Clause 45 - Goods, facilities and services
Equality Bill [Lords]
11:00 am
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 134, in clause 45, page 27, line 18, leave out from ‘public’ to ‘of’ in line 19.
Janet Anderson (Rossendale and Darwen, Labour)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 135, in clause 45, page 27, line 26, leave out subparagraph (ii).
No. 136, in clause 45, page 27, line 31, leave out subparagraph (ii).
No. 137, in clause 45, page 27, line 36, leave out subparagraph (ii).
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
I seek simply to probe a little on the difference between provision to the public, and provision to a section of the public. I think that I know what that distinction may be, but it would be helpful if we heard from the Minister how he sees that working in practice. The is an argument that, ultimately, when one says that one is providing something to the public, it is inevitably to only a section of the public that wishes to have a particular service. That raises the question as to whether the expression “a section of the public” is not, in fact, otiose. I just wanted the Minister to explain what he has in mind.
Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe and Sale East, Labour)
Clearly, it would be common ground in the Committee that it would be discriminatory if, on grounds of religion or belief, person A provided person B with goods, facilities or services that were of a lesser quality, or on different terms than those on which A would normally provide them to other members of the public. However, it is also the case that some suppliers of goods, facilities and services choose to provide them in different ways to some sections of the public, for example, by offering preferential terms or discounts to students, the unemployed or old age pensioners.
The Bill would prevent a service provider from offering such discounts to a section of the public—for example, the unemployed—but then, on the grounds of religion or belief, refusing to provide that same service to a prospective customer who fell into that category. For example, if a theatre charged £6 per ticket in general but had a concessionary price for the unemployed of £5, it would be unlawful to charge an unemployed atheist the full price while arguing that that was the price that was generally available to the public. If that atheist were unemployed, they would fall within the category to which the theatre had decided to give a discount, and should be able to enjoy that as much as any other unemployed person. It would be discriminatory to prevent them from receiving that benefit because they held a particular belief.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will see the merit of the provision. We do not want discrimination of the kind that I have just outlined. Where somebody belonging to a certain group obtains a benefit from a particular provider of goods, facilities or services, they should be able to receive it, and they should not be discriminated against because of their religious or other beliefs.
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
I am very happy with the Minister’s reply, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 151, in clause 45, page 27, line 39, at end insert
‘but not a boarding house with accommodation for under 12 persons where the owner or his near relatives reside on the premises.’.
Janet Anderson (Rossendale and Darwen, Labour)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 110, in clause 47, page 28, line 43, leave out subparagraph (i).
No. 111, in clause 47, page 29, line 2, leave out ‘six’ and insert ‘twelve’.
No. 152, in clause 47, page 29, line 18, at end add—
‘(4)For the purposes of this part, “premises” shall include a boarding house or similar establishment with accommodation for under 12 persons.’.
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
We now come to a part of the Bill that has attracted a certain amount of controversy. In a remark the Minister made earlier when we first started discussing clause 44, I detected him getting his retaliation in first, before anything had been said that might cast aspersions on the Government’s position. I hope that the Minister will relax, and just consider carefully the issue that the Committee needs to grapple with.
I say at the outset that it may well be that the Government’s position on this issue is correct, but there is a matter that requires some thought. There has been comment about the extent to which a person should be allowed to discriminate on grounds of religion or belief in respect of providing accommodation. The starting point for the relevant part of clause 45 is part of clause 47, which some of the amendments in this group address. Clause 47 makes it clear that in terms of a landlord parting with part of premises in which they or a near relative is going to continue to reside, subject to the amount that is parted with being no more than two households or six individuals—this is how the law will be framed—there is an entitlement for discrimination to take place. The philosophical underpinning for that is the belief that when one starts to intrude on to what I would call the private sphere, it is not fair or right to insist that people take into their own homes individuals with whom they may have profound disagreements.
