Clause 29 - Deprivation
Animal Welfare Bill
7:00 pm
Bill Wiggin (Shadow Minister (Agriculture & Fisheries), Environment, Food & Rural Affairs; Leominster, Conservative)
I shall try to keep my comments short. With amendment No. 176, we seek to make sure that everything possible is done to preserve the life of an animal that may have to be destroyed under the clause. Subsection (9) as drafted makes it clear that references in the clause to disposing of an animal include its destruction. Although I accept that the destruction of an animal under the clause would probably take place only in the most exceptional circumstances, I feel that it is nevertheless necessary to make ensure that it is to be done only when evidence given by a veterinary surgeon suggests that destroying the animal would be in its best interests. Magistrates are not suitably qualified to pass judgment on the medical condition of an animal, so the amendment would empower them to consult a veterinary surgeon, who is better qualified to determine whether an animal’s condition warrants an order for it to be put to sleep. That is a constructive little amendment, and I hope that the Minister agrees to it.
In keeping with the principle that science and expertise must be used to secure the welfare of our animals, amendment No. 177 seeks to ensure that the appropriate qualified person is appointed to carry out the functions detailed under subsection (4)(a). That is not made explicit in the Bill as drafted. The subsection states that the court can
“appoint a person to carry out, or arrange for the carrying out of, the order”,
but it does not give any criteria to determine who that person may be. I am sure that it is not the intention of the Bill to leave open the possibility of an inadequate person being required to carry out functions of the legislation. I covered the circumstances in which a person should be authorised to destroy an animal in relation to amendment No. 176, and the argument for amendment No. 177 is in a similar vein.
As a society, we need to know that animals are well treated and that we do not put them in a position where they are once again left vulnerable to being neglected or abused. If society, through the courts, judges that an animal should be treated in a certain way, we must be reassured that it will be done professionally and competently. If, for example, the court decides that an animal is to be sold, we would want to make sure that that was done in a reputable way, through the correct channels.
With amendment No. 57, we seek to ensure that a court always justifies the reasons for its decisions; I am sure that the court would want to do so. Under subsection (6) as drafted, there is a responsibility on the court to justify its decision only when it decides not to deprive an owner of their animal. That is right and proper, but although I appreciate that in many circumstances a convicted offender should be banned from keeping their animals, that is not an automatic decision. I am puzzled as to why a court needs to give a reason for not enforcing a deprivation, but does not need to give reasons when issuing a deprivation order. That seems like a contradiction. A court should have a duty to give reasons when it makes an order, as well as when it does not make an order. If anything, that would make any future appeal or judicial review hearings easier, as those present will be able to see why the court made its original decision.
We are nipping through the amendments as quickly as we can, Mrs. Humble. Amendment No. 178 is similar to amendments Nos. 176 and 177, and to all intents and purposes serves to achieve the same aim of ensuring that the interests and needs of animals whose futures depend on the powers exercised by the courts are put first. We all know that one of the reasons for the need to pass the legislation is to update our laws so that they concord with scientific advances and medical evidence. I agree that that is necessary and important, which is why we want this to be seen throughout the Bill.
The amendment would ensure that in the absence of the owner being available, a qualified vet would be present to decide whether it was in the animal’s best interests for it to be put to sleep. I believe that in the owner’s absence, only an independent vet should provide the necessary evidence for that important decision to be taken.
Amendment No. 182 seeks to ensure that the preservation of an animal’s life will always be the priority when taking decisions under the legislation. The Bill does not explicitly state that the destruction of an animal involved in a fighting offence should be the decision of last resort. The Kennel Club has expressed concern about the matter, and I believe that we must act in the best interests of an animal, regardless of the offence that it commits. As such, we must sometimes be prepared to put the effort in to preserve its life.
Sadly, it is all too often in the best interests of an animal involved in a fighting offence to be put down, but it should always be done after examining the medical evidence given by a veterinary surgeon, who should always exercise his judgment on the basis of the animal’s wellbeing.