New Clause 9 - Aerodrome security strategy report
Civil Aviation Bill
10:00 am
John Pugh (Shadow Minister, Transport; Southport, Liberal Democrat)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I made the point inherent in the new clause on Second Reading, and although it is a probing amendment at this stage, it is slightly more than a bolt-on to the Bill. It is a very opportune amendment because of the genuine concerns that have been expressed about the expansion of airports and their security. I suspect that there will not be another civil aviation Bill for the next couple of years, so this might be our only opportunity to air those concerns properly.
The new clause would simply require all aerodrome authorities to produce at least an outline of a security plan, and to secure some form of Home Office ratification or support for it. I tabled it partly because of what I have learnt about airports in the past year or so.
To take the example of a provincial airport—I prefer not to name it at this stage, but it could be almost any provincial, non-designated airport—I looked at who was involved in the security process. The carriers have their part to play. The airport owners have their part to play in the construction of the building and the people whom they hire for security. There are invariably immigration and customs staff; not in the same numbers as at Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted or Ringway, but none the less, there is always a cohort there. There are people responsible for the security of the airport, the departure lounges, and the public areas in and around the airport. There are often additional people also contracted to look after the car parks and security, and there are often further people who are responsible for removing those who are detained by customs and immigration, often also working under contract. Additionally, there may be around the place special branch travelling in and out with particular flights. So, security for most airports is a fairly multi-textured and complex thing, and is often difficult to co-ordinate successfully.
In the airport that I studied, there were genuine disputes about demarcation. A particular case occurred where people were asked to be removed by the firm responsible for removing them—they has been detained by immigration—but the people who were asked to do that were not contracted or cleared to go to the place where those people were found. As a result, there are all kinds of unnecessary complications.
In that airport, which I subjected to some examination, people were asked by the customs and immigration people to wait—in this case people who were suspected as being involved in people-trafficking—and they simply absconded. They absconded because the accommodation provided by the airport was simply not good enough. It did not provide adequate surveillance. The people had to be left, even though they had been detained for having inadequate documentation, because another flight was coming in that needed staffing and supervising and the customs and immigration staff were not capable of doing the two jobs. They could not monitor a night flight and properly detain and interrogate people who had been kept from a previous flight at the same time.
As a result, there was a history—not a major one, but a history nevertheless—of people absconding or being allowed to go and book into a hotel, and in some cases not reappearing at all, because of shortages of security staff at the right time and in the right place.
The airport that I am talking about is not an unsophisticated one. We know that beyond the existing regional airports, there will be others that wish to expand their international traffic. I am concerned that a lack of co-ordination may be a chink in the armour. It raises concerns about terrorism, drug smuggling and people smuggling.
I have had discussions with people in the Home Office responsible for airport security, and they clearly want to improve and enhance security at regional airports. I have had contacts and discussions with private security forces that supervise airport grounds. Again, they indicate that there is a clear need for enhancement, constant vigilance and looking at new airports when they come on-stream to see that the security arrangements are adequate for the task. There is a general feeling that more power is required.
In the particular example that I looked at, a loophole that concerned me was that people who were responsible for car park security were themselves found to be without adequate reason to be in the country; not all of them, but a few individuals, who were prosecuted. Those real concerns about what is happening, to a minor extent, or what may happen in the future, led me to believe that we ought to get our house in order. We have an obligation to have a workable system. I tried to make the new clause as sharp as I could and not put too much detail into it.