In respect of clause 47, it is clear to me—because there is nothing to suggest otherwise—that the Government envisage that in such circumstances a cash element might be involved in the decision to dispose of or manage parts of premises; in other words, the situation might not be as simple as people inviting guests into their home, because the guests in question might be paying guests.
With that in mind, I turn again to clause 45 and the prohibition on discrimination for goods, facilities and services. It seeks to make a distinction between what is said in clause 47—which I have just touched on, I hope correctly—and what it says in relation to hotels, boarding houses or similar establishments. Clause 45 makes it clear that discrimination cannot be exercised in
“a hotel, boarding house or similar establishment”,
however strongly an individual may feel about a matter. Therefore, this is the question I ask the Minister: how was that distinction arrived at, and what is the basis of the difference?
I think I am right in saying—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—that a boarding house can be a bed-and-breakfast accommodation; I think he used that phrase. It seems to me that that amounts to little more than the kind of accommodation that is touched on in clause 47. Indeed, to an extent, I have difficulty in drawing the distinction. Where is the dividing line between bed-and-breakfast accommodation and a person who divides their premises with another person? If I say that I will have a paying guest in a room in my house, what is the nature of the services that I would have to provide to change that into a boarding house or similar establishment? Is it a matter of statutory regulation, or some other distinction? I want to tease that issue out from the Minister in Committee today.
The effect of my amendments would be to take a boarding house with fewer than 12 people in it out of the regime of goods, facilities and services and into the exception clause—clause 46—which also raises the issue of whether premises should have as few as six individuals in them in order to qualify for the exception. Six individuals could occupy little more than three rooms, so if somebody lives in an old mansion and derives some income from paying guests, they may find that they quickly reach that ceiling.
Another thing that caused me problems in definitional terms was what constitutes two households. Again, can the Minister help us? That term seems to be highly flexible; I assume it means a family unit, but it could comprise a large number of people. Could we have more helpful clarification from the Minister about that?
These are probing amendments; I want to make that quite clear to the Minister. Underlying them, however, is an anxiety. I suppose the classic illustration causing that anxiety is that of the elderly person running a small bed-and-breakfast accommodation. There are many such establishments up and down the country. The reality is that people coming into those premises have to live cheek by jowl with the host or hostess within that place—and, frequently, sharing common facilities. To all intents and purposes, it is difficult to see how to distinguish them in any way from someone within the exceptions to clause 46—except, possibly, where the person concerned provides them with breakfast in the morning.
A few minutes ago, the Minister emphatically said that boarding houses must be covered. Although I do not mind that degree of emphasis, will he help the Committee work through its implications for the varied ways in which people provide goods and services? The Government clearly decided—rightly, in my view—that there had to be exceptions to respect personal susceptibilities within the private sphere. But at what point should the line be drawn? Since I am not 100 per cent. clear at what point the line has been drawn, I particularly seek clarification on that.
Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe and Sale East, Labour)
Again, the whole Committee is grateful to the hon. Gentleman for tabling these amendments to open up discussion. Essentially, the amendments that he has made concern where the discrimination line should be drawn when people offer accommodation to other people.
The effect of amendments Nos. 151 and 152 would be that small boarding houses
“with accommodation for under 12 persons”
should be treated as small premises. They would thus be excluded from the prohibition on discrimination. We believe that there is an important distinction between temporary accommodation—such as that provided in boarding houses, bed-and-breakfast accommodation and hotels—and the supply of premises.
Amendments Nos. 151 and 152 would, in effect, mean that providers of bed-and-breakfast facilities could carry on discriminating against Muslims, Hindus or anyone else seeking overnight accommodation from them whose religion they may not like. That is the essential distinction. One is short-term accommodation, usually provided on a nightly basis and similar to a hotel, in that someone is there in a highly transitory way. In the case of premises, however, individuals may be resident for considerable periods and be using premises as their home. Indeed, they may be tenants and have solid legal rights to remain in that residence. In that instance, the relationship between the landlord and the resident is clearly much more important to both parties than it would be in the provision of bed and breakfast. One, in essence, provides an overnight service; the other provides a long-term home. There is a fundamental difference between the two, and however large or small the boarding house is, it could never fall into the second category, which is more permanent.
