Clause 30 - Providing false information
Identity Cards Bill
4:00 pm
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 228, in clause 30, page 26, line 15, leave out from 'false' to end of line 16.
I seek nothing more than an undertaking from the Minister that he will reconsider clause 30(2)(b). The amendment would remove the words
''is reckless as to whether or not it is false.''
I shall give the reasons for reconsidering the provision. It deals with someone who provides false information to someone else, perhaps in confirming the contents of an entry in the register. Such a person providing false information would be liable to penalties.
Clearly, the Minister has tried to assist the defendant by saying that the defendant has to know or believe the information to be false. That introduces an element of moral culpability—that is to say, the matter goes beyond the actus reus and involves some form of mens rea.
My point is that ''reckless'' is a very difficult word. It is increasingly frowned on in criminal law. In road traffic legislation, there used to be a charge of driving furiously. I am not even sure that it does not still exist in some jurisdictions, but I think that it has been taken away from our road traffic Acts. There used to be a charge of reckless driving, which I imagine fell somewhere between driving dangerously and driving without due care and attention. Reckless driving is no longer a charge.
The word ''reckless'' is used with tremendous caution in criminal cases because it is difficult to define. It has been particularly condemned in certain criminal damage cases. For example, what if someone slams down the telephone in a public kiosk when in a temper, and the thing breaks in half? It cannot necessarily be said that that person intended to break it in half. They were terribly angry because they could not get through but, on the other hand, there is a certain degree of moral culpability in slamming it down.
Case after case involves talking about recklessness and whether that is an essential element of an offence. All I would say to the Minister is that that is difficult territory. Judges find it extremely difficult to direct a jury on what ''reckless'' actually means. Does it mean negligently or carelessly? To what extent does recklessness involve knowledge? Directions to juries from judges over the years in cases using the word ''reckless'' have been fraught with difficulty.
If the Minister thinks that it is essential to include subsection (2)(b), so be it. However, we are doing our duty in Committee by pointing out the problem with that word, of which he, as a very skilled lawyer, will be well aware. Will he ponder the position between now and Report to see whether any improvement could be made?