where the model had come from and what the arguments in favour of it were?

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

I have seen a look of bafflement on the faces of members of the LGA on many occasions—worthy body that it is.

I can but repeat the fact that the idea of directly elected executives came from local councils throughout the political spectrum. On the one hand, I am accused of heavy handed centralism, while on the other I am  criticised for taking an open, devolutionary approach. However, I guess that that comes with the territory.

The amendment would restrict councils’ range of options for the size of their executive when they choose to operate either a leader and cabinet executive or an elected executive. In the case of a leader and cabinet executive in England, the range of options is the same as the 2000 Act already provides for the existing leader and cabinet model. It is also along the same lines as the elected executive model. I listened carefully to the arguments made by the hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire for increasing the minimum size of an executive to five from the current three. In essence, all the arguments are judgments about what we think may be appropriate in particular circumstances.

In some circumstances, five might be appropriate. In other circumstances, it may be eight or four. One of the things that I have learned in this job is just how important geography is to a local authority and to how decisions are taken. Let us consider the example of Cornwall, which is a significant geographical area, and compare it with the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Denton and Reddish in Tameside. The geography—let alone the history and culture—changes how decisions are made and rightly so, which means that models of accountability must have flexibility. There is a fine line.

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

The Minister’s argument suggests that executives should be larger rather than smaller to deal with such matters.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

My argument concludes that greater flexibility is required. We are teasing out some paradoxes. Here I am again being devolutionary—let them choose.

The hon. Gentleman made a serious point about corruption. He referred to circumstances in which corruption would be more likely if there were only a small number of people. I acknowledge the common sense of that view, but I refer him to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, South that accountability and scrutiny by the council and councillors individually and, of course, the probity of the officers protect us all against corruption in local government. The numbers that we propose under the Bill are the same as the existing circumstances. I am sure all Members join me in welcoming the probity of our local government, which in 99.9 per cent. of cases has proved to be very trustworthy. I am sure that the hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire would join me in acknowledging that point.

The judgment is balanced, but greater flexibility is important. I want to put on record some of the principles behind the clause. Those that underpin the executive arrangements under the Local Government Act 2000 and the Bill are important. The Act provided for the first time a separation of the executive of the council and what is called the back bench of the council. I do not think it is appropriate to use a parliamentary term in respect of a council, but I am sure that members of the Committee will acknowledge the difference.

The 2000 Act provided that most council decisions were to be taken by a small number of high-profile,  visible councillors whom the public recognised as responsible for those decisions, rather than through the previous committee structure, which I do not believe was transparent, visible or accountable to the public. That was done to make it clear to the public who within the council was responsible for those decisions. It was also done to speed up decision making and to enable councils to give more effective leadership for their areas.

Again, that is important in the context of the Bill. It is not just a question of speeding up decisions for the sake of it, or at the expense of consultation or accountability. It is important for the coming together of local authorities and their partners that decisions can be taken effectively and speedily. The biggest single complaint against local authorities from the private, voluntary and community sectors is the lack of effective decision making.

Peter Soulsby (Leicester South, Labour)

Does my hon. Friend accept that his point about the division between the executive and scrutiny is actually an argument for restricting the maximum size of the executive rather than the minimum size? Problems with the status and effectiveness of scrutiny are often a reflection of the perception—at the least—that all the most effective members of a local authority manage to become members of the executive and that scrutiny is undertaken by those who are left out.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

My hon. Friend raises an important point. My argument is against the amendment, the consequence of which could be interpreted as he said. Greater flexibility is what is important. It is sensible to have a maximum—I think that the figure is 10. Again, there is a balance.

The idea behind the 2000 Act was to make executive decision making more visible, more transparent and therefore more accountable, as well as to speed it up. The Act also did something equally important that the Bill builds upon, which was to provide for overview and scrutiny to hold the executive to account and to facilitate policy development in the local authority. The overview and scrutiny process does not merely scrutinise. It can take up reports, investigate and make recommendations to the council like our own parliamentary Select Committees. Despite the pain they can sometimes cause a Government, it is acknowledged by Governments and the House that they are a valuable part of our democratic process.