On the matter of thresholds, I must be completely honest with the hon. Gentleman and say that it is not entirely certain or clear why the thresholds were chosen.
Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Devonport, Labour)
I am sorry to return to the point that my hon. Friend has just made about the difference between someone who is in accommodation for a longer period and who therefore does not fall into the category of an overnight bed-and-breakfast stay, but there are hotels in certain parts of the country, particularly in coastal areas, that accommodate elderly people who have a bed-and-breakfast, hotel-type service but who are there for very many months. My aunt on my husband’s side was in one such hotel for years until she died. Into which category would someone like that fit? I am sure that there is an answer, but I am not sure into which category that person would fit.
Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe and Sale East, Labour)
I hope that I can answer my hon. Friend’s question. In essence, we want to draw a distinction between the transitory short-term nature of the overnight accommodation provided in bed and breakfast and the arrangement whereby someone opens up their own home to another person long-term. The latter arrangement is very different to short-term bed and breakfast accommodation. That is the difference that we seek to reflect here. I shall think carefully about my hon. Friend’s point. One learns a lot in Committee, and I shall get back to her if I have further thoughts on the matter.
I was explaining to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield that if we are all being completely candid, which of course we are in Committee, it is not entirely clear why the particular thresholds were chosen. It is, however, important to acknowledge that they have worked in other legislation. He is right that we mean family units when we talk about households. I acknowledge that they will be different in size and scale, but we are still are talking about two family units when we talk about two households.
In conclusion, it is worth pointing out that in discussing these issues, we start to enter into the sort of areas that the discrimination law review will doubtless want to consider very carefully, and it is entirely right that we do so. None the less, we stand by the wording of the Bill, which we believe is clear, and I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
I shall certainly seek the Committee’s leave to withdraw the amendment. I will reflect on what the Minister said, but I still have the anxiety, which was well encapsulated by the intervention made by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport, that the distinction that the Government are making is much less clear-cut in practice than one might assume.
The principle of someone providing another person with long-term accommodation, including breakfast on a long-term basis, is very well established. Indeed, one of my relatives lived exactly in the way described by the hon. Lady. Having returned penniless from the middle east in the 1970s as a result of ill health, he spent the next 20 years lodging with a friend of his family’s. He certainly had one meal a day, and, I suspect, was sometimes invited in for other meals of the day. Those meals were provided on a basis that would have fallen into the boarding house category. The relationship was based on an informal understanding and friendship, even though there was payment, yet it would have fallen foul of the legislation. I therefore worry about it.
Equally, I also acknowledge that the Government have a perfectly good point; the line must be drawn somewhere. If the Ritz hotel were to say that it would not accommodate people because it did not like Roman Catholics coming across its portals, most people would think that that was fairly scandalous.
We have, however, to be careful when straying into the private sphere. The Government have recognised that; otherwise they would not have included the saving subsections of clause 47—the exceptions to clause 46. I hope that they will consider whether a wider range of arrangements may not be made, where something approaching bed and breakfast is provided, and that it may be unfair to say to people, “You cannot turn somebody away because you object profoundly to their religion or philosophical beliefs”. If the Minister is willing to reflect on that, I too will do so and see whether there is anything that we need to come back to on Report.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
I must apologise to the Committee. The Minister said earlier that he wondered where I had drafted the amendments. It is clear that I must have drafted at least one of them, amendment No. 108, with a shaky hand, because it reads like gobbledegook. On looking at it again, I note that if I had written not
“leave out from beginning to first ‘to’ in line 6”,
but “leave out from beginning to first ‘to’ in line 7”, it would have made a great deal more sense.
Before we pass on from the clause, I should like the Minister to consider subsection (3) and help the Committee a little, because I have some anxieties that I was hoping to highlight with the amendment. But with your leave, Mrs. Anderson—and I hope that I do not stray—I hope that we can do so by simply looking at the matter on clause stand part.
