Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment No. 211, in page 18, line 43, leave out subsection (3).

I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Conway. We have a great deal to do this morning, so I want to be very brief in my introduction to the amendment, which relates to clause 20. That is an important clause because it is about what the Secretary of State may do without an individual's consent. It becomes a very serious matter when the state takes powers to do things without such consent. Subsection (3) is very complicated, and the amendment is designed to probe the Minister about what it means.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

This amendment is helpful. Like other Committee members, I have worked through the clauses and the explanatory notes to try to understand the exact scope of this clause. It is difficult and complex.

To what extent are we talking about only the provision of information to people overseas? To what extent would that broaden the scope of our previous discussion on clause 19 about allowing information to be disclosed to other people and agencies in the United Kingdom, separately from the scope of that clause? We would like to discuss such issues more generally in the clause stand part debate.

During our discussions on this amendment it would be helpful to be given a greater understanding of the precise scope of the provisions in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Does the Minister see the clause as being specifically about the disclosure of information from the identity register to people abroad for overseas proceedings, or as applying more broadly?

Explanatory notes are usually very helpful. However, paragraph 132 of those for this Bill pretty much repeats the wording of the clause, and does not leave us any more enlightened. It also has an interesting variation on the spelling of ''overseas''—it spells it ''oversees'' twice. It is important that we get a statement from the Minister on the precise intention of the clause. Clearly, people will have additional concerns about the provision of data held by the UK Government to people overseas; when such data goes overseas, it will not be under the same control mechanisms as when it is held in the United Kingdom only. That is a natural area of concern, which I hope the Minister will clarify in his response.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

I have little to add, save that my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) is entirely right. We are dealing with an important clause about the provision of information without the consent of the individual, an issue to which we shall no doubt return during the stand part debate.

Like the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan), I had spotted the mistake in the spelling of ''overseas''. I am afraid to say that, having read subsection (3) and paragraph 132 of the explanatory notes two or three times, I was very little the wiser. The   amendment would omit subsection (3), on which we seek a full explanation from the Minister. Paragraph 132 is helpful in that it draws our attention to the ability to prohibit the provision of information without consent for use in overseas proceedings.

I shall make two points, to which I hope the Minister can respond. What sort of overseas proceedings are we talking about? Would they be those that deal solely with criminal charges and the like, and would the provision apply to every other country in the world? Will the Minister focus a little on the issue of control?

It is not unknown for certain matters not to be able to be published in our own press in this country, because of our domestic laws. That is very proper; matters might be subject to privilege or injunctions. Nevertheless, no such provision can extend to foreign websites and newspapers. Sometimes a person otherwise protected from the provision of information in this country, finds himself totally unprotected because it can be provided abroad. It would be helpful if the Minister took us through examples of what subsection (3) means, and we look forward to hearing from him.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

This is an important clause. I will try to contextualise it and I may stray into a broader debate than the amendment demands. My comments can be carried over into the clause stand part debate if appropriate.

The clause sets out the relationship between the Bill and another important piece of legislation, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Specifically, the clause deals with how information from the register could be provided without consent for the purposes set out in that Act. Therefore, it is not restricted to the provision of information to overseas authorities, although that is the issue on which the amendment has concentrated.

To understand subsection (3) one must understand the context. Section 17 of the 2001 Act was enacted to ensure that public authorities could disclose information that was otherwise subject to statutory restriction on disclosure for the purposes of a criminal investigation or criminal proceedings.

Under section 17(2) of the 2001 Act, information that is subject to a statutory bar may be disclosed for the purposes of carrying out, initiating, bringing to an end or facilitating a determination of criminal investigations and criminal proceedings in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. That answers the hon. Gentleman's query about the sorts of proceedings. The 2001 Act restricts provision to those purposes I mentioned.

