Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment No. 97, in clause 44, page 26, line 25, leave out ‘or belief’.

Janet Anderson (Rossendale & Darwen, Labour)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 98, in clause 44, page 26, line 29, leave out ‘or belief’.

No. 99, in clause 44, page 26, line 30, leave out ‘or belief’.

No. 100, in clause 44, page 26, line 34, leave out ‘or belief’.

No. 102, in clause 44, page 26, line 35, leave out ‘or belief’.

No. 103, in clause 44, page 26, line 39, leave out ‘or belief’.

No. 104, in clause 44, page 26, line 42, leave out ‘or belief’.

Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)

I have to make a confession to the Committee: I went through the Bill at random and simply decided to delete references to the words “or belief” in the text. I did that because I wanted to initiate a debate—in which I hope the Minister can help the Committee—on what the Bill is saying. I appreciate that when one looks back at clause 43, one sees that religion is defined as “any religion” and belief as

“any religious or philosophical belief”,

but it seems that what underpins the legislation—and the reason the provision has been included—is the desire to prevent discrimination on the grounds of a person’s religion or religious belief. At least, we are talking about something that centres on somebody’s belief, or lack of it, in a deity and matters associated with it.

The difficulty with clause 44 is that it seems, according to one reading of it, that the extent of the discrimination covered goes far beyond religious belief or indeed a philosophical belief centred on a deity or a lack of a deity. Is not the expression “philosophical belief” so wide that it would have to cover, for example, somebody’s political beliefs? If somebody believed that all property was theft, would they not be covered by the use of the word “belief” in the clause? Another example would be if somebody believed that men were not all born equal and that there were differences and inherent inequalities based on people’s race or other characteristics. Would that belief be covered by the use of the word “belief” in the clause?

There is a serious issue. We discussed this matter in the context of religious hatred. Many people think that there is an entitlement to discriminate against people who hold certain sorts of obnoxious views. If those views relate to a deity or to a lack of religion, I can see the logic in why that should be covered. However, if this clause extends that provision, and we say, “You can’t discriminate for the purposes of this Act,” which goes on to cover goods, facilities and services and other things, “because you dislike a person’s beliefs, which   may in fact be of a very practical kind,” we must ask ourselves whether that is what Parliament should be doing.

The Minister, in answering the brief points I made about clause 43, said that the reason the definition was drafted to comply with definitions in the European convention on human rights. I wonder whether that is the case, because the belief systems with which we are dealing must relate to religion. Religion or the lack of it is difficult to define. It is about a person’s view of the universe in which he is living—whether there is a god, a hereafter and so on. I wait for reassurance from the Minister.

Are we not defining belief so that it extends to anything in which a person happens to believe? Let us take some practical examples. If a Jewish lady running a hotel or boarding house knew that the people coming along believed that Jews were untermenschen—a lower form of life—should she be required to admit them to her establishment? If somebody was known to believe that all property was theft, it might reasonably be supposed that people might be a bit wary about letting them into their premises, whether it is a hotel, boarding house or even a shop. They might think that shoplifting was about to take place.

We must address the practical issue. The Minister may be able to provide me with some reassurance, and I wait to hear from him; but I find it hard to believe that “belief” needs to be quite so widely drawn to give effect to what the Government intend, in terms of protecting people’s religion or lack of it. I hope that we may be able to focus our debate on that.

Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe & Sale East, Labour)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for at least exposing to debate an important issue about underpinning this aspect of the Bill—the difference, and the complementarity, between religion and belief. His amendments would strike out the word “belief” from the Bill wherever it occurs. He must have had an amusing time going through to find out every example of where “belief” occurs.

To limit the provisions and protections only to those whose beliefs are aligned to an organised religion would be an unfair restriction. Those whose beliefs are equally strongly held but more philosophical—for example, humanists—should also be protected. The amendments would mean that a person with strongly held religious beliefs could lawfully discriminate against another person simply because that other person’s beliefs were not religious or associated with an organised religion. There are many in our society who hold no formal religious beliefs—atheists, humanists and so on—and whose belief structure actively rejects religion in any guise or form. It would be wrong for such people to be exposed to discrimination, and they should have the equal protection of the law.