Subsection (3) provides a let-out clause. I was about to say that it was the halal butcher’s let-out clause, but I suppose that it might also be the kosher butcher’s let-out clause. It says:
“Where a skill is commonly exercised in different ways in relation to or for the purposes of different religions or beliefs, a person who normally exercises it in relation to or for the purpose of a religion or belief does not contravene subsection (1) by—
(a) insisting on exercising the skill in the way in which he exercises it in relation to or for the purposes of that religion or belief”.
A halal butcher may say, “The way I kill animals for slaughter is without pre-stunning. That is my religion or belief; therefore I must insist on exercising my skill as a butcher in that particular way.” As I understand it, that provides him with a complete let out from the operation of subsection (1), which is the prohibition on discrimination in the provision of facilities and services. To take that issue just a little further, that would presumably apply even where the halal butcher was slaughtering meat that might be provided subsequently to people who were not Muslims.
Then we come to paragraph (b), which currently says that the second exception is if a person
“reasonably considers it impracticable to exercise the skill in that way in relation to or for the purposes of another religion or belief, to refuse to exercise it in relation to or for the purposes of that other religion or belief.”
I detect a double standard creeping in, which means that a halal butcher is entitled to say, “I insist on exercising my skill in a particular way, because my religion requires it”, but Tesco, for example, would have to fulfil the conditions of paragraph (b), which asks whether people have considered whether it is impractical to provide halal meat. I am not sure that that is fair.
If we are saying that if somebody has a religion that requires him to something in a particular way, he is free to do it that way—even if other people might be inconvenienced, such as those who would prefer to eat meat that was not killed in the halal fashion—why should there be the second test, which says that people are exempt only if they reasonably consider it impractical to exercise the skill in that particular way? I find the interrelationship between those two concepts difficult to understand and I would like clarification from the Minister about why both those paragraphs, with slightly different impacts, have been included alongside one another. That is important.
One feature of people saying that they have to exercise a skill in a particular way is undoubtedly that people who may disagree with them, but do not take as much offence as the person concerned, end up having to be subordinated to it. We eat a great deal of halal meat in this country, because in many butchers that is all that is available. The same would apply to kosher food. There is quite an important issue of discrimination and I seek the Minister’s clarification as to why the paragraph is worded as it is.
Evan Harris (Science, Non-Departmental & Cross Departmental Responsibilities; Oxford West and Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)
I would like the hon. Gentleman, also, to comment on the matter, if he thinks that it is appropriate. The question of skill is interesting, because the distinction applies only if a skill is involved, rather than in instances in which food is ordered from a wholesaler. In his view, does the clause fail to deal with the question whether a shop or chain of shops is discriminating if certain parts of the community feel that it could, if it chose, provide the food that they want by ordering it from somebody else, but it has chosen not to do so? Should it deal with that question at all? A similar question would apply to a school canteen that failed to provide for the dietary preferences of a certain religion although no skill, as defined here, was involved; it would simply have to order goods from a supplier. Would he care to comment?
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
The hon. Gentleman goes to the heart of the matter. There is a twofold test. One part is to provide protection for somebody who says, “I have to do something in a particular way; that is my religion or belief.” In the case of halal butchery, it is questionable whether a Muslim has to kill sheep in a particular way because of his faith. The test is, rather, that a Muslim cannot eat meat that has not been killed in a particular way. That raises the interesting question of why paragraph (a) has to be there at all. It is arguable that a Muslim butcher is under no constraint to kill sheep in a particular way so long as the end product is not going to be eaten by Muslims.
