Clause 30 - Providing false information
Identity Cards Bill
6:15 pm
Andy Burnham (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Leigh, Labour)
The hon. and learned Gentleman knows more of criminal law than I do, but I hope to convince him that it was necessary to draft the clause in this way. He will know that recklessness—as an alternative to intention—is a common feature of the criminal law. A person acts recklessly if he is aware of a risk and, in the circumstances known to him, it would be unreasonable to take the risk. Having regard to the definition of “false” under clause 43, which includes
“any inaccuracy or omission that results in a tendency to mislead”,
it is clear that a person might be reckless as to the veracity of the information he is providing.
I can understand members of the Committee being concerned to ensure that those who mistakenly provide false information, or even perhaps negligently provide false information, are not criminalised by the clause. I can give the hon. and learned Gentleman an assurance that such people will not be criminalised. That is not our intention. However, he will know that recklessness is a higher test than a mistake or negligence and, in my view, reflects a culpability that should be criminalised, given that we all want the register to be maintained to the highest possible standards.
While prosecutions for recklessly providing false information might be few and far between, it is right that the option should be left open to prosecutors and juries. It goes almost without saying that the effect on the accuracy of the register will be the same, regardless of whether a person intended to provide false information or was reckless in providing false information.
The hon. and learned Gentleman asked whether the term “reckless” is strictly necessary, and I hope I have explained why it is. We must also be explicit about the fact that there are alternative states of mind—so I am told—such as knowing information to be false, believing it to be false or being aware that it might be false. However, taking the risk is reckless. There are obviously gradations of being reckless. The clause has been drafted in this way to allow the courts to have regard to all the possibilities for someone providing false information.
I am not an expert, but I gather than recklessness is a common ingredient in criminal offences. It was recently endorsed by the House of Lords in a case in which a previous House of Lords decision was overruled. As a result, recklessness is now subject to a subjective, not an objective, test. The key question is whether the defendant himself appreciated the risk he was taking, not whether the reasonable man would or would not. I hope that means something to the hon. and learned Gentleman.
For the reasons I have outlined, we believe it important to maintain under the Bill the fact that recklessness is a common alternative in the criminal law to intention. It is of course important that people who apply to join the register do so knowing the risks of failure to provide information that is secure. The recklessness test is a higher test than simply making a mistake or being a bit negligent in terms of the information provided. That, I hope, captures what the hon. and learned Gentleman seeks. We need to keep the Bill as drafted. With that in mind, I ask him to withdraw the amendment.