Clause 12 - Conditional cautions: types of condition
Police and Justice Bill
9:30 am

Michael Fabricant (Whip, Whips; Lichfield, Conservative)
My hon. Friends have already spoken quite eloquently about clause 12, but I have a concern about secondary legislation, which I mentioned in my intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs (Nick Herbert). I am the first to accept that all Governments, of whatever colour, cannot have everything debated on the Floor on the House, as that would simply cause a logjam. However, whereas it is appropriate to have secondary legislation for setting levels of fines and that sort of thing, it becomes dangerous when it fundamentally reforms legislation.
My hon. Friend has already quoted the Magistrates Association, so I will quote only one more line. It says that secondary legislation
“opens up the possibility of more serious offences, rather than extremely low level ones, being dealt with outside a court.”
That clearly does not meet the requirements of natural justice, of the judiciary or of one’s peers making judgments. It would be fundamentally wrong if more serious crimes were included within the ambit of the Bill through secondary legislation.
The Minister told us in the previous sitting that we have a “benevolent” Home Secretary, but what serious assurance can she give us that no future Home Secretary—perhaps not because of his nature, but because of changing circumstances in Britain—will decide that he must bring more serious crimes under the auspices of clause 12, meaning that they could be dealt with outside a court? How can we be assured that there would still be a role for magistrates and Crown courts if there were changes in secondary legislation? What safeguards can the Minister give us to assure us that someone who was not as “benevolent” as the present Home Secretary—I use the Minister’s word, although some would argue that he is not so benevolent—would not extend the powers considerably?
Does the Minister agree that, in principle, it would be wrong for more serious cases to be dealt with in that way? If she sets out the principle, lawyers will always be able to say that a Home Secretary who is not benevolent and who tries to extend the powers beyond what is provided for in clause 12 is in breach of the spirit of the law. I should be most interested to hear what she has to say, first, about the spirit of the law and the principle and, secondly, about the safeguards that exist to ensure that the power is not extended.