Clause 20 of the Identity Cards Bill ensures that information can be provided without consent for the purposes specified in the 2001 Act, provided the rules in clause 23 of the Identity Cards Bill are complied with. I will discuss those rules in due course. Subsection (3) would allow the Secretary of State to give a direction prohibiting the provision of information for use in specified overseas proceedings. That is a limitation on the power that exists in the 2001 Act and it mirrors the corresponding power in section   18 of that Act. All we have sought to do in subsection (3) is mirror the restriction and I will come on to give one example of where the restriction might be applied. The effect of the amendment would be to remove that power and that restriction.

The grounds on which the Secretary of State might prohibit information from being provided for overseas purposes under section 18 of the 2001 Act include where the Secretary of State considers that it would be more appropriate for any jurisdiction or investigation to be exercised or carried out by a court of the UK. Where, for example, the Secretary of State takes the view that it would be more appropriate to proceed with a prosecution in the UK rather than abroad, the Secretary of State can quite rightly withhold that information from the authorities abroad, so that it does not facilitate a prosecution. They are exactly the sorts of circumstances in which I think hon. Members would want the Secretary of State to be exercising such a power.

That simple response answers the point that was raised, although hon. Members might want to explore it further.

Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)

I can see exactly what the Minister is trying to do. His final remark was that he thought that hon. Members would want this power. Immediately, something set my mind thinking. What if we were faced with the opposite situation, where a foreign Government were withholding information so that we could not prosecute someone who had committed a crime in this country? I am not sure that we would be happy about that. I am a little worried about the power. There is clearly a difficulty of the jurisdiction and where the prosecution takes place, but this is an important matter about which we must think carefully. Perhaps the Minister will give it further thought.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

I always listen with care to the hon. Gentleman's contributions and I will of course give it further thought. The clause is entitled to facilitate the disclosure of information in a context that Parliament has already legislated for in the 2001 Act. It is entirely appropriate that the Bill should be consistent with the qualifications in that Act. It would be inappropriate to have inconsistent legislation. The whole purpose of subsection (3) is to mirror properly in the Bill the restriction in the 2001 Act. I can think of many reasons why we, as a sovereign Government, would want to be able to exercise that power. I can also think of many reasons why other Governments would not want us to; but that, of course, would be a matter for relationships and discussions between Governments, and it is quite right that it should be. It would be entirely inappropriate if the Secretary of State was required to give such information in those circumstances.

Consequently, it is right that the Bill contains provisions to ensure that it is consistent with the 2001 Act. That is a clear explanation of what we are doing. I invite the Committee to reject the amendment. In fact, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.  

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

This is an important clause in terms of how it relates to clause 19, the clause on which we ended our discussions on Tuesday evening. It is important, under this part of the Bill, to test the Government's intentions in respect of paragraph 9, schedule 1 information; in ordinary English, that is the provision dealing with the personal or audit trail, showing all the times that the identity register has been checked. That is potentially the most personal data held in the system, allowing people to track a person's movements and the kind of interactions that they have had.

We have to remember that the audit trail may include lots of interactions with public services, border control interactions and any interaction with the police or law enforcement agencies. Under the provisions that allow the identity register to be used by commercial entities, the audit trail may also include things such as registering for a new mobile phone contract and opening a new bank account. All that information will, I assume, be stored as audit records under paragraph 9 of schedule 1.

This is what I am seeking to tease out from the Minister: clause 20, as it interacts with clause 19, seems to suggest that there will be hierarchies of suspicion that allow paragraph 9 of schedule 1—the audit trail information—to be disclosed. The clause seems to put in a serious crime threshold for certain bodies, and we sought to debate that under clause 19.

Mr John Taylor (Solihull, Conservative)

I endeavoured to regale the Committee with my recent experience of buying a new motor car. I had to produce a passport; I think that that may have had something to do with money laundering. I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman would care to say, in his excellent review of the situations covered, whether my experience is instructive.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

The hon. Gentleman is entirely correct. In our earlier debates, we discussed the issue of money laundering regulations. They may be the Trojan horse that effectively introduces compulsion into the carrying and use of an identity card, because anti-money laundering legislation will have a cascade effect. It will mean saying to organisations, ''If you want to be sure that you are complying and that you will not be prosecuted, you must perform certain checks'' but, in a sense, the only acceptable form of check would be the identity card. If that becomes the case, and the identity card comes to be in regular use for all kinds of routine financial transactions, the audit trail will effectively include a record of the fact that a person carried out a financial transaction with a particular body on a particular date. That is potentially very intrusive.

