Clause 3 - Information recorded in Register
Identity Cards Bill
11:00 am
Ben Wallace (Lancaster and Wyre, Conservative)
I was drawing my remarks to a close at the end of the last sitting. It is important that the Committee recognise that amendment No. 34 is intended to tie down the Government on the purpose of the Bill. It was said that the database will be used to verify the identity of an individual presenting an ID card and that it will exist for that purpose alone. It will carry a certain amount of information, as described in clause 1, but it will also hold footprint information on credit reference and so forth. That will show the pattern of people's lives and behaviour in a way that goes beyond the purpose of the register according to how the Government originally introduced it.
The Minister said that only in limited circumstances will certain organisations or agencies be allowed to look at that extra footprint information. He assured us that they will not be allowed to browse through that information, but nothing in the Bill, or in the other relevant Acts that I have looked at, prescribes that focused purpose of those agencies by telling them, ''You can't browse through that information, but you must request it only on very specific issues.'' Such a statement does not exist; that is in the gift of the Home Secretary.
Clause 19, which addresses the other allowed uses of the register, says that the
''provision of information is authorised by this section where it is''
to ''the Security Service'', the ''Secret Intelligence Service'', GCHQ and the ''Serious Organised Crime Agency''. They will be allowed to look through the information if that is for the purposes of their function.
It is important to cross-reference with the Security Service Act 1989 to discover what is the purpose of the Security Service. Section 1 of that Act was amended in 1996, but subsection (3), which was not amended, states:
''It shall also be the function of the Service to safeguard the economic well-being of the United Kingdom''.
That is a very general description. When the Labour party was in opposition, I remember that it accused the security services of using that function so as to listen to and monitor strike leaders during the miners' strike. I say to Members with misgivings that that Act and this Bill authorise the security services to look at information relevant under paragraph 9 of schedule 1. That is one of the functions provided.
Let us consider GCHQ's functions, as described in the Intelligence Services Act 1994. Section 3(1)(a) states that one of its function is
''to monitor or interfere with electromagnetic, acoustic and other emissions and any equipment producing such emissions and to obtain and provide information derived from or related to such emissions or equipment and from encrypted material''.
The point I am making is that those functions are widely drawn in these Acts. Therefore, a powerful individual in the guise of the Home Secretary is involved with the security services. He has the ability to authorise people to look at the information. In some cases, he is almost prevented from stopping them looking at it because they are allowed to do so by the very nature of the Acts that put them in place—the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the Security Service Act 1989.
Therefore, if the Minister wants to put safeguards on the information, the best way to do so might be to remove the footprint purpose of the register—to remove it recording all the questions put to it—such that it still serves its purpose and still verifies the individual and their card against the database. Alternatively, he could come to this Committee or to the House with more detail on the times when he will allow those agencies or public authorities mentioned in clause 19 access to that information.
When, exactly, can those organisations have the information? I am not talking in terms of each case or just their general function. I am asking for what purpose, and when, can they do that. This should be done to safeguard people's civil liberties in that environment and to allow them to understand the situation. The Minister could add to the list limited circumstances in which other people will also be able to have access to the information.
This issue is the crux of the matter, which is why it is important to spend time on it. We are moving from the database being used for verification to its holding more than that. It will hold data on people's behaviour, traits and pattern. The Minister might want to come forward and say, ''No, we need it because it is about counter-terrorism. We make advantage from it.'' However, he should make that case, not hide it behind the central database of a register for verification. It is more than that. This is where the concerns about civil liberties lie.