Although philosophical belief takes us wider than organised religion, it is not limitless. The hon. Gentleman and I and other members of the Committee discussed those issues at great length in considering the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill. We made it clear that the courts determine what religion is. We know from case law that religion has to be consistent with   human dignity; it must have a cogency, seriousness and sense of cohesion about a particular series and set of beliefs. We would expect a philosophical belief to betray the same hallmarks, although it does not revolve around belief in a particular deity.

As I said, then, philosophical belief is not limitless; for example, it would not be possible to claim that belief in the supremacy of a certain football team qualified as a religion or philosophical belief. Nor, indeed, could that claim be made about belief in the principles of a political party, the point raised by the hon. Gentleman. We know that because of the case in April this year of Baggs v. Fudge, in which a member of the British National party sought to challenge the refusal of an organisation to interview him for a job under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, which incorporate wording about “philosophical belief” similar to that in the Bill. That individual’s argument, that his support for the BNP constituted a philosophical belief, was thoroughly rejected by the tribunal, so there is no case to suggest that any such political belief would qualify as a religion or belief under the Bill. We are not making up the provisions on the spur of the moment; as I said, there is a precedent for them in the 2003 regulations.

Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)

I can understand the rationale in Baggs v. Fudge, which concerned an adherence to a political party, as I understand it. That seems to me to be capable of being distinguished from an adherence to a particular philosophical belief. There may be no such difference, but the Minister may understand why I remain slightly troubled by this point. It is one thing to say, “We refused to interview him because he was a member of the BNP” and another to say, “We refused to interview him because we knew that he had a belief in white supremacy”. Maybe there is no distinction between those two statements, but I see a capacity for one. I wonder whether we are in danger of opening a door to people to make such arguments.

Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe & Sale East, Labour)

Often those two things, a particular belief and association with an organisation, are inextricably linked. In the end it will always be for the court, the employment tribunal or other judicial setting to determine whether the provisions of a particular employment law are relevant to a particular case. Our job here is to set out in legislation the overall provisions, and that we do, in a way that does not give limitless extent to the concept of philosophical belief, but ensures that it is consistent with the hallmarks of religious belief, such as cogency, which I quoted earlier.

The hon. Gentleman tempted me into the boarding house argument. I suspect that we will discuss boarding houses later. My clear view, which will no doubt be rehearsed later, is that, where somebody operates a boarding house, they are not in a position, nor should they be, to act in a discriminatory way.

Evan Harris (Science, Non-Departmental & Cross Departmental Responsibilities; Oxford West & Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)

I had not intended to contribute to the debate, but having heard the Minister I rise to endorse what he said and to put a couple of points to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield.

I did not hear the hon. Gentleman deal with this matter in speaking to the amendments. Does he feel that the provision, as he would amend it, would capture those who have non-theistic beliefs that are their basis for ethical behaviour? That is somewhat different from belief in a political party or a football team. Does he feel, as, for example, the British Humanist Association does, that his amendments would undermine that position?

In its briefing to me, the association is keen to ensure that the Committee resists the amendments. It considers that it is wrong to classify non-religious beliefs as religious, and in a way it is nonsensical to do so. That is why the words “or belief” are so important. I am sure that we will come back to this point later, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman recognises that there are instances of people without religious beliefs being discriminated against in the delivery of public services. We will no doubt discuss school transport.

The hon. Gentleman will be aware that in the Army chaplains are provided for those who believe in the afterlife, but there is no equivalent service for those who believe that the life that they are putting on the line is the only one, although they may have a similar need for counselling.