Mr John Taylor (Solihull, Conservative)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way to me yet again. To pick up on remarks made in an earlier sitting by my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold, does that not show that the use of the identity card will not be driven merely by its necessity for accessing public services, but will be further driven—to an extent as yet unknown—by its   necessity in engaging in private contracts in the private sector?

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

The hon. Gentleman puts his point effectively. We can assume that those data will be available.

I would like to clarify my reading of clause 20—subsection (4) in particular—with the Minister. He has already put his case for why the security services, which are those bodies set out in clause 19(2) and might be called the spook element, should have comprehensive access to data. He describes their comprehensive statutory functions and the fact that they will have access to the audit trail data and everything in the register at all times for the broad range of purposes that have been set out.

Those who will have access to the broad identity data in all circumstances are listed in subsections (3), (4) and (5). They are the Departments or the money people—whatever they are going to be called after the merging and reorganising of Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue—and chief officers of police. We now know that that will include some of the Channel Islands as well, although the Alderney question is hanging over us. I do not know if that has been answered.

Those people will have access to the generality of the identity data under all circumstances, but my reading of clause 20(4) is that they will have access to the audit trail data only if they are investigating serious crime. I am trying to understand how that restriction will work in practice. It seems curious that we have this wording in clause 20(4), but clause 19 (3), which is about the police, and subsections (4) and (5), which are about Customs and Excise and the money people, all have similar wording excluding paragraph 9 of schedule 1. Can the Minister clarify whether his intention is for the two clauses to interact to say that those people have restricted access under clause 19, which is then clarified in clause 20? It seems oddly structured, rather than have all the powers defined in one clause, to have brought them into clause 20(4).

The other area of interest here, which has not yet been discussed, is clause 20(2), which again makes reference to the exclusion of the personal audit data of paragraph 9 of schedule 1. I want to clarify the intention here. Clause 20(2) says

''provision of . . . information not falling within paragraph 9 of schedule 1 is authorised by this section''

and then talks about the anti-terrorism, crime and security elements that we have just discussed. Is it the intention, therefore, that the audit data will never be disclosed under these 2001 Act provisions?

Subsection (2) seems to suggest that a if public body is able to disclose information under the 2001 Act, it will not include the paragraph 9 of schedule 1 information. If someone needed to get hold of that, it would have to be disclosed under clause 19 and clause 20(4) powers. I am trying to understand the matrix of clauses 19 and 20—the net effect for the system as to when this potentially very comprehensive and very personal data might be disclosed.  

Another point that it might be helpful to have clarified is the scope of the audit trail. We have discussed the audit trail: I can understand why the Government are damned if they do and damned if they don't, as not having one is problematic while having one is potentially intrusive.

Again, to understand the scope of that audit trail, it would be helpful to know what data are to be disclosed under subsection (4). Will they form a whole-life record? That is the key question. Are we saying that from the moment somebody gets an identity card, which is going to be fairly swiftly if the Government have their way, the audit trail will be kept for whole of life? If at no point will it be deleted as historic data, the data that can be disclosed under clause 20(4) will be potentially intrusive and comprehensive. The public ought to be aware of the extent to which those data will be kept and the circumstances under which they may be disclosed.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

I would like to make one point—a general one—which was put to me by the Commission for Racial Equality. This is its view, so it is appropriate that I mention it in the clause stand part debate, although it covers other clauses, too. It is important that the Minister knows that the CRE is concerned that in the current anti-terrorism climate, the disclosure powers—combined with increasing racial or religious profiling—provide the opportunity to target particular groups or categories of person. It reminds us that the stop-and-search rate for black and Asian people under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is between four and five times higher than that for white people.

