Clause 35 - General
Equality Bill [Lords]
2:30 pm

Hywel Williams (Spokesperson (Disability; Health; Social Security; Work and Pensions); Caernarfon, Plaid Cymru)

I want to refer to the definition of race on page 21. As hon. Members and the Minister know, the concept of race has been problematic in the past. It is defined in the clause by reference to, among other things, “national origin”. That is not itself defined. National origin can also be problematic. Dr. Gwynfor Evans, a former Member of this House, said that anyone could be Welsh as long as they were prepared to take the consequences. National origin is what I say it is; it is a matter of self-definition. That might give some difficulties if one was alleging some wrong.

A friend of mine, who comes from Yorkshire, is married to a Welsh woman—and a Welsh speaker, at that—and has two sons, Owain and Rhodri. He occasionally asks me whether I have any idea of their national origin. I say Welsh, of course, because they are prepared to accept the consequences. There has been controversy about the matter. Some Members might recall the Brewer Spinks case in the early 1960s, when Brewer Spinks Ltd. tried to ban its employees from speaking Welsh. It led to a huge amount of controversy, to demonstrations and to a climbdown by Brewer Spinks before the law had anything to say.

In subsequent cases, people have alleged discrimination and all kinds of wrongs on the basis of national origin, which then defines race—people have been annoyed at being called Welsh, Taff or Taffy—and such cases have been decided. This is a slippery area of the law, and I want a reassurance from the Minister that the Government have fully thought the matter through.

Eleanor Laing (Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, Scotland; Epping Forest, Conservative)

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I intervene merely in order to give him some moral support as I am an ethnic minority Scot.

Hywel Williams (Spokesperson (Disability; Health; Social Security; Work and Pensions); Caernarfon, Plaid Cymru)

I thank the hon. Lady for her support.

There have been problem cases that have brought the law into disrepute because it is unclear. The area has been brought into further disrepute by the many complaints brought against such people as A.A. Gill, Jeremy Clarkson, most infamously Anne Robinson and most recently the Prime Minister. Those cases were not pursued, but there is controversy and we need some reassurance.

There has also been controversy about discrimination involving language that defines national origin, which itself defines race. The outcome of cases in that field has been less than satisfactory. I refer the Minister to the first and most prominent such case, that of Jones andDoyle v. Gwynedd county council. Jones and Doyle alleged discrimination because they were not employed because they could not speak Welsh. As it happens, the judgment by Kilner Brown was that there was no discrimination. However, there have been further cases, and Kilner Brown himself said that language could not be used to define national identity, which could not then be a case for racial discrimination because it was clearly ludicrous to allege that, for example, Mrs. Hughes and Mrs. Jones having tea together in Bangor were from different racial groups merely because one spoke Welsh and the other did not.

Those are the sorts of complications that have arisen. It is a slippery matter, and I merely seek the Minister’s assurance that the matter has been thought through.

Meg Munn (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Department of Trade and Industry; Sheffield, Heeley, Labour)

I had not intended to speak to this clause other than to answer questions, so I will confine my remarks to the matters raised by the hon. Gentleman. The definition of race used in the legislation follows that contained in section 3(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976, and we believe that it has stood the test of time. However, the Government are aware that as a result of the Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, which implement the EU race directive in UK law, some of the racial grounds are treated differently from others in the 1976 Act. For example, harassment is expressly unlawful only on the grounds of race or ethnic or national origins, not on the grounds of colour or nationality. That difference came about because the European Communities legislation under which the regulations were made can be used only to make provisions implementing EU obligations or dealing with related matters.

The Government intend to iron out those and other undesirable inconsistencies across the whole of discrimination law. The discrimination law review will be the appropriate place in which to deal with that and I look forward to hearing the hon. Gentleman’s considered contribution to the consultation on that. Other than to commend his Welsh friend for marrying somebody from Yorkshire, I have nothing to add.