Clause 13
Greater London Authority Bill
4:15 pm
Michael Gove (Shadow Minister (Housing), Communities and Local Government; Surrey Heath, Conservative)
This group of amendments, and the debate on the various clauses, relates to the budget functions of the Mayor and the assembly. The Minister has already acknowledged, in his discussion on clause 12, that we should have a clearer and more transparent division of the budget for the Mayor and the budget for the assembly. I do not need to rehearse at length the arguments about why that should be so. The Mayor’s functions are relatively clear. We have heard Labour Back Benchers talking about the importance of preserving the Mayor’s executive functions and heard from all parties about the importance of recognising the assembly’s specific scrutiny functions. At various points, we have sought—and will seek—to enhance the assembly’s scrutiny functions. So far, of course, every attempt to do so has been beaten back by the Government, but we will carry on regardless.
If the assembly is to ensure that its scrutiny functions are effectively safeguarded, it has to ensure that its budget for those functions is effectively safeguarded. We are concerned that the Bill gives the Mayor the potential power to pillage or ransack the budget for scrutiny. We are not suggesting that the current Mayor wishes to exercise it, but a future Mayor might.
The complex formula in the Bill will allow the assembly to permit its budget and the Mayor’s budget to expand in tandem. If the Mayor’s budget increases, the assembly’s budget can increase, but not by an amount greater than the Mayor’s. It seems broadly sensible that there should be a ceiling to the assembly’s budget. The assembly can never grow like Topsy, and its budget can grow only in proportion to the growth in the Mayor’s budget and in the functions that the Mayor and assembly bodies discharge.
So far, so good, but although there is a ceiling, there is no floor. The formula does not prevent the Mayor from reducing the assembly’s budget and paring it to the bone. It is entirely possible that a future Mayor, tiring of the effect of the scrutiny to which the assembly is subjecting his policies, might—with the help of lackeys in the assembly—seek to introduce a budget that would deprive the assembly of the necessary funding to discharge its duties.
Two different amendments seek to deal with that point—one in the names of myself and my hon. Friends and one in the names of the hon. Members for Carshalton and Wallington and for Lewes. My party’s amendment seeks to ensure that the assembly can effectively control where the floor is set. The amendment in the names of the hon. Members for Carshalton and Wallington and for Lewes proposes what I believe is called an envelope, such that the assembly’s budget cannot be reduced by more than any increase in the Mayor’s budget—you pays your money and you takes your choice. Naturally, we believe that our system would be superior, but I look forward to hearing the arguments of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington in favour of his system—his logic can sometimes be seductive. Both amendments are intended to ensure that the assembly’s budget is protected. Interested as I am in the Liberal Democrat arguments, I am even more interested in the Minister’s arguments as to why that protection should not exist. If one accepts the logic of having a ceiling, as we do, why not accept the logic of having a floor?
In the previous debate, one of our aims was to ensure that the assembly’s scrutiny functions should not be impaired by the devolving on to the LTUC of any additional responsibilities. In the same way, we believe that those functions should not be impaired by a future Mayor who might seek to ravage the assembly budget.
I turn now to another issue—how the budget can or should be amended. At present, there is provision for amendment of the total budget by a two-thirds vote of the assembly. Given the particular arithmetic of the GLA, that means in effect that the Mayor and potentially one other party, or one other party and one or two other assembly members, could ram through a budget that suits their interests. That would be particularly likely if the Mayor and his party were to have a successful run at the polls. We seek to safeguard the majority of Londoners from such a minority siding with the Mayor to pass a budget that would not be in the interests of all London. We want the overall budget to be amendable by simple majority.
I mentioned earlier something that it is importantto recognise. The proportional representation and additional member system in the assembly means that a simple majority requires an alliance involving more than one party. Under the current system, the Mayor could get his budget through with the adherence of potentially just one party, whereas our proposal would require the consent of two parties. In effect, that would be a majority of all voting Londoners who had cast votes in GLA elections.