Also, the commission is concerned that Muslims may be over-represented in those data and fears that there may be racial profiling of suspected terrorists or targeting of the Muslim community, particularly by the police and intelligence services. It believes that it is essential that threats posed by a few individuals do not translate into measures that, especially since 11 September, are perceived as being targeted exclusively on Muslims or on any other racial or faith community. It wants safeguards to be in place to ensure that the practical use of the national identity register by prescribed agencies reflects that.

It is a regular procedure in the House that interest groups express their concerns about certain issues to Members and I thought it my duty to pass on those points to the Minister. This clause is very important; it is potentially extremely intrusive on the lives of individuals in this country. As my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold has said, we are discussing a situation in which there is no consent from the individual and disclosure of information by the Home Secretary to a variety of bodies—home security services, the police, the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise. It is my understanding that any information is authorised to be disclosed to the security services if it is in connection with their functions and that information provided to the other agencies is acceptable if it is in the interests of national security or the prevention or detection of crime, or for other reasons that the Home Secretary will specify by   order. If that is right, perhaps the Minister will talk to us about those other reasons.

The most troubling aspect is in paragraph 9 of schedule 1. We return to it time and again, and the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam is entirely right to draw our attention to the problems with it. If one is searching for wording that is not plain English and that needs to be carefully analysed to decide what it means in practice, one need look no further than paragraph 9, which is very important. It states:

''The following may be recorded in the entry in the Register for an individual—

(a) particulars of every occasion on which information contained in the individual's entry has been provided to a person''.

What does that mean? Does it mean that every single time any information about me is provided to anybody, that has to be—or can be—recorded in the register? Does sub-paragraph (b) mean that every single time such information is provided, a note will be made on the register of to whom it has been provided?

I am especially concerned about sub-paragraph (c). It refers to

''other particulars, in relation to each such occasion, of the provision of the information.''

What on earth does the word ''particulars'' mean in that context?

That brings us on to the whole issue of what some briefing papers call the audit trail and the clause's potentially intrusive nature with regard to my life. Let me explain my understanding of it. The Minister would do well to confirm or deny it, because there are those outside the Committee who will want to know what is kept on the register, and who has access to it and for what purposes. I understand that in due course my register entry will have been set up, but my identity card may or may not replace my passport. Will he confirm that every time I travel using a travel document, that fact will be noted on the register and I will, in a sense, be followed in an audit trail with the facts being noted on the register and accessible by other people for various purposes?

Will the Minister tell us, particularly in relation to the words

''other particulars, in relation to each such occasion, of the provision of the information'',

not only who will have access to all that, and in what circumstances and for how long, but which activities of mine could possibly be on the register and which of the various bodies will have access to the information?

I assume that I will get my card on a certain date, having first been on the register. For the sake of the debate, let us say that I am 35. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam asked for how long the audit trail will continue. Will it continue to my death, perhaps 50 years later? By then, what information about me will have been built up on the register? Virtually all my business and domestic activities, and my travel, will be on there for people to access. Is there a cut-off point, after a certain number of years, when this information will be deleted?

Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)

My hon. Friend is well versed in these matters. What is the current procedure if the   police investigate a serious crime—perhaps involving national security—and somebody is investigated who subsequently proves to be totally unconnected and innocent? Are records kept for ever more? If not, why are these records to be kept?

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

My hon. Friend raises an interesting point on the distinction between crime in relation to national security—we all understand that the Bill relates to terrorism—and other crime, ranging from the lowest sort to some crime encompassed by these provisions, which is more serious.

If, for example, my hon. Friend were charged with a grave offence, God forbid, notwithstanding the fact that he was acquitted unanimously by a jury in the Crown court, records of that charge would certainly be kept, although he would leave court without a stain on his character. To that extent, in relation to terrorist matters, the record would be kept and there would be an existing audit trail.

Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)

My hon. Friend slightly misunderstands what I am probing for. If the police eliminated me completely from their inquiries, there would be no record of my involvement, because I had nothing to do with the crime. However, under this procedure, the information will be sought and put on the register, and we do not know how long it will remain there. That is the difference.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

I was obtuse. It was too early in the morning for me to spot exactly what my hon. Friend was saying, but I understand now. Of course, if he was utterly cleared under the current law and everyone found out that he had nothing to do with the crime, that would be the end of the story and no records would be kept.

The Minister may want to confirm that we are moving toward a provision under which the scenario advanced by my hon. Friend as to a record being kept may apply to the new register and identity card information. That has not hitherto been so and is yet another relevant example.

I was not able to mention my next point when we concluded our deliberations on Tuesday, because we rushed through a number of clauses and were unable to debate them at length. My right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis), the shadow Home Secretary, and others on the Conservative Benches will continue to express their worries about the effect of the Bill on civil liberties, individual freedoms and the over-mighty state. The clause and subsequent clauses provide a golden opportunity for the Minister to speak at length—I do not want a short reply—and satisfy the Committee that our worries and those that have been expressed by people outside the building about civil liberties and intrusiveness can be met.

My right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary said on Second Reading that civil liberties is one of the important tests that the Government need to meet. I am bound to say that, from what I have seen so far in the clauses and in the absence of a full explanation of paragraph 9 of schedule 1, my worries remain distinct.  

Mr Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), Home Affairs; Newark, Conservative)

Without referring specifically to cases that are in and out of court and in the public eye at the moment, will the Minister relate clause 20 to our present circumstances? I am talking about bringing British citizens back to this country from a period of detention abroad where they were uncharged and untried and, simultaneously, the new control measures to which the Home Secretary referred when it seemed that terrorist suspects were to be released into the community. Indeed, some may be sent back to their countries of origin, while others will be kept under a type of house arrest or, perhaps, even tagged. How much clause 20 will bear on those three different measures will clearly be important in the future.

Will the Minister reflect on subsection (3), which

''shall have effect in relation to the provision of a person with information by virtue of subsection (2)'',

particularly in respect of overseas purposes? The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam drew attention to the sudden inclusion of the words ''serious crime'' as opposed to ''crime''. I should be grateful if the Minister would relate that to the present circumstances, as it will concentrate our minds in the future. My argument is based on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking when he spoke about the views of the shadow Home Secretary on the importance of civil liberties and how such matters will bear on that.

Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)

I had not intended to speak to clause stand part, but the interaction between my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) and the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam—and the interaction between clauses 20 and 23—could give rise to serious problems about civil liberties. We must be proportionate, and clearly the state has to take powers to deal with serious crime, but, as has been pointed out several times this morning, the use of information can take place without an individual's consent. When we consider clause 20 and the requirements that must be satisfied under clause 23, it seems that senior officers of the new Serious Organised Crime Agency have to say to the Secretary of State only that they have serious concerns about a person and the Secretary of State will make an order.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

My hon. Friend refers to the security services saying that they have serious concerns. Nowhere in the Bill do I see the fact that the Secretary of State must then say to the security services, ''Prove your serious concerns. Don't just come fishing, tell me what they are so that I can make a judgment on their merits''. There seems to be no provision by which to judge the merits.

Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Perhaps the Minister will comment on that. It is a significant and serious point.

I will give the Committee two examples where I would be concerned about the use of the powers. I have already shown concern about the first in my intervention on my hon. Friend. It relates to people who are totally innocent but who are connected to   someone who might be a terrorist. Supposing that, on a Thursday morning, a terrorist goes to collect his shopping from somebody but they are being watched. That somebody would be totally innocent in relation to the activities of the terrorist, yet an inquiry would be made and an entry would be made on their register.

My second concern is association. I do not wish to cast any aspersion on any particular religious group. Supposing there were a religious group—let us not even name the type of religious group—and certain individuals within it were suspected of terrorist activities. The powers might be used to get information on every person who went quite innocently to that religious gathering. Again, there would be an entry in the register for that purpose.

