Clause 29 - Unauthorised disclosure of information
Identity Cards Bill
3:00 pm
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
We have moved to an important clause, which makes whistleblowing an offence. It will be a criminal offence to disclose confidential information without lawful authority to others, such as journalists or loyal members of Her Majesty's Opposition, and information learnt during the course of employment by individuals who have responsibility for
''the establishment or maintenance of the Register; or . . . the issue, modification, cancellation or surrender of ID cards'',
which is deemed to be confidential.
I shall begin by speaking to amendments Nos. 230 and 231, which go together. Under clause 29, a person is guilty of an offence if, without lawful authority,
''he provides any person with information''
that he should not provide. I read the rest of the clause to see whether there were any defences. I was not looking for the whistleblowing provision, but I found the first reference to a defence under subsection (4). Let us assume that I work in such areas and I supply someone with information, because of negligence on my part, utterly accidentally. It cannot be impossible that I supplied information accidentally, not intending to cause any harm nor necessarily aware at the time that I had carried out such action.
I could not avail myself of subsection (4) because that would enable me to have a defence if I could show that, at the time of the alleged offence, I believed on reasonable grounds that I had lawful authority to provide such information. I could not possibly say that, because it would not apply in my circumstances. I put before the Committee the proposition that someone can supply another person with information somewhere between accidentally and negligently, but without what might be described as a level of criminal intent.
Such a person would not have a defence under the clause, which is why I want ''knowingly or recklessly'' inserted into the clause. There might be a better phrase than that. ''Reckless'' is not a word that actually commands great respect in criminal law at present, and has not done since the case of Caldwell. I am trying to cover the morally innocent person who supplies information to another accidentally or carelessly, but without the intent to cause a problem. The position of the whistleblower is different, because he or she supplies the information wholly and intentionally with a purpose. I shall deal with that in a moment. However, in amendments Nos. 230 and 231 I am trying to cover an individual who has, at worst, been negligent.
Amendment No. 229 would omit paragraph (c). Subsection (3)(c) states:
''information is provided or otherwise disclosed with lawful authority if . . . it is made in pursuance of a Community obligation''.
I have no idea what community obligations are. By seeking to omit paragraph (c), I can at least draw from the Minister some explanation as to what is meant by ''a Community obligation''.
Amendment No. 141 would widen subsection (4) to say that it shall be a defence if
''the provision of information or the making of the . . . disclosure was in the public interest.''
That is a public interest, or whistleblower, defence. Because such worlds are too complicated for me, I cannot envisage circumstances in which a whistleblower may want, or feel it essential, to provide some information to the public via the press or someone else. However, whistleblowers have been badly treated by Governments over the years, and the Government, on this occasion, ought to consider carefully our amendment on whistleblowers and the issue of public interest. Perhaps the whistleblower wishes to make public some dreadful scandal—I cannot say—but at least amendment No. 141 gives the Minister an opportunity to speak to us, hopefully at some length, on whistleblowing and a possible whistleblower's defence.