I heard what the hon. Gentleman said and agree with his points about religious hatred, but I say to him that when we are dealing with discrimination on the basis of religion there must be an alternative approach that deals with belief. Because of his belief and learned status, the hon. Gentleman will be aware of case law in this area which interprets belief narrowly and not vacuously. If he could cite some case law in which he believes that interpretation went too far, that would be of interest to us all and would give us pause. However, as the Minister said, case law has been able to make a clear distinction between beliefs of a philosophical nature, including non-theistic beliefs and humanism, and other beliefs to which he rightly drew our attention. He wants to be clear that the Bill does not give protection to such beliefs. Obviously, we would not want the Bill to spill over into protection against discrimination on the basis of, for example, political beliefs. Where would it end? There is a strong case for keeping the wording as it is.

Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for providing some reassurance about the British Humanist Association. These are probing amendments. I find that when Bills are in Committee I am rung up by all sorts of people who express horror at amendments I have tabled. The Christian Institute was on to me last week expressing anxiety about some of the amendments that we will come to later. I had to point out politely that they are probing amendments designed to stimulate debate.

The hon. Gentleman made some good points. I want to make one thing clear: it was never and would never be my intention to remove from humanists protection concerning their beliefs. I fully acknowledge that the   rather provocative way in which I tabled the amendments might have that unintended consequence, which is why I intended, having listened to the debate, to go away and think further about whether anything else needed to be done to the clauses.

Evan Harris (Science, Non-Departmental & Cross Departmental Responsibilities; Oxford West & Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)

I should have said that when speaking to the British Humanist Association I pointed out that I was certain that these were probing amendments, and the association understood that. It looks forward to the hon. Gentleman’s support on other parts of the Bill, and he can rest assured that its view is that he is not seeking to undermine protection for humanists.

Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)

I am glad to hear that.

So far as my anxieties are concerned, it is very nice to have judges who interpret the law, who interpret words and who do so narrowly. One difficulty, and this should not allow Parliament to abdicate its responsibilities in the matter, is that we play around with words in statute. On one showing, and giving the words here their ordinary English meaning, it would be possible for a future judicial interpretation to widen the scope of what constitutes a belief in a way that no member of the Committee wants.

That anxiety may be far-fetched, but it exists and Parliament should not simply give up searching for better ways of expressing what we are trying to do. I still have in the back of my mind the slight reservation that there is a way of finding a better definition of the sort of beliefs we want to cover here, but I certainly do not have the formula at the moment. I have listened carefully to what the Minister said and, as usual, he was reassuring. I thank him and the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) for our discussion, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment No. 105, in clause 44, page 26, line 41, leave out from ‘justify’ to end of line 42.

Janet Anderson (Rossendale & Darwen, Labour)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 106, in clause 44, page 27, line 14, leave out subsection (5).

No. 107, in clause 44, page 27, line 15, leave out “not in good faith,”.

Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)

We come on to discrimination. Subsection (3) states:

“A person (“A”) discriminates against another (“B”) for the purposes of this Part if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice”

and goes on to provide a list of what those are. Paragraph (d) refers to a provision, criterion or practice

“which A cannot reasonably justify by reference to matters other than B’s religion or belief.”

I wondered whether the second half of the sentence was necessary in the overall context of the clause, which is why my amendment would take it out and leave

“which A cannot reasonably justify”.

In doing so, I was again being slightly provocative because that allows scope to ask whether there might be justifiable reasons relating to religion or belief which would allow discrimination to take place. That brings us back to something I touched on earlier, which was discussed during consideration of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill. Some people’s religion or belief may be extremely unpleasant or obnoxious. Could that provide a possible justification? That takes us into the areas of discrimination that are intended to be covered in this part of the Bill.

The other two amendments relate to the latter part of the clause, subsections (4) and (5). Subsection (4) states:

“A person (“A”) discriminates against another (“B”) if A treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat another and does so by reason of the fact that, or by reason of A’s knowledge or suspicion that, B ... has brought ... or intends to bring, proceedings under this Part”.

