Edward Garnier (Shadow Minister, (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers); Harborough, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment No. 73, in clause 21, page 19, line 23, at end insert—

‘(2A)Where subsection (2) applies, the Secretary of State shall notify the individual in writing that he has taken action under that subsection within 30 days of doing so.’.

Jimmy Hood (Lanark & Hamilton East, Labour)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 183, in clause 23, page 20, line 26, at end insert

‘and,

(c)notifying the individual of the fact that information has been provided.’.

Edward Garnier (Shadow Minister, (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers); Harborough, Conservative)

Amendment No. 183 would have a similar effect on clause 23, which we touched on briefly a moment ago, to that which amendment No. 73 would have on this clause. I want to ensure that there is no unnecessary, uncalled for or unjustified growth in secret government.

The clause is entitled “Use for correcting inaccurate or incomplete information” and it will allow the Secretary of State to tell someone who is not the subject of the information that something recorded   about an individual is inaccurate or incomplete, and allow him to tell that unspecified third party that the information on the register is inaccurate or incomplete without letting the subject of the information know either that the information is inaccurate or incomplete or that he has told someone it is inaccurate or incomplete.

Unless the Government can persuade us otherwise, the Secretary of State should notify the subject of the information in writing that he has taken action under the provision within 30 days of doing so. There is no magic about the figure of 30 days, and if the Government want to specify another period I shall be happy to go along with it if it is reasonable.

I have a philosophical objection to things going on about me out of my sight unless there is a good and justifiable public policy reason for them to do so. I understand that there will be occasions when the register might say, for example, that I am a suspected drug dealer, people trafficker or money launderer. The third party—let us assume that it is the police, and perhaps the chief constable of a particular area—may wish to gain access to the information about me on the register, on which those data have been recorded.

I appreciate that, on other occasions, one of the Ministers has said that opinion evidence or opinion shall not be recorded in the register. However, I drew their attention to the definition of personal information in the Data Protection Act 1998, under which opinion evidence or opinion seem to be recordable.

I appreciate also that there shall be occasions when it might be in the interest of the detection or the prevention of crime for that third party, if it is a police authority or officer, to know that the information designating me as a suspected people trafficker or a money or drug criminal is inaccurate. It might be in my interests for that to be corrected. I also have a right to know the information about me on the register that is wrong.

This short debate has briefly exposed the dangers inherent in the ID register system as well as the use that can be made of it by the state either for or against my interests and, more particularly, without my knowledge. The more we computerise and dehumanise government, the more important it is for the individual citizen to be treated as a human being rather than as a digit and as a collection of inanimate information.

The Bill is all about giving the Secretary of State undefined powers to do undefined things, nominally in the interests of the state and in the interests of ourselves as a collective of individuals. However, we are becoming pieces of information to be processed, rather than human beings. If we are to move down this road for reasons of administrative and governmental efficiency, it is important that we do not lose sight of the fact that the Government exist to benefit the individual and to benefit society, which is a collection of human beings, not just numbers.

I urge the Government when addressing amendment No. 73 and amendment No. 183, which relates to clause 23, to explain how they can justify the   movement of information about me, whether accurate or inaccurate, in circumstances in which I am wholly ignorant of that traffic.

Alistair Carmichael (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Orkney & Shetland, Liberal Democrat)

I have added my name to amendment No. 73. Amendment No. 183, which stands in my name, relates to clause 23, but it deals with much the same point.

Returning to an earlier debate about the ownership of the information and the basis on which it is provided, I share philosophical difficulties of the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and it remains my strong view that the information should remain in the ownership of the individual to whom it relates. That being the case, it makes sense that when the information has been wrongly recorded or corrected, as outlined in the clause, the person to whom the information relates should be made aware of that fact. The one obvious rider relates to national security and the prevention and the detection of crime. With that, I shall be interested to hear what the Under-Secretary has to say.

Andy Burnham (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Leigh, Labour)

Amendment No. 73 would make it a requirement to notify an individual in writing within 30 days if information had been requested about him under clause 21 by another person. The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland would expand the power under clause 23 to make regulations, so that they could include provision about notifying an individual that information had been provided without his consent under clauses 19 to 22.

I want to make the important point that we have constantly gone over such ground during our proceedings and we are now having to do so yet again. However, it is crucial that that happens because, although we have discussed these matters, the same myths are being propagated about what the Bill will and will not do.

