Clause 9
Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill
2:45 pm
David Heath (Shadow Secretary of State for Justice & Lord Chancellor, Ministry of Justice; Somerton and Frome, Liberal Democrat)
It is rather rare that one is almost formally invited by the Attorney-General to table an amendment in Committee, but in this instance we can properly say that we were. Similar amendments with the same objective as those in this group were proposed on 3 July in the House of Lords to clause 33 of the Bill that became the Offender Management Act 2007 by my noble friends Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Baroness Linklater. They were well supported, and received support from Baroness Anelay of St. Johns, Lord Ramsbotham, Lord Judd and Baroness Howe of Idlicote. In response, the Attorney-General, Baroness Scotland, said:
“The distinction between welfare and well-being is an interesting, important and rather subtle one. The House will have extensive opportunities to reflect on it during consideration of Clause 9 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, referred, which was recently introduced in another place. I agree with her that that is probably the better place for these issues to be more fully debated.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 3 July 2007; Vol. 693, c. 999.]
That is very much an invitation from a Minister to table these amendments, which is something that I have not enjoyed before. The Minister may care to have words with the Attorney-General later.
The amendments relate to sentencing, which is a serious purpose to which we could devote a considerable amount of time. I do not propose to do so, because we can simply state the objectives of this group of amendments. Essentially, they would introduce into the principles of sentencing in the criminal court some of the underlying principles that apply in the family court in terms of the welfare of the child and its paramountcy.
As the Minister will know, the Children Act 1989 requires that the principle should apply to all children involved in family court proceedings, and that there is a welfare checklist that the court is required to consider when taking forward any proceedings involving a child. The proposition before us this afternoon is that a similar welfare checklist ought to apply when dealing with the rehabilitation orders, which have at their core the idea that one treats the individual as a whole. The circumstances that might promote criminality and offending behaviour in that child, and all those influences that are pooled together by those agencies that have dealings with the young offender and that are invited to give their views and advice to the court, ought to be taken into account during the sentencing procedure.
The Children Act 2004 framework document—the five outcomes document— examines the factors that ought to be taken into account when considering whether a relevant authority or institution has improved a child’s well-being. Some of those factors are entirely relevant to the actions of a court when considering the disposals available to it in dealing with a young offender. There are particular factors that are relevant to the points made earlier by the hon. Members for Northampton, North and for Leyton and Wanstead and by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough.
What are the provisions available, in the context of sentencing procedure, to deal with education, for instance? Is there a special needs requirement that is not currently being met? What are the welfare implications? Is the child a child in need, as identified under section 17 of the Children Act 1989? Those are material issues, as are mental health assessment, consideration of housing and living conditions, and consideration of physical health. All these factors, if they are taken in the round, provide the substance that ought to underlay the principles of sentencing.
What is being proposed is to draw together the various strands of Government policy in this area. The Government have been very clear in stating their intentions in respect of how best to deal with children who suffer various disadvantages and to ensure that they have access to the type of support that they need. All those factors are relevant to a person who has found themselves in trouble with the courts, where there are underlying issues that go beyond the offending behaviour, which must properly be brought into account when considering the measures contained in the Bill. By extending the principles of sentencing to encompass those factors, I believe that the courts would take an even wider view than they currently do of their responsibilities to the child as well as to society, in trying to protect society against the offending behaviour, in dealing properly with the prospects of recidivism and in ensuring that there is less prospect of reoffending.
Without extending the debate—I think that my intentions are very clear already, and I have no doubt that other Members will support my views—I believe that the amendments would reconcile the provisions of this Bill with the Children Act 2004 and other legislation. They would reconcile the systems that are already in place in the family court to those in the criminal court, which would produce more integration in what we do with these young people to ensure that they have access to the support that they need.