It covers somebody who is discriminated against on the basis that they are making a complaint. Subsection (5) provides a saving clause, stating:

“Subsection (4) does not apply where A’s treatment of B relates to B’s making or intending to make, not in good faith, a false allegation.”

That puzzled me a little. Let us say that an employer sees that someone is behaving badly and decides to discipline him. The employee says that he is being discriminated against on the grounds of his religion. The employer believes that allegation to be false, and wishes to continue to discriminate against him; indeed, he probably wants to sack him and get him off the premises.

Subsection (5) seems to imply that a false allegation can be made, but as long as it is made in good faith, the person making it is entitled to the continuing protection of the clause. I find that a little odd. An allegation is either false or it is not. How on earth can someone who is facing up to dealing with an employee who is committing gross misbehaviour and who he wants to get rid of form a conclusion? The employee has made a series of the most dreadful false allegations about being discriminated against on the basis of religion or belief, but the employer has to consider whether the allegation was made in good faith; otherwise, if the employee is able subsequently to show that the allegation was made in good faith even though it was false, the employer would still be discriminating against him.

I would be grateful if the Minister would explain how that will work in practice. If he thinks that it might not work well, that might be a good reason to take out the four words in the amendment.

Evan Harris (Science, Non-Departmental & Cross Departmental Responsibilities; Oxford West & Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)

The hon. Gentleman continues to do the Committee a service, as he has done for other Committees, by raising important issues and being brief about doing so. I disagree with amendment No. 105, but I see what he is getting at.

Amendment No. 107 highlights an interesting point. It will be hard to tell whether an allegation is false before that has been determined, and as the subsection refers to the intention to make a false allegation, we are not even considering a situation in which an allegation has been made. The question is whether it would be   difficult, given that one is already in double conditionality—determining whether there was an intention to make an allegation and whether it was going to be, or was, a false one at that stage—to make the third judgment about whether the allegation was made in good faith.

Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Devonport, Labour)

I share the hon. Gentleman’s confusion about “in good faith” and I hope that the Minister will be able to explain whether there is some legal basis for the use of the term; we need to identify what is good faith.

Evan Harris (Science, Non-Departmental & Cross Departmental Responsibilities; Oxford West & Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for recognising that it is not just the hon. Member for Beaconsfield who seeks to question the term.

Presumably, there will be a test as to whether something was in good faith and whether an allegation of discrimination under part 2 was reasonable in judging it to be not in good faith, reasonable in judging that there was an intention, and reasonable in judging that that it was a false allegation. The key question for the Minister is whether the words are vested in other anti-discrimination legislation, perhaps in the field of race, and whether, therefore, there is case history that shows whether the words have caused confusion. It is unusual, given the long history of such legislation, for something brand new to have come this far and got through the House of Lords. Subsection (5) is difficult to understand without clarification, and I hope that the Minister will take the opportunity to make it clear what is intended.

Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe & Sale East, Labour)

As the Committee has already noted, the provisions allow for indirect discrimination to be lawful only where the overriding reason for an action is unrelated to a person’s religion or belief. For example, financial considerations might mean that a small business, perhaps a child-minding service, is not in a position to provide kosher food. That would be a function of the fact that it was a small business with limited financial opportunities, not to do with the religious belief of its potential customers. It would be indirect discrimination, but it would justifiable because it had occurred as a consequence of financial and practical considerations, and there was no intention to discriminate against an individual or a potential customer.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield acknowledges that his amendment might be provocative. I do not envisage any circumstances in which we could justify deliberate indirect discrimination targeted at a particular individual. I accept that the amendment allows for a situation in which the action might be reasonably justified, but we are getting into the difficult territory of subjective judgments about what is reasonably justified and what is not. I hope that the hon. Gentleman, who agrees that it is provocative and probing, has already realised that he might want to withdraw the amendment.

