Clause 7 - National Lottery Distribution Fund: apportionment
National Lottery Bill
10:30 am
Hugo Swire (Shadow Minister (the Arts), The Family & Culture, Media & Sport; East Devon, Conservative)
I should have said at the outset how pleased I am to be serving on this Committee with the hon. Member for Bath, who I know will support many of the Conservative amendments. It seems to have fallen to me to table the majority of the amendments. I was lulled into a false sense of security by the hon. Gentleman, who told me that he is still recovering from the after-effects of the London Olympics Bill. If his response to the programme motion was anything to go by, what he might have lacked in eloquence on Second Reading he fully intends to make up for in Committee.
Let me refer to the Second Reading before I move on to the meat of the clause—I know that you will not allow me to go wide of it, Mr. Cook. It is worth bearing in mind that we last debated this Bill back in June, and at this stage we have no idea when Report and Third Reading will happen. One of the questions that arises is: what is the reason for the delay? That is particularly relevant given that a series of statutory instruments have been laid before us, one after the other—like rainfall—to extend the shelf life of the New Opportunities Fund. The Minister will no doubt wish to explain.
I am pleased to say that we get straight to the heart of the matter with these amendments. In a sense, we are starting off with the most contentious clause in the Bill. Amendments Nos. 24 and 25 would remove the ability of the Secretary of State to prescribe expenditure by the Big Lottery Fund. We do not believe that the Government should have such wide prescriptive powers in respect of what the Big Lottery Fund spends its money on and the bodies to which it makes its grants. The Minister will maintain, as he has done consistently, both in public and in private, that the Government will not prescribe spending in the controlling and detailed way that we fear—that there will be no micro-managing of the BLF. However, even the Big Lottery Fund itself speaks of having a new, less prescriptive relationship with the Government.
Whether or not they are fully used, the simple fact is that the Bill contains draconian powers. When passing legislation, one should always be aware of the law of unintended consequences. Our experience of the New Opportunities Fund suggests that, in time, the powers will be used to the utmost. No doubt others will mention the example of Jamie Oliver and the school dinners initiative during the last election campaign. Ministers panicked and decided that they needed some extra cash quickly. Where better to go than to the lottery? How can we be sure that the Government will not prescribe expenditure in other areas in which Government expenditure needs to be supplemented? Where a Government can prescribe—as they seek to do by adding new section 22(3)(d) of the National Lottery etc. Act 1993—they can later proscribe, with all the sinister connotations that that carries. Proscribing is the reverse of prescribing and none of us in this Room would be happy to see that development.
Some £93 million of lottery funds has already been spent in breach of the principle of additionality. Rightly, Mr. Cook, you will not allow me to stray into a definition of additionality, which is a key part of what we shall be deliberating over the coming few days. I know the hon. Member for Bath is keen to get additionality defined in the Bill. I am talking about spending on MRI scanners in NHS hospitals. I agree that the sum is relatively trivial compared with the £285 million that the Minister has directed to be spent on child care, not to mention the £42 million for fruit in schools—something that I now understand has been taken on by the Department for Education and Skills. Powers of prescription will allow the Secretary of State to use the lottery funds as her personal treasury. In that respect, the powers will mean that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport is the only Department that has its own source of revenue—hypothecated revenue, I would argue.
How jealous the Chancellor must be when he looks at his falling Treasury receipts and the rising expenditure created by his unleashing of expenditure on recruitment, particularly in the public sector. How jealous he must be when he looks over at his Cabinet colleague the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, who is a close friend of the Prime Minister, and sees her with an embarrassment of riches—awash with money—and under the clause, she can decide to whom it goes. No wonder the Chancellor wants to direct as much of that money as he can into the health and education services—a trend that we have seen begin—under prescription from a compliant Secretary of State.
The Bill is trying to invest powers in the Secretary of State and the Opposition are trying to divest them from the Secretary of State. Secretaries of State change, and while I have nothing personal against the current Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, how many of us know for how long we will occupy our present positions, particularly if there is a rather public leadership contest in one's own party? Before the Minister scoffs at that, I suggest that that will be a situation in which he might well find himself in the not-too-distant future.
Treasury revenues are falling and a nice big fat lottery is pumping in money. What do the Government do? They decide to give more power to the Secretary of State to prescribe where that money goes. That is unacceptable.