On the second point, the hon. Gentleman is right: there is a clear implication that anybody who provides goods or services, such as an ordinary high street butcher, has to ask himself whether it is reasonably practicable for him to organise his business or skill so as to ensure that Muslims can buy meat from his shop. That is why I posed the question. Indeed, amendment No. 108 would remove the middle part of paragraph (b), so that it could also be a defence to say that one refuses to exercise the skill
“in relation to or for the purposes”
of another religion. In a sense, that is the other side of the coin to paragraph (a). However, that is clearly not what the Government intend. We need to tease out from the Minister what the Government want.
Evan Harris (Science, Non-Departmental & Cross Departmental Responsibilities; Oxford West and Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)
This is a little complicated. I think that my question was on a different point from that being made by the hon. Gentleman. I shall not interfere with any exchange that the Minister may have planned to have on the matter, but I want to ask about the impact of the clause, and this is the time to do it. Would it become incumbent on a school canteen to provide particular types of food to children, or would a high street butcher have to provide certain types of meat to such a community? If it was straightforward for them to do so—if they could get it from another wholesaler and price it accordingly—would the clause make it incumbent on them to do so, or would they run a risk of being accused of committing a tort of discrimination under the clause if they chose not to do so? Skill is a separate issue. I am sure that my question was dealt with in another place, but it would be useful to the Committee for it to be clarified.
I know of a number of people who are concerned about how far they will have to go. I know that the question relates to previous provisions, but I would be grateful if the Minister clarified the point.
Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe and Sale East, Labour)
It is worth making it clear at the outset that the skills involved in the preparation of food are different from the question whether a supermarket should provide particular goods or whether a particular school should provide a certain range of school meals. Supermarkets and schools will take decisions that relate to their customer base, the area that they seek to serve, the children on the school register and so on. However, if they refuse to provide certain goods or services when all the evidence suggests that they should do so, they could be at risk under other provisions of the Bill, but not under subsection (3), which has a narrow significance.
Subsection (3), which the hon. Member for Beaconsfield queried, recognises that in relation to some activities, most notably the preparation of food, some people operate in a particular way and with particular skills, in line with their religious doctrine. That is a serious issue, although my hon. Friends may have noticed I let forth a slight laugh earlier. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield said that this would doubtless be the halal butcher or kosher clause, and at that precise moment I read in my brief that the most obvious example would be kosher and halal butchers. That coincidence brought a smile to my lips. None the less, it is an interesting and serious issue. We certainly would not wish the clause to be used to force those butchers to change their practices for the benefit of other religions.
As always, the hon. Gentleman raises a point that is worthy of further reflection. I am happy to do that, not to ensure that the intention is right—I think that the hon. Gentleman shares our good intentions—but to check whether the wording delivers everything that we want. I want to satisfy myself that it does. I think it does, but I shall reflect further on the matter, and if we feel that the wording needs to be tightened, we will come forward with our thoughts in due course.
Evan Harris (Science, Non-Departmental & Cross Departmental Responsibilities; Oxford West and Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)
The Minister felt that the point that I raised about school canteens and high street butchers generally providing a service for the community might not be covered in subsection (3), but is it covered elsewhere in the clause? In other words, if a high street butcher operates in an area where there is a potential market, will he be forced to respond to that market? What is the threshold for schools before they will be expected to provide canteen meals for a particular community?
It seems to me that subsection (1) talks of discrimination against person B when the service in question is already being provided to the section of the public to which he belongs. I thought that I understood it, but now I am not sure. I would be grateful if the Minister made absolutely clear which part of the clause applies.
Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe and Sale East, Labour)
Sometimes in our debates, we all end up more confused than we were at the beginning. The important point is that we are trying to ensure that a person’s skills relating to religious observance and practice are not skewed in a particular way because of the wider interests of the community. We must respect those skills and traditions. In the same spirit in which I made an offer of further reflection to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, I say to the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon that I am prepared to take this issue away and reflect further on it to ensure that we have got the wording right.
I am sure that the whole Committee regards the objective as important. We do not want someone with a particular skill or religious belief to be forced to subvert their practice or religious belief because of wider interests. We want to protect that, and they should not be accused of discrimination if they want to protect it. To be certain, I will reflect on the wording and, as I said, if further tightening of the wording is necessary, I will introduce further proposals in due course.