In building overview and scrutiny—one councillor described it at the Birmingham conference as overscrew and mutiny, which I took as a compliment to the concept—we are building on the 2000 Act in the Bill. We see it as an evolution, admitting that the council manager problem has not worked out as intended. We seek to develop further the governance framework for councils, both as regards the executive and—as we shall see when we come to overview and scrutiny later in the Bill—so that we can facilitate councils’ delivery of the strong, effective and accountable leadership needed to shape the areas they represent and not just the institutions of which they are the executive controllers, as well as their delivery of higher quality and responsive public services. One key point about leadership of local authorities is the ability to work  with other partners from the business, voluntary and public sectors to make a joint effort to implement strategies. That is why executive models are so important in the new local government era.

I think I have answered the points that the hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire made. He talked about the nature of participative democracy as opposed to representative democracy, and one must strike a balance, whether through the Bill’s measures to facilitate people’s involvement or not. It is obviously important to us all that actions or explanations for inaction are given in response to public involvement.

The point behind the Government’s thinking is that although opportunities for involvement and for influencing decisions are crucial, we cannot allow participative democracy to replace representative democracy. That would lead to a lack of decision making. It is a tribute to the hon. Gentleman’s imagination that the idea of increasing two to four on an executive was turned into a fundamental political philosophical debate, despite the fact that he directly contradicted the contribution from the hon. Member for Poole. However, I guess that they have to probe.

I hope that I have provided the Committee with an explanation of the Government’s thinking, and I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Benton.

The debate has been an interesting, and I am grateful for the way in which the Minister has dealt with it, but his imagination is running riot if he thought a contradiction was emerging between my hon. Friend the Member for Poole and me.

The Champagne moment this morning came from the Minister spreading open his arms and saying, “I am going to be devolutionary. Let them choose”. I shall remind him of those words when we discuss other models of council leadership. However, for now, I appreciate the debate, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Andrew Stunell (Shadow Secretary of State for the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Communities and Local Government), Department for Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)

I beg to move amendment No. 38, in clause 39, page 22, line 28, leave out subsection (6).

Christopher Chope (Christchurch, Conservative)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 39, in clause 40, page 23, leave out line 19.

No. 40, in clause 40, page 23, leave out line 36.

No. 41, in clause 41, page 26, leave out line 13.

No. 43, in clause 41, page 28, leave out lines 10 to 15.

No. 45, in clause 41, page 29, leave out line 33.

Andrew Stunell (Shadow Secretary of State for the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Communities and Local Government), Department for Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)

I shall start by dealing with the question of strong leadership. Everybody in the room is in favour of strong leadership; the alternative would be to be in favour of weak leadership. Similarly, we are all in favour of good government, because the alternative is to be in favour of bad government. The Minister introduced the idea that we should be in  favour of good devolution, rather than bad devolution, or as he put it, irresponsible devolution. I sign up to strong and good against bad and weak. Let us be quite clear about that.

The amendments would remove the proposal for an elected executive. I welcome what the Minister had to say about the continuation of the existing executive model. It, of course, contradicted the Bill, but it was good to hear that there will be no change. There will be a four-year term and increased accountability, but councils will be free to wangle the new rules that the Government impose on them, so that they can carry on as they do at present. Accountable turns into fixed as normal.

At the heart of the Government’s proposals there is confusion based on the complete misconception that strong leadership must mean strongly centralised leadership. The elected executive proposal provides a clear example of that confusion. The Minister referred to the examples of Kent and of Manchester. I might have mentioned Somerset and Liverpool. All sorts of examples show that neither the leadership model, nor the electoral system, or anything tangible in the Bill, leads to a significant difference in the performance of councils. Neither the number of stars councils get, nor what Ofsted thinks about them—or any of the factors that the Government routinely take into account to judge councils’ performance—are affected, either for the better or the worse, by the leadership models under which they function. That is not to say that there is no diversity in the performance of two councils with the same leadership model. Despite all the praying in aid of strong leadership for the model under discussion, it falls to bits if it is considered seriously.

The debate on clause 41 will probably go more to the heart of our criticism of the Bill than will the discussion on this group of amendments, which are designed to remove one of the models that the Minister is proposing. When we get to that clause, I shall argue that, in the spirit of devolution—with open arms, as the Minister so clearly demonstrated with his body language—we should be aiming for internal self-government for local authorities. We should have as many different models as possible with the minimum of prescription. Incidentally, I would not have supported the Conservative amendment, because it would have restricted councils’ freedom and ability to decide what to do.