For the avoidance of doubt, I say to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough that, if he were a suspected criminal or drug dealer, such information could not be held on the register because it would not be a registrable fact. He need have no fear that such a position is possible. As he knows, the registrable facts are set out clearly under schedule 1. It is for the organisation requesting the information to examine its own records. Obviously, other organisations could hold information that he might be a suspected drug dealer, but not the national identity register. It is an identity verification system and it will not hold all types of information about criminal or medical records.

We have been over such matters before and we must do so again because we cannot allow such arguments to stand unchallenged. It is important to take such action because it affects the whole basis on which the amendments were introduced. There is no fear that such information can be held, so a lot of the arguments fall because of that statement.

It is important to note in respect of both amendments that, to comply with the first data protection principle, which requires that the information be processed fairly, the Secretary of State will have to give notification to data subjects of, among other things, the purposes for which data will be processed. In practice, in respect of the national identity register, it will probably be the case that on the application form an explanation will be given of the power to carry out cross-checks under clause 21 and the power to provide information without consent under clauses 19, 20 and 22. In all likelihood, such matters will be explained on the application form for people registering with the scheme.

However, unlike the two amendments, the Data Protection Act does not oblige the Secretary of State to give notification of each occasion on which the powers are used. There are good reasons why we consider it not appropriate to place the Secretary of State under such an obligation. As for amendment No. 183, it is obvious that there will be many circumstances in which it would be completely inappropriate to inform a data subject that information about him had been provided. Such notifications could, for example, undermine criminal investigations, matters of national security and Customs-related investigations.

The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland will know that one reason for introducing the Bill is to weed out and close down people’s ability to acquire documents fraudulently in false names. If people were notified of discrepancies, they would also be notified of the fact that an investigation was under way into why they had applied for documents in two different names. There might be good reasons for not having a requirement in the Bill whereby each time a cross-check is undertaken, the individual is notified.

On amendment No. 73, clause 21 was drafted specifically to allow the Secretary of State to notify people or organisations that provide information as part of the identify checking process if subsequent inaccuracies or omissions are discovered in the information they supplied. That will enable us, when an organisation has provided information that we believe is inaccurate or incomplete, to alert that organisation to that fact.

As a result of that power, the administrators of the national identity register will be able to help to ensure that data held in other places by Departments and public bodies are accurate. In turn, that will help us in a general fight against identity fraud. It will ensure that those who try to avoid identification by using slightly different details will find it harder to do so.

Members of the Committee may have heard about the publication yesterday of a UK Passport Service report on its personal identity project. It covers the processes whereby the UK Passport Service is increasingly cross-referencing data received with those held by other Departments. That has proved to be successful and, as hon. Members can see from the report, the project is to be extended. The measure simply gives the same powers in relation to the national identity register as exist with regard to the UK Passport Service.

In most cases, when processing an application form, the Secretary of State is likely to have the most recent and accurate information about an individual. Where a discrepancy arises between that information and the information held on another database, that other database may well be out of date. It will then be a matter for the organisation holding those data to consider amending its records or make further inquiries of the individual. At that point, there is a strong likelihood that the organisation concerned will contact the individual to alert him or her that a discrepancy has arisen and to ask for clarification. In most cases, people will experience the effect that the amendment seeks to achieve: there will be notification when such a check has been carried out.

It is possible that the Secretary of State may have reason to believe that the information on the application form is inaccurate and that the data held by other organisations are correct. In those circumstances, as the UK Passport Service is already doing, it is right that the Secretary of State has the power to try to clear up the discrepancy. It is open to the Secretary of State to contact the individual should he wish to do so.

A legal obligation to notify the data subject every time a cross-check is carried out, even where no discrepancy is revealed—that is an important point—would involve a disproportionate investment of time and resources. It would be bureaucratic and unnecessary. As I have outlined, in practice, where discrepancies arise, the data subject is likely to be contacted by one or other data controller. Furthermore, the power is limited to the validation of information that is or could be held on the register. There is no scope for it to be used in a way that would be surprising or that would involve anything other than the usual identity information.

I give that cast-iron assurance to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and, for those reasons, ask him to withdraw the amendment.