Most of the Committee’s attention has been drawn to amendments Nos. 106 and 107 and potential malicious claims of discrimination. My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Alison Seabeck) and the hon. Member for Oxford, West and   Abingdon have asked for further clarification. The proposition is that a claim is either right or wrong. That is too simple. A claim might be malicious, and then right or wrong. The situation is more complex than the hon. Member for Beaconsfield at first indicated.

Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)

I am very mindful of that and, from my memory of employment law, I can tell how the clause originated. It is possible for somebody to bring in good faith a claim that turns out not to have been justified. I should not regard it provision for that as improper. Somebody may believe that they have a justifiable grievance, and they may want to have it considered by a tribunal. However, that is slightly different from a false allegation. I find extremely difficult the juxtaposition of a false allegation with an allegation made in good faith.

When one focuses on what the Bill intends to achieve, one sees that we are talking not of the esoteric complexities of employment law, but of precise allegations. If an allegation is false and not mistaken, by its very nature, giving the words their ordinary English meaning, it cannot have been brought in good faith at all. That is why I find the juxtaposition of the two terms so odd. That was the point that I was trying to make.

Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe & Sale East, Labour)

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the circumstances we envisage are the making of vexatious claims or unjustifiable repeat claims. That is the kind of malicious conduct that we seek to cover. We do not want something that is so defined that it inhibits and discourages people from bringing claims because, from the outset, it may not be 100 per cent. certain that their claim and case can be proved. We have employment tribunals and a judicial process in which judgments can be made about whether an allegation is proven.

We are seeking to rule out situations in which something is clearly malicious. For example, if I were a shopkeeper and somebody continually went around the neighbourhood claiming that I gave a worse service to a particular religious group, it would be utterly ridiculous for me not to be able to discriminate against that person by refusing to serve them whenever they came into my shop. We seek to cover that conduct, and we want to do so in a way that still encourages people to bring claims when they feel that they are justified. The claims will still need to be determined through the due process that we operate within employment legislation and race relations legislation.

Evan Harris (Science, Non-Departmental & Cross Departmental Responsibilities; Oxford West & Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)

I am grateful to the Minister for coming up with an example, because it is always helpful; I think. However, whose good faith is it? In that example, the person may have had the information on what they consider to be good authority, and they may have had reasonable grounds to think that the action was taking place. They are not acting in bad faith by propagating serious allegations; perhaps they have   attempted to establish the truth and have not received a response. Would the Minister say that the shopkeeper was best advised to wait until the outcome of the allegation before refusing service, or is that just a chance that one takes under this legislation?

Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe & Sale East, Labour)

Of course, in the end all matters are determined in a court of law; but if I were that shopkeeper I should have grounds to justify my conduct. The conduct of someone who went around the neighbourhood spreading malicious rumours and gossip that I was discriminating unfairly against people when I was not would be the grounds on which I could defend my action of discrimination against that individual by refusing to serve them in my shop.

It is possible that I should have to defend the action in court, but I should have a defence. That is the point. Even if people were slightly uncertain, that defence should still mean that people could bring forward a complaint about somebody’s conduct. We want people to come forward with complaints when there may be grounds to believe that unfair discrimination is taking place. It is important to have a fallback position on which people can exert a form of discrimination if they feel that others are spreading malicious gossip about them.

I hope that my explanation, however poor or good, reassures the Committee. The system is the same that has operated in race relations legislation and in other forms of discrimination. It is tried and tested, meaning that we can deal with the malicious person and encourage people who have justifiable grounds to bring a complaint that needs to be tested through a judicial or tribunal process. I hope that in light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield will reconsider and withdraw his amendment.

Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)

So far as amendment No. 105 is concerned, I am grateful for the Minister’s comments and agree with them. It was a probing amendment and I do not wish to press it to a Division.

So far as amendment No. 107 is concerned, I continue to have reservations about the wording of the legislation. It is not the first time in Committee that we have examined wording that features in earlier legislation and found it difficult to understand why a particular form of words was used. One of the difficulties is that once wording gets into legislation it tends to stay there for ever, until Parliament is bold enough to try to do something better.