I am surprised and disappointed that the Government are withdrawing the town manager model. It is okay to say that there is no support for it, but what is wrong with leaving it on the books so that a local authority can consider it as a possibility? The Minister may ask why, if I am saying that, do I want to get rid of the elected executive model? I should explain that I want to do so because it is operationally fundamentally flawed and unworkable. The Minister has had difficulty picking a solitary local authority that wanted the system. One was provided for him in the evidence session; it turned out to be Stockton. The response of the LGA representatives was, “Well, we do not have a whipping system in the LGA, so Stockton can think what it likes”—with “However daft it is” in square brackets. That must have been a powerful piece  of evidence for the former Secretary of State, who has a constituency in the neighbourhood. However, it was not a powerful piece of evidence for the current Secretary of State, whose constituency is in the metropolitan borough of Bolton, which has no overall majority of members at the moment and has had changing leadership over the past three years.

We need to consider carefully the proposed model and what is wrong with it. It is unworkable in the most basic way. Some of the problems will be illustrated when we get to clause 41. A recent Conservative amendment would have restricted the size of the executive. Under the directly elected executive model, the size of the executive would have been predetermined before the process got to the ballot box. That means that it is not open to a Conservative party to say that it believes in a limited, small number or, perhaps—having just heard its views in the debate—a large number. Perhaps it would want a 14 or 15 executive member system—following what the hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire said—as the way the authority should be led in future. It would not be open to a Labour party, perhaps with a more centralist view or a mini-mayor model, to say that it wanted a slate with two members on. What is wrong in practical, working terms, is the predetermination of the slate size, which cannot be a matter of electoral competition between the parties.

Other problems include the fact that, if the leader of a council goes under the executive model, all the members of the executive are immediately dismissed. I wonder whether the Government have considered what would happen if the leader was hit by a bus a fortnight before the council was to take a budget decision and all the executive members were taken out. There will be no opportunity to change elected members who are not up to the job—no crop rotation. If we have a Home Office situation—I do not wish to wallow in the Government’s grief on that—it will be impossible to move an executive member who is failing in the job or has become discontented with their lot. Of course there are all sorts of problems because, as has been mentioned, it is not automatic that the party with the largest number of votes in an area gets the largest number of seats. That is interesting in my borough of Stockport, where it has happened on a number of occasions.

That brings us to the matter of running elections for the council at the same time as those for the elected executive. Using rational thought, it seems to me that the leading councillors from each political group will be in the slates for the executive. One of those slates will be elected—let us say for argument that it is the Labour slate—at which point the executive members’ council seats will become vacant and there will be a set of by-elections to replace them. In an authority such as Tameside, where there is a regular, substantial majority of Labour voters in most wards, perhaps that would not be a problem. However, one can perfectly well see that in a large number of other places—I could speculate on where they might be—the subsequent by-elections would result in non-Labour members being elected and the majority of the Labour administration being lost.

All those issues are straightforward and practical, and the current model completely fails to address them.  There is also the small matter of the change in political composition that takes place anyway as time goes on. Some 30 per cent. of local authorities currently have no overall control and 40 per cent. have experienced such a period in the past eight years. When we reach clause 41, I shall argue that it is void for want of certainty. It is impossible to tell how it will work or is intended to work and what its outcome will be, other than that all the predictions suggest it will be error-prone and prone to catastrophic failure because of the Government’s inability to say precisely what they believe should happen in each case. None of the situations in question is dealt with in the Bill.

In the spirit of our earlier debate, I ask the Minister to reconsider the matter, reintroduce it in the Lords if that is what he wishes to do and make some connection between people who know how local government works and the person holding a quill pen who wrote the words in the Bill. The clause is fundamentally and completely unworkable. That brings me back to my first point: if the Government wish to introduce more and more different models that councils can opt into, that is fine by me. I do not have a problem with it, nor does my party. However, just as they have now decided that they made a serious mistake with the town manager model for Stoke, which they have withdrawn, they have the opportunity to recognise the serious mistake they are making on this occasion before they make it. They can have another go at introducing a model that makes practical sense for local authority management and leadership.

I could wax lyrical and longer, but I have made my point as clearly and explicitly as I can. The model is unworkable and would be completely catastrophic for any local authority. Unless the Government can satisfy us on a number of issues, it is clear that they or their successors will come back to us and say, “It’s like Stoke mark 2. We screwed up and we want to take it away.”

Bob Neill (Bromley & Chislehurst, Conservative)

I am interested in the observations of the hon. Member for Hazel Grove and I have a lot of sympathy with him, gained from my own experience in local government and from talking to other people. I would prefer that the Government did not prescribe the governance system for councils at all. I would prefer that it was left for them to decide in a broadly devolutionary fashion, but if the Government are going to do it, they should get it right.

It is noteworthy that a range of the written submissions made to the Committee highlight exactly the same sort of practical concerns as those the hon. Gentleman has just described. The Local Government Association raised that concern and the submission from Unlock Democracy went into considerable detail about the practical implications. I do not want to repeat what the hon. Gentleman has said, but there seems to be a real concern here. The elected executive is a peculiar combination of a strong mayor model on the one hand and the traditional executive leader and cabinet that we are becoming used to on the other.

I see the logic of the strong mayor model. It is not always appropriate but one sees the logic of adopting the American pattern of one directly elected figurehead, with some separation between the elected mayor and the council that scrutinises him. In a Committee considering a different Bill, I criticised the  way we have not followed that logic through in London. Under those circumstances, there is an argument for the mayor’s executive being separate from the council. That is what happens in New York where there is a system of deputy mayors who are not members of the city council. They form a legislature cum scrutiny body.

An interesting idea for a directly elected mayor of London in the future would be to have a slate and deputy mayors rather than some of the other bodies, but that is not what we have now. The directly elected executive takes the worst of that system—it removes the executive from the membership of the council—but does not have the benefit of the strong, single political figurehead with the strong electoral mandate that one has in the New York or London style systems. It falls between two stools. That is very dangerous.

I am just about old enough to have been elected to a London borough at a time when it still had something that was referred to colloquially as the aldermanic by-elections. There was a period when councillors elected a certain number of aldermen and there were frequently by-elections to fill their places.

Patrick Hall rose—

Bob Neill (Bromley & Chislehurst, Conservative)

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman remembers that.

Patrick Hall (Bedford, Labour)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Does he think that the directly elected executive, whether or not there is support for it around the country, does not have a leader? I think it does.

Bob Neill (Bromley & Chislehurst, Conservative)

It certainly has a leader, but it is undesirable to decouple the members of the executive from membership of the council in the way that is proposed here and create by-elections. Although the leader has some status, it is not the same in terms of public perception and electoral legitimacy as that of a mayor. In the New York scenario it would be “Vote for Bloomberg for mayor” together with a list of his nominees for deputy mayor. It is not the same in practice. That is the real problem here.

In the days when there were by-elections to fill vacancies created when councillors were appointed to be aldermen, the turnout was usually minuscule. About a month after the main election for councillors one would try to persuade people to go out and vote again. Frequently turnout was down to about 10 per cent., which did nothing for democracy. The point is well made by the hon. Member for Hazel Grove. We have seen it in by-elections to this House when Ministers have been sent to the House of Lords, such as Lord Whitelaw of Penrith and others.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

You lost that seat.

Bob Neill (Bromley & Chislehurst, Conservative)

Exactly. The electorate sometimes react against what they perceive to be a needless by-election. Funnily enough, the Government are creating a needless hostage to electoral fortune in requiring councils to go through that process. It is no good the  leader of the council explaining that he did not want to have these by-elections to fill the places of members who are now members of his executive but that the Government require him to do so. That will not cut much ice with voters who wonder why on earth they will have to go through the rigmarole again a matter of weeks after they had had just done so. I think it would damage the credibility of the electoral system.

Secondly, I do not think it is desirable for the elected members in this system not to be people with constituents and constituencies. That is the difference: with the mayoral system, everybody seems to understand the separation of powers. The proposed system seems to hover between the two; it does not quite go the whole hog of the separation of powers on the American model, which might be intellectually justifiable, but produces some of the downsides without some of the benefits.

The point is also made about how important it is, if we are going to have somebody who is called the leader of the capital, that that person can demonstrate to the electors and the residents of the borough or district that they command the confidence of the majority of the councillors. It is very difficult for them to work otherwise. If people want a directly elected mayor again, that is fair enough, as they do not require that because they have their independent mandate. However, to dilute that situation with the leader and the executive is undesirable. Things do happen—councils change control. A practical example comes from my part of the world. Control of the London borough of Bromley changed as a result of two by-elections between the council elections, not this time but the time before. From 1998 to 2001, there was a change of control. What would happen if we had had a leader and an executive ostensibly there for a four-year term, but the majority of the council had gone the other way? That clearly would not be sustainable. There has got to be proper provision to prevent that happening.

There is also a concern about the inability to shuffle the pack. When I was a councillor in the London borough of Havering, the leader of the council appointed the committee chairmen, and they effectively formed a Cabinet. There came points when we thought that is was appropriate within our four-year term to move members around, so somebody might have been chairman of the housing committee for a couple of years—it might have been four years, and passed through an election—and wanted to bring people on. Somebody might have said they were not going to stand again at the next election, and he might want to bring somebody forward to get into that portfolio in time to fight the next election. There is nothing to suggest how that would be possible under the present system. Those are exactly the practical, nitty-gritty bits of day-to-day local government practice which whoever drafted the current proposal does not seem to have taken on board. That is why I have real misgivings about the way the clause is currently drafted. I really think that the Government should think about it again.

John Pugh (Shadow Minister, Health; Southport, Liberal Democrat)

I think we are engaged in creating undue disharmony from over-prescription. I would like to  illustrate that with reference to my local authority, of which you and I, Mr. Benton, were members and, I think, leaders. I hope that we were strong leaders; I am sure that we were.

The current system in Sefton is that elections occur by thirds. The executive is established and it reflects the balance of the parties and the balance of the whole area. From square one, as long as there has been an executive, Sefton has had that system. We are very sensible, mature people who are capable of talking to one another, and habitually on the Cabinet, there has been a Tory leader, a Labour leader and a Lib Dem leader, with the Lib Dems currently leading the council—for obvious reasons, connected with electoral success. It does not lead to inefficiency: the Audit Commission and comprehensive performance assessment bear that out. It does not lead to hard decisions being dodged, and it does not lead to a lack of ability to work together. In fact, this year, the budget, which is normally agreed by two parties, was agreed by all three parties. What would be a nightmare in that situation would be an executive slate on a party basis. That would be profoundly distorting because of the political geography of Sefton. I am not sure that it is as politically diverse as Denton and Reddish, but it is certainly pretty diverse. Labour wins seats only in Bootle, and nobody else does, despite sincere trying from time to time, as you are all too clearly aware, Mr. Benton.

Central Sefton is a bit of a mix, and Labour never wins anything and never has in Southport. Whatever executive there were, including a directly elected executive on a party slate, it would necessarily be seen as a colonial power in some part of the borough. We could be saved by sticking with the status quo, although that is not quite the situation, and choose the option of leader and cabinet. Obviously, any leader in that sort of scenario would be very wise to appoint an all-party cabinet. However, as I understand it, there is nothing in arrangements currently before us that would prevent a clear-out by the leader, a quick change in the cabinet—rather like the Prime Minister from time to time changes his Cabinet—that destroys that balance, so reducing the authority to a state of comparative paralysis. Such things happen—if a leader went mad under the current four-year term arrangements, there would be little option other than to shoot him. There is an entirely workable and happy arrangement in Sefton, which operates consensually and satisfactorily whereas, under the Bill, we would be pinioned between two really quite unattractive alternatives.

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

When I first examined the clause, my approach was a permissive one—similar to that of the hon. Member for Hazel Grove, who said that he had had trouble with ruling things out of the Bill, because if people want a directly elected executive, we should let them have one. However, given the further remarks that have been made by both him and others, I feel that the Minister needs to do more if he is to satisfy the Committee that the proposal is a good one.

The Minister mentioned that the idea came from local authorities themselves, but we could do with a bit of evidence for that. Stockton was mentioned in the witness discussion, but I cannot see in the White Paper a long list of councils that have clamoured for the  proposal, and it would help if the Minister said where the push actually came from. The illustrations of practical flaws that have been given by those who have commented have been quite significant, and one wonders which council has missed them.

Let me pick out one of those flaws. It comes from one of the Minister’s party colleagues, so I think that he ought to answer it. Jeremy Beecham told the witness sitting of the Committee that he was unhappy with the proposal. He said:

“There is...a question as to why it is necessary for the executive not to be drawn...from elected councillors? Why do you have to treat them, as it were, as a class apart within the council?”——[Official Report, Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2007; c. 19.]

He made that point in answer to an issue that was raised by the hon. Member for Bedford about the involvement of councillors, and to illustrate that one could have all sorts of initiatives to involve councillors with a strong leadership model, and yet, despite that, the directly elected executive leadership model would produce a further barrier to involvement. Given that a colleague of the Minister offered that concern, the Minister might wish to think about it.