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
I am grateful to the Minister for what he has said. I apologise to the Committee because the concepts in subsection (3) are not easy to explain and I may not have explained them as well as I had hoped. Paragraph (a) seems to give a complete let-out to someone who, being of a particular religious faith, requires that animals be slaughtered in a particular way. He can say, “I insist on doing it in that fashion because that is what my religion requires.” It seems to me that there is nothing in paragraph (a) to say that his position need be reasonable or not. For example, someone can say, “I am a Muslim. I run a small abattoir and I insist that all the animals that come through my abattoir are slaughtered in a way that is compatible with halal butchery.” That seems to be the end of the matter and that is the let-out.
When we come to paragraph (b), the concept of reasonableness suddenly creeps in. That is what alerted me to the oddity of the two paragraphs together. I shall explain what paragraph (b) seems to be saying. Let us suppose that someone came along and said, for example, to a non-Muslim local meat supplier running a small abattoir that it would be useful if halal meat could be supplied to the town that the supplier served. If they said, “It’s true that my religion or belief does not insist on humane killing, but nevertheless my belief as a Christian is that animals should be made to suffer as little as possible, so I want all my animals to be pre-stunned,” the argument might be, “You’re not being reasonable.” That is why I have anxieties about the way in which the two paragraphs are linked.
Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe and Sale East, Labour)
Just occasionally, some things become clearer during deliberations in Committee. It is true that there is a test of reasonableness in paragraph (b), but the reasonableness relates to the practicality of exercising the skill. For example, if the meat were to be cut in a very restricted place, it might be impractical to serve the wider interests of other, non-Muslim, potential customers of the business. That may be a practical reason that prevents the service from being provided, which would be perfectly reasonable. The reasonableness test relates not to the exercise of the skill but to the practicality of exercising the skill. That is my understanding, but I will continue to reflect on the matter.
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
I understand that, but the measure could be used as a lever to force people who may not have strong religious beliefs or any religious beliefs to conform to the views of those who do have a strong religious belief, because it would simply be said, “Well, there is no practical reason why you can’t provide these people with goods and services, namely meat, in the form that they want.” Unless a person could say, “Actually, it is religious scruple that prevents me from doing so, because I insist, on religious grounds, that I must slaughter my meat in a particular way,” they could be required to do it. The impact of the measure would be to force those who ran abattoirs and who had no religious beliefs to provide halal meat even though they might have scruples or anxieties about it and did not particularly want to do it.
As the Minister will know, the question of halal and, indeed, kosher food is controversial. I believe fundamentally—this is my personal view—that it must be allowed, because it covers a religious matter, but if someone were to ask me whether it is better for animals to be pre-stunned or to have their throats cut I should not have the slightest hesitation in saying that I prefer them to be pre-stunned. I detect in the subsection a slight twist against people, which worries me, to force them to provide goods and services in a way that they might not want to do. Not having any strong religious views, they would be told that they had to do so, because it would be unreasonable not to.
That is what I think is wrong and that is why I tabled an amendment to make it clear that reasonableness did not enter into the matter at all. I hope that the Minister will think about that. There is something fundamentally wrong in telling people, “Because there are Jews or Muslims or any other group in society who require some goods or services in a particular way, you, not having any strong religious views on the subject, should be compelled to provide them.” That is a potentially objectionable aspect of the subsection.
Evan Harris (Science, Non-Departmental & Cross Departmental Responsibilities; Oxford West and Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)
I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing to consider my point. The question I am raising does not relate to the issue of the skill but is a general question: will high street butchers or supermarkets be expected to provide to people who want them certain services that would, potentially and practicably, be available if commercial businesses chose to go into the market? If they do not do so, will they run a risk of being held to have discriminated under the clause? It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify that at some point. I suspect that the clause does not force commercial decisions on commercial organisations, but it is not all that easy to tell.