The Minister will not recall this—mercifully so, I suspect he will feel—but I remember doing a piece of Northern Ireland legislation under which the playing of musical or other instruments was banned. When I inquired what another instrument was, none of the civil servants had the slightest clue what was being referred to. We got that deleted, but I think that it had featured in legislation going back over 20 years.

This provision has slightly the same flavour. Subsection (5) states:

“intending to make, not in good faith, a false allegation.”

I do not want to interfere with the way that this has been working in the past. The words “not in good faith” are not necessary to enable the sort of case that   the Minister is troubled with to be adequately covered. That is what it boils down to. Having said that, and in the belief that the Ministers and his advisers might go away and think about this again, which would be quite easy for them to do, I will ask the Committee’s leave to withdraw the amendment.

Before I do so, I shall pick up on the example that was used, where a person decides to ban someone from coming into their shop because they misbehave when they are in there; such a person has shouted, hurled abuse and been difficult with others. The shopkeeper says that they cannot come in, but the person argues that the reason why that is being done is because the shopkeeper knows that they are a Roman Catholic, a Jew or a Sikh. That is the basis. The shopkeeper says that that is nonsense, but he meanwhile has to keep order in the shop. Knowing well that the allegation is false, he wishes to keep the person out. That is the classic sort of illustration, as the Minister says, of where people must be allowed to take decisions.

The wording has got to be seen in that light. That is why I repeat that I have a question mark in my mind about this rather strange phrase

“not in good faith, a false allegation.”

Is it necessary?

Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe & Sale East, Labour)

I have frequent cause to reflect on the contributions of the hon. Gentleman. I am almost certain that we are completely right on this matter, but I undertake to consider it a little further. I will write to him, sending copies of the letter to all members of the Committee, so that we can all be 100 per cent. confident that what we have in place in relation to other legislation applies equally well in this area.

Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, (Assist the Home Affairs Team); Beaconsfield, Conservative)

I am grateful to the Minister and I am pleased that I continued talking for another 10 seconds. On that basis, I will not take up any more of the Committee’s time. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Evan Harris (Science, Non-Departmental & Cross Departmental Responsibilities; Oxford West & Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)

I rise to discuss one issue. I accept that we might have an opportunity to deal with it later under new clause 15, which is why I will be brief, but it does fall here and there is a danger that we might not reach it. I will understand if the Minister cannot give me a full answer.

I want to check whether the Minister understands the implication of the change in wording agreed in the House of Lords in relation to A’s religious belief. I think that he will be aware of the debate. In Bill 72, which was presented in the previous Parliament to the Commons, and in this Bill, when it first went to the House of Lords, subsection (1) was differently phrased. Another subsection talked about where the religion was not also A’s religion and where the basis of the discrimination was based on a religion that was not A’s religion. That was subject to some debate and the Government drafted the new wording—in response to probing by my noble Friend Lord Lester—   that we see before us. It is the right wording, but I have a simple question. In the employment regulations, which another clause of this Bill amends, a version of the old wording is used. I wonder whether the Minister might consider it appropriate—given that he understood the doubt about the old wording—to transpose the new version, which is good and clear, to the employment regulations so that there is parity.

The argument is not too complex, but including in parentheses, “whether or not it is also A’s religion or belief” in line 26 makes it clear that it does not exclude A’s religion. Therefore, an orthodox Jew would not be able to discriminate against a progressive Jew. That would also apply to an analogous situation. I understand that the Minister may not be certain, and I should like to be able to read him the wording in the employment regulations, but I would be grateful if he responded to that point.

Paul Goggins (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wythenshawe & Sale East, Labour)

The best way to respond is to promise that when we debate this—[Interruption.] Well, I have every confidence that, under Mrs. Anderson’s chairmanship, we will reach the point in the Bill that the hon. Gentleman wishes to debate. I look forward to discussing it later.