Clause 19 - Offence
London Olympics Bill
12:00 pm
Richard Caborn (Minister of State (Sport), Department for Culture, Media & Sport; Sheffield Central, Labour)
I will try to explain why we have included this provision in the Bill. Amendment No. 16 would remove the reverse burden of proof in relation to criminal offences that we have created under our new regime for controlling advertising in and around the Olympic venues. I understand the spirit in which the amendment is tabled, but it is appropriate, and indeed proportionate, that the burden of proof falls on the defendant in this case.
Subsection (2) provides a crucial defence for anyone charged with an offence under an advertising regime. Those defences are right and proper and must remain. The burden of proof is on the defendant because the subject matter of the defence is so closely conditioned by the defendant’s own knowledge. We feel that it is more appropriate for the burden to fall on the defendant. Our approach is consistent with the case of Sheldrake v. DPP, which essentially sets the bounds of acceptability in relation to reverse burdens of proof. Our approach also closely follows the type of defence available under section 224 of the Town and Country Planning Act, which provides an offence in breach of advertising restrictions imposed under the Act. In this specific case, we believe that there is an argument for reversing that burden of proof because of the knowledge of the individual.