It would not be quite so bad, and I would not have quite such concern, if the Minister could assure us this morning that the entries on the register are sunset provisions, so that when somebody is totally cleared of having any association with a crime, the entry is removed. There could be a build-up of someone's entries. If there are a huge number of entries and someone examines them and says, ''Oh gosh, this person has been inquired about an awful lot of times,'' they might start to be investigated for no particularly good reason. The phrase ''fishing expeditions'' has been used this morning and I am concerned about the state going on such expeditions into ordinary citizens' lives.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

The hon. Gentleman makes a useful point about the potential effects of someone having had checks made against them, their being on the register and that leading other people to grow the cloud of suspicion around them. Does he agree that it would be helpful for the Minister to clarify whether checks that are made without consent under these kinds of provisions—clauses 19 and 20 and so on—would also be recorded in the audit trail? We know that other checks will be recorded in that trail. It would be helpful to know whether the without consent checks will also all be specifically recorded.

Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point and it is one of a number to which I would like the Minister to give an answer.

My final query is whether there are any circumstances in which information that has been acquired without an individual's consent can be used in court proceedings. We need to know in what circumstances the information can be used subsequently.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

I will endeavour to give as full a response as hon. Members would wish on this important matter. The debate has been broader than the provisions of clause 20 and I understand that.

I remind hon. Members that the clause is intended to set out the relationship between the Bill and the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which this Parliament has already passed. It is part of the law and, as I said earlier, it is the Government's intention to make the provisions of the Identity Cards Bill entirely consistent with that existing legislation and the clause seeks to do that.  

It is probably best to start this more detailed contribution where I think the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam did, and to discuss the ''damned if you do, and damned if you don't'' circumstances. The Government are mindful that the use of the cards, the recording of their use and the recording of information relating to their use or the extraction of information from the register must be recorded. There is no question but that, for the civil liberties of individuals, for data protection reasons and for many other reasons, all of which I think we would subscribe to, it is crucially important that the register records the use to which it has been put in respect of an individual. I would want to be able to know who had access to the information on me, and that must be recorded.

I accept that there are certain circumstances, such as in the investigation of serious criminal matters, in which it would not be in the public interest for the individual to get that information, and the Bill reflects that; exceptions are made for that. However, it is important that the necessary oversight of the scheme allows the relevant commissioner—and that includes the intelligence services commissioner, whom we are about to discuss under the Bill—access to the audit trail so that they can oversee the use of the information. So the collecting of the information is important for the purposes of securing individuals' liberties. I do not think that there is any disagreement about that.

The next question is how long that information should be held. Obviously, information could be misinterpreted, but we ensure that that does not happen by providing for oversight by the commissioners, rather than by inappropriately deleting data so that information about exactly how the records have been accessed is destroyed and therefore cannot be audited in future. Therein lies the rub. The answer lies in the Bill, and I shall come to that later.

Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)

If one was standing in the commissioner's shoes, and there was the slightest doubt as to whether information could have any useful purpose in future, one would be bound to come down on the side of retaining that information. That is the point. Someone in that official capacity is bound to do that. Whether that is the correct thing to do on civil liberties grounds is a totally different question.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

The scheme is structured so that the retention of that information is subject to a very important qualification set out in clause 3(4), a clause that we have already agreed should stand part of the Bill. It specifically says:

''Information, once entered in the Register, may continue to be recorded in the Register for so long as it is consistent with the statutory purposes for it to be so recorded.''

That is entirely appropriate phraseology, and an entirely appropriate set of circumstances for the commissioners to operate within. It would be inappropriate for me, as a Minister, to seek to define what may continue to be recorded in advance by giving some sort of time limit.  

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

We understand that the Minister cannot put a time limit in the Bill, but he will understand why we raised the issue. Could he give us examples of the sort of situation in which he envisages that the information might be deleted?

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

An example of when it might be deleted would be a situation in which the information was no longer of relevance, for the purposes of the Bill.

