Clause 44 - Discrimination
Equality Bill [Lords]
10:30 am
Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe and Sale East, Labour)
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for at least exposing to debate an important issue about underpinning this aspect of the Bill—the difference, and the complementarity, between religion and belief. His amendments would strike out the word “belief” from the Bill wherever it occurs. He must have had an amusing time going through to find out every example of where “belief” occurs.
To limit the provisions and protections only to those whose beliefs are aligned to an organised religion would be an unfair restriction. Those whose beliefs are equally strongly held but more philosophical—for example, humanists—should also be protected. The amendments would mean that a person with strongly held religious beliefs could lawfully discriminate against another person simply because that other person’s beliefs were not religious or associated with an organised religion. There are many in our society who hold no formal religious beliefs—atheists, humanists and so on—and whose belief structure actively rejects religion in any guise or form. It would be wrong for such people to be exposed to discrimination, and they should have the equal protection of the law.
Although philosophical belief takes us wider than organised religion, it is not limitless. The hon. Gentleman and I and other members of the Committee discussed those issues at great length in considering the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill. We made it clear that the courts determine what religion is. We know from case law that religion has to be consistent with human dignity; it must have a cogency, seriousness and sense of cohesion about a particular series and set of beliefs. We would expect a philosophical belief to betray the same hallmarks, although it does not revolve around belief in a particular deity.
As I said, then, philosophical belief is not limitless; for example, it would not be possible to claim that belief in the supremacy of a certain football team qualified as a religion or philosophical belief. Nor, indeed, could that claim be made about belief in the principles of a political party, the point raised by the hon. Gentleman. We know that because of the case in April this year of Baggs v. Fudge, in which a member of the British National party sought to challenge the refusal of an organisation to interview him for a job under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, which incorporate wording about “philosophical belief” similar to that in the Bill. That individual’s argument, that his support for the BNP constituted a philosophical belief, was thoroughly rejected by the tribunal, so there is no case to suggest that any such political belief would qualify as a religion or belief under the Bill. We are not making up the provisions on the spur of the moment; as I said, there is a precedent for them in the 2003 regulations.