Clause 44 - Discrimination
Equality Bill [Lords]
10:30 am
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)
I have to make a confession to the Committee: I went through the Bill at random and simply decided to delete references to the words “or belief” in the text. I did that because I wanted to initiate a debate—in which I hope the Minister can help the Committee—on what the Bill is saying. I appreciate that when one looks back at clause 43, one sees that religion is defined as “any religion” and belief as
“any religious or philosophical belief”,
but it seems that what underpins the legislation—and the reason the provision has been included—is the desire to prevent discrimination on the grounds of a person’s religion or religious belief. At least, we are talking about something that centres on somebody’s belief, or lack of it, in a deity and matters associated with it.
The difficulty with clause 44 is that it seems, according to one reading of it, that the extent of the discrimination covered goes far beyond religious belief or indeed a philosophical belief centred on a deity or a lack of a deity. Is not the expression “philosophical belief” so wide that it would have to cover, for example, somebody’s political beliefs? If somebody believed that all property was theft, would they not be covered by the use of the word “belief” in the clause? Another example would be if somebody believed that men were not all born equal and that there were differences and inherent inequalities based on people’s race or other characteristics. Would that belief be covered by the use of the word “belief” in the clause?
There is a serious issue. We discussed this matter in the context of religious hatred. Many people think that there is an entitlement to discriminate against people who hold certain sorts of obnoxious views. If those views relate to a deity or to a lack of religion, I can see the logic in why that should be covered. However, if this clause extends that provision, and we say, “You can’t discriminate for the purposes of this Act,” which goes on to cover goods, facilities and services and other things, “because you dislike a person’s beliefs, which may in fact be of a very practical kind,” we must ask ourselves whether that is what Parliament should be doing.
The Minister, in answering the brief points I made about clause 43, said that the reason the definition was drafted to comply with definitions in the European convention on human rights. I wonder whether that is the case, because the belief systems with which we are dealing must relate to religion. Religion or the lack of it is difficult to define. It is about a person’s view of the universe in which he is living—whether there is a god, a hereafter and so on. I wait for reassurance from the Minister.
Are we not defining belief so that it extends to anything in which a person happens to believe? Let us take some practical examples. If a Jewish lady running a hotel or boarding house knew that the people coming along believed that Jews were untermenschen—a lower form of life—should she be required to admit them to her establishment? If somebody was known to believe that all property was theft, it might reasonably be supposed that people might be a bit wary about letting them into their premises, whether it is a hotel, boarding house or even a shop. They might think that shoplifting was about to take place.
We must address the practical issue. The Minister may be able to provide me with some reassurance, and I wait to hear from him; but I find it hard to believe that “belief” needs to be quite so widely drawn to give effect to what the Government intend, in terms of protecting people’s religion or lack of it. I hope that we may be able to focus our debate on that.