Clause 5 - Applications relating to entries in Register
Identity Cards Bill
12:30 pm
Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), (Assisted By Shadow Law Officers); Newark, Conservative)
Much of what the hon. Gentleman has just said makes a huge amount of sense to Conservative Members. In particular, those of us with rural constituencies where people are more widely spread out may feel the need to question the Government, especially about mobile units and the specified time and place at which people would attend, as well as about the practical provisions in clause 5, such as when and where to be photographed and have fingerprints taken or
''otherwise to provide such information as may be required by the Secretary of State.''
My principal aim, however, is to speak to amendment No. 46, which falls sensibly and conveniently under clause 9, which is entitled:
''Renewal of ID cards for those compulsorily registered''.
The amendment would ensure that clause 9(4)(b) required the relevant person to allow ''all of''
''his fingerprints, and other biometric information about himself, to be taken and recorded''.
I want to talk first about fingerprinting and secondly about biometric information.
There has been criticism on all sides, but particularly from the Government, of the London School of Economics document, ''The Identity Project''. I do not want to quote matters of principle involved, however; they may come up later. I will focus on the specific examples that the document discusses concerning fingerprints and their reliability in the context initially of the register, and later of the card. Some good points are made. For instance, the document states:
''The GAO report concluded that the fingerprints of about 2 to 5 percent of people cannot be captured 'because the fingerprints are dirty or have become dry or worn from age, extensive manual labour, or exposure to corrosive chemicals'.''
Later on, there were suggestions that refuseniks as far as the register and the card are concerned could willingly damage their fingerprints by taking up a pumice stone and setting to work. That is not an agreeable prospect, as I am sure hon. Members would agree, but it can be done. Anybody who has sanded a piece of oak or hardwood knows that at the end their hands feel agreeably smooth. They will run them over the hands of their spouse and he or she will say, ''What smooth hands you've got''. I will go no further, Mr. Hood, but that is what I am told by colleagues.
The point is that it might seem that a fingerprint is not only unique, which clearly it is, but indestructible, which it is not. It can be worn off. In the same way in which one can file a nail, one can pumice away one's fingerprints. On top of that, if people are skilled enough, they can fit false fingerprints. I gather that that has been pioneered—if that is putting my finger on the right phrase—in Russia and Ukraine by some of the serious and organised crime agencies there.
Much more worryingly, the report that I mentioned went on to say:
''People who had recently used hand cream created serious problems for the fingerprint readers''.
A number of the people currently in this Room will have used hand cream this morning. Perhaps they have popped out for a quick comfort break to stick on a bit of hand cream—I do not know. I do not wish to be silly about this issue, but it is possible that innocent activities will create great difficulties for fingerprinting. Similarly, there could be a problem involving those with
''particularly hard or calloused skin, such as chefs, gardeners and labourers.''
It is interesting that the error rates in fingerprinting are both significant and poorly understood. The report said that, according to the fingerprint verification competition 2004—a recent review of available systems—
''only a handful of products achieved an equal error rate of under 3 per cent., and most were much worse. Furthermore, it would be hazardous and risky for governments to lock their core infrastructure into a single proprietary product while both attack and defence are evolving rapidly.''
I will move on from there and illustrate the point. Following the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004, the Spanish national police managed to lift a fingerprint from an unexploded bomb. Three highly skilled FBI fingerprint experts declared that Oregon lawyer Brandon Mayfield's prints were a match to the crime scene sample. American officials described the match as ''absolutely incontrovertible'' and as a ''bingo match''. As a former US soldier, Mayfield's fingerprints were on the national fingerprint system. He was imprisoned for two weeks. However, the fingerprint was not his. According to one law professor:
''The Mayfield misidentification also reveals the danger that extraneous knowledge might influence experts' evaluations. If any of those FBI fingerprint examiners who confidently declared the match already knew that Mayfield was himself a convert to Islam who had once represented a convicted Taliban sympathizer in a child custody dispute, this knowledge may have subconsciously primed them to ''see'' the match.''