Clause 1 - Purpose
Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill
9:00 am
Oliver Heald (Shadow Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs & Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Assisted By Shadow Solicitor General), Constitutional Affairs; North East Hertfordshire, Conservative)
I wish you every success with “Question Time”, Sir Nicholas. I am sure that the whole Committee would say that it is long overdue. I do not suggest that the Programming Sub-Committee should reconvene so that we can watch it, but we would enjoy it. By then—who knows?—we may find one of our distinguished colleagues as leader of the Liberal Democrats later today.
The question whether the clause should stand part depends on whether the terms and conditions for making an order under clause 1 are acceptable. It would therefore be necessary for the Government to assure us that the effect of an order made under clause 1 would be deregulatory in effect, or that it would involve a non-controversial simplification of the law or the introduction of a non-controversial Law Commission Bill. Sadly, the Minister has so far not been able to provide such an assurance in the Bill.
New clause 2 is an attempt to remedy the problem. In our first attempt to remedy it, we tried to define what should be the purpose orders made under clause 1, our amendments suggesting that the purpose should be deregulatory. In new clause 2 and new schedule 1, we suggest limiting the subject-matters to be covered by such orders. The powers granted in part 1 are wide, so new clause 2, which is based on the recommendations of the Regulatory Reform Committee, suggests that the limitation of powers should be similar to that which applies to the Scottish Parliament. I have gone a little further by adding some variations and additions. It is an amendment on which I think we should be able to agree.
The principle of allowing Ministers to amend existing legislation by order to remove regulatory burdens has been well established in law for some years. However, certain areas of policy are of a higher order of concern than others. For example, it may be perfectly reasonable for a law relating to housing regulations to be amended by order, with a lower level of parliamentary scrutiny; but it would be entirely different for laws relating to our constitution or our civil liberties to be altered by order. The reserved areas of competence suggested in new schedule 1 are so important that they should be excluded from the powers set out in clause 1. The Minister might argue that a matter relating to terrorism involves only a technical change and should therefore come within the order-making power for convenience. My argument, however, is that some areas of jurisdiction are so important that only full parliamentary procedure will do, even if the change concerned is minor.