Edward Garnier (Shadow Minister, (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers); Harborough, Conservative)

Let me put the Under-Secretary out of his misery: I will ask the Committee’s leave to withdraw the amendment, but I want him and the Government to understand that in a democracy public trust in the institutions of government is vital. I am afraid that public trust in the Government—I do not mean this Government; I mean Governments generally—is declining as we become more and more a computerised society and less and less a society in which people interact with each other as individuals.

I am sure that we have all received any number of complaints about the operations of the Child Support Agency. That is a classic example of a situation in which the individual feels wholly disempowered as a consequence of having to deal, as a number, with a computer, which simply will not sympathise with his personal problems.

I know precisely what schedule 1 of the Bill says, but I am not so naive as to believe that a massive exchange of information is not already taking place between Departments, even before the Bill becomes an Act. Nor am I so naive as to think that, just because we have the Bill as drafted, all sorts of things will not go on that   are not specified in the Bill and still less in the regulations. I flag up yet again a concern that needs to be addressed, if not by this Committee then by some other part of Parliament at a later stage. In the meanwhile, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers); Newark, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment No. 74, in clause 21, page 19, line 32, leave out “something” and insert “a specified statement”.

Jimmy Hood (Lanark & Hamilton East, Labour)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 75, in clause 21, page 19, line 33, leave out “something” and insert “a specified statement”.

No. 76, in clause 21, page 19, line 36, leave out “something” and insert “a specified statement”.

Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers); Newark, Conservative)

These three amendments are simple. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (4) include rather imprecise references to

“something recorded in that individual’s entry”,

“something provided to the Secretary of State”,

and

“something otherwise available to the Secretary of State”.

The amendments would simply replace the three references to “something” with “a specified statement”. I hope that will tie down subsection (4) and make it a little clearer.

No doubt the Under-Secretary will tell us that this clause should be read in conjunction with clause 11 and that he will resist the change to the wording, because changing the wording here would mean that the wording in clause 11 ought to be changed. However, I would still appreciate his explanation.

Andy Burnham (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Leigh, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman anticipates my notes on clause 21 and this amendment. The clause must be seen in the light of clause 11, which contains the power to require information for validating the register in the first place. Clause 21 comes into play when it appears that that information is incorrect and it needs to be cross-checked or verified with another Department. He is right that the clause is complementary to and consistent with clause 11—perhaps that should have been clause 12, but that is a different argument.

Clauses 11 and 21 use the word “something” to refer to the information that can be required for the purposes of verification. As we have discussed, “something” covers any information that can be recorded in the register. Beyond that, the Bill does not limit the information to which clauses 11 and 21 can relate. However, the persons from whom information might be required under clause 11—and thus provided to, under clause 21—must be specified in an order, which will be subject to the affirmative procedure.

While the hon. Gentleman was speaking, I was reminded of the phrase “something of the night” and the fact that, although it is vague and imprecise, we all knew what she meant by it. In this legislation, “something” refers to things such as a photograph and fingerprints. The term is deliberately wide, because we   are talking about not only facts, data and words, but other information that could be held on the register, such as a biometric reading or a photograph. However, I assure the hon. Gentleman again that it does not extend to anything other than the information held on the register. Schedule 1 guarantees that. The term “something” refers to paragraph 2 of schedule 1, which lists

“(a)a photograph of his head and shoulders;

(b)his signature;

(c)his fingerprints;

(d)other biometric information about him.”

The term is used so that all the registrable facts can be encompassed.

I have explained why the amendment is neither sensible nor necessary, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers); Newark, Conservative)

I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for that explanation. I should apologise for my earlier absence; I trust the reason was explained and the apology accepted.

Edward Garnier (Shadow Minister, (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers); Harborough, Conservative)

I did not explain.

Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers); Newark, Conservative)

Forgive me, Mr. Hood. I attended the evacuation exercise in the Chamber. I hope you will indulge me for having done so.

The phrase “déjà vu” has come to mind many times in respect of the Bill. I remember putting precisely the same arguments as those I have put with regard to this amendment to a different Minister in a previous debate, and I received almost the same arguments in response. I take on board the points that have been made about clause 11 and paragraph 2 of schedule 1, although I still have reservations and remain less than content. However, as the Under-Secretary gave a lucid explanation, as did his ministerial colleague, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.