I have been asked to comment on information recording the fact that security services or police services—agencies of that nature—have accessed information under the powers in the Bill. The concern of the hon. Member for Cotswold was that an individual's record might be accessed on a number of occasions. Let us say that access was justified in terms of the circumstances in which the application was made, and let us say that the relevant tests were passed, but that the search turns out to be fruitless. The information might have been needed to prove a person's innocence, if nothing else, and we hope that it might prove that, in certain circumstances. The recording of that access might, over a number of occasions, build up to a suspicious entry.

I understand why the hon. Gentleman puts that point forward but, in relation to an individual's civil liberties, I would much rather that such information was preserved. I can see arguments why deletion of that information would give a false impression of the way in which an individual's information had been accessed. Once it was deleted and lost, the fact that information had been abortively accessed on a number of occasions would be lost, and that might be just the sort of thing that a commissioner would want to comment on. For clear and understandable reasons, I am not prepared to set out now the parameters for when that information should be stored or deleted. That will develop over time, and it will be a matter for the commissioner.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

The Minister has correctly referred us back to clause 3 and the statutory purposes. However, they include the lower level threshold of the prevention and detection of crime, and the inference might be drawn from that that information in relation to that very broad category of the statutory purpose of the prevention or detection of crime could be held for as long as is possible under the statute of limitations.

I hope that the Minister will be able to give more assurances on that in later stages of our deliberations. We know that discussions of those kinds of issues take place; for example, in the context of the regulation of investigatory powers, there is a debate between the Home Office and law enforcement officers about what is proportionate and necessary. The public will want more clarity than, ''We can't really set any kind of framework at the moment.''

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

With respect to the hon. Gentleman, I have not said all that I intended to say on this matter.

Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)

It is not often that I fundamentally disagree with the Minister, but I do fundamentally disagree with him on this point. Let us take my example of the terrorist who collects his   shopping from a lady who is proved subsequently—even on the same day, perhaps—to be totally innocent. Surely, her entry in the register should be deleted as soon as possible? To broaden the point, when an entry is put on the register, will there be any mechanism to record the result of that inquiry? If that woman's entry remains on the register, surely it should be recorded that the matter was followed up, but that she was found to be totally innocent.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

There is a fundamental disagreement between the hon. Gentleman and me on this. If I was that totally innocent individual who happened to be near to a person who was perceived to be a serious threat to this country, in circumstances that justified access to my entry in the register to establish my identity because there were grounds for suspecting that I might have been involved in a serious crime, and that access established or helped to establish that I was entirely innocent, that is the sort of information that I would want to be preserved on the register, so that at some time in the future a commissioner might be able to say that that occasion of access happened. That is exactly the sort of thing that, for the protection of my liberty, I would want to be recorded. It is also exactly the sort of thing that would reassure those people from ethnic minorities or religious groups who have concerns, because it would allow an accumulation of information to show whether there were trends of access, and that would allow a commissioner, or the intelligence services commissioner, to comment on whether there had been inappropriate use of the information on the register.

I fundamentally disagree with the hon. Gentleman about this matter, but I understand that it does fall within the ''damned if you do, and damned if you don't'' category. That is a consequence of having a register of this nature, with the powers that we already give those whom we charge with the serious responsibility of investigating and preventing serious crime.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

This is an important debate, and I have a specific question for the Minister. Does

''uses connected with the prevention and detection of crime''

extend to uses in relation to the prosecution of a criminal offence? If I was appearing in the Crown court and I had as a defence an alibi for a particular date, would the prosecution be entitled to seek from the register rebuttal evidence as to where I was on that date—for example, whether I was abroad or not? I repeat that that is a specific question.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

The prosecution, like the defence, would be entitled to refer to the register to establish an alibi, for example. If that information were preserved in the context of a criminal prosecution, I would think it entirely appropriate that it could be accessed. However, it could not be accessed willy-nilly. There would have to be reason to believe that such an investigation would reveal information that would be of assistance, just as there are rules on the disclosure of evidence in all