My second point is one that has cropped up on a number of occasions and was made by Unlock Democracy—the “one-way street” argument. The White Paper and the Bill presume that if the model adopted is that of a directly elected mayor or a directly elected executive, then that will be fixed and there will not be an opportunity to reconsider. That seems contrary to the spirit of devolution in which the Minister has set out.

The Minister has a tough set of questions to answer on the practical difficulties that have been raised by so many people connected with local government.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

I think particular praise should be given to you in your Chairman’s role, Mr. Benton, because obviously you had to remain neutral when the hon. Member for Southport made comments on your local council. The frozen look on your face was one that I wanted to put on record for the benefit of the readers of the Liverpool Echo. My mind boggles at where we could go on that.

Throughout the debate, including in the weeks and months preceding today, I have been surprised by the level of opposition from the hon. Member for Hazel Grove to the proposal. He has campaigned and spoken with some force, and I find that genuinely surprising. The idea for a directly elected executive, or a slate, came initially from Stockton council and has been considered by other authorities including, I believe, Cornwall and Durham county council. As I said during the previous debate, it is often the geography of a place that dictates the arrangements for best governance. I make my argument on this basis; the hon. Member for Hazel Grove has been almost passionate in his opposition to the model, and yet he claims that his approach is a permissive devolutionary one—if the model does not work, let Stockton worry about it. The hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire said we had got it wrong over the city manager model—no, Stoke council has said it does not want it and I will not tell Stoke that it has to have it.  That is perfectly permissive, but it passes the test of strong executive arrangements.

The hon. Member for Southport said that everything was hunky-dory in Sefton. Everything is not hunky-dory in Sefton. Your constituents, Mr. Benton, require good services, improvement in economic performance and regeneration. North Liverpool’s regeneration is the largest single infrastructure project in the United Kingdom, and it came about not because of strong leadership from Sefton council—I pay tribute to the hard work that the council does—but because of the intervention of the private sector and Government agencies. That is why it is happening.

We cannot accept that the status quo in all parts of the country is enough; we have a responsibility to ensure that the best models are in place. Regarding the directly elected model, I do not accept the argument that, on the one hand, we should be devolutionary and permissive and, on the other, because hon. Members do not like this particular model, it should not be allowed. That seems to be contradictory. If there are difficulties with that model, let us talk them through with the relevant local authorities.

I get the impression from Opposition Members that they do not accept the case that strong leadership matters.

Bob Neill (Bromley & Chislehurst, Conservative)

With respect to the Minister, does he accept that the thrust of the argument some of us are making is not that there is anything wrong with being devolutionary, but that it is the Government who have chosen to set up a particular menu from which councils must choose and therefore that it is incumbent on the Government to ensure that the menu includes options that are practically workable? That is my real concern.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

The hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire asked me to provide evidence of where the idea had come from, and I have done so.

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

You gave me three pieces of evidence.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

That makes it wrong?

Alistair Burt (Shadow Minister (Communities and Local Government), Communities and Local Government; North East Bedfordshire, Conservative)

No.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

Okay, so it does not make it wrong.

I will run out of time and I do not want to delay the Committee. Regarding the points that the hon. Gentleman has made about the comments by Sir Jeremy Beecham, I would give the same answer to Sir Jeremy Beecham as I have given to him. I do not think it is incumbent on me to respond to those points just because Sir Jeremy is in my party; it is incumbent on me to respond to the hon. Gentleman’s points because he is the Opposition spokesman.

Where the Government disagree with Sir Jeremy is that the model has come forward from local councils and it provides for a directly elected slate, which would offer visible and accountable leadership. There may be pragmatic problems in implementing it, but there are pragmatic problems in implementing any model of government. I am sure that, when our forefathers introduced the idea of ward councillors, they envisaged practical problems. However, in my view those problems can be overcome. The model is not a one-way street; it does provide for a reversal of the decision. The principle that underlies the arrangements in the Bill is that the method by which a leadership model is chosen is the method that can undo it, whether that be referendum or decision.

The hon. Member for Southport described the situation in Sefton. He could be absolutely right, but I would imagine that Sefton will not opt for this model, because of the reasons that the hon. Gentleman has given. The hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst displayed a centralising tendency, in effect saying, “Well, I will devolve as long as I like the model that is being given”. I do not accept that.

Bob Neill (Bromley & Chislehurst, Conservative)

As long as it works.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (Local Government & Community Cohesion), Department for Communities and Local Government; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman should trust the local electorate and the local authorities.