Schedule 1
Legal Services Bill [Lords]
12:00 pm
Bridget Prentice (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Lewisham East, Labour)
Now we may get to some of the more detailed disagreements on some of the principles in the Bill. The Committee knows that the Government have always advocated the importance of an independent Legal Services Board—independent from the Government, the judiciary and the legal profession. That is why we have arranged the Bill so that appointments are made in accordance with the code of practice of the Commissioner for Public Appointments.
It may be useful for me to set out the principles of the code: ministerial responsibility, merit, independent scrutiny, equal opportunities, probity, openness and transparency, and proportionality. The code follows the principles established by the Nolan Committee, of which we have heard already, and provides a sound and established basis for making appointments to public bodies. It sets out clear and independent appointments procedures. It does not prevent consultation with appropriate people, and the Government consider that the Lord Chief Justice would be an appropriate person in this context. However, there are good reasons why concurrence is not set out in the measure. Concurrence would give a person other than the Minister—in this case, the Minister is the Lord Chancellor—a casting vote, and in effect, a veto over the appointment of the person selected. Setting out a named person to whom the Lord Chancellor must give concurrence would be absolutely contrary to the principle of ultimate ministerial responsibility for appointments. It would remove the formal role of the Commissioner for Public Appointments—who, by the way, is appointed by the Queen—in the oversight and regulation of public appointments, and it would weaken parliamentary scrutiny. It would not be in the interests of anyone.
It is important that, before the Lord Chancellor can remove board members, conditions, which are set out in the Bill, must be met, including consultation with the chairman on their removal. The conditions provide strong statutory safeguards to prevent the abuse of that power, and it is important that the board is independent of the Government and the profession. Although the present Lord Chief Justice is and previous Lords Chief Justices have been independent, consumer groups have nevertheless been adamant in their concerns about the perception of a person with historical connections to the legal profession. Irrespective of the clear integrity of that office and the office holder, I would not want to damage consumer confidence by setting out a statutory requirement for concurrence in the way that the other place agreed.
We must provide for an independent board, and I can see no benefit at all in requiring the Lord Chancellor to seek the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. I have said over and again in meetings with the legal profession and with Members that I cannot imagine the appointment of such a person being undertaken without the Lord Chancellor listening to the views of appropriate people, of whom one is clearly the Lord Chief Justice. However, it is not right to give the Lord Chief Justice, who consumers rightly or wrongly perceive to be part of the legal profession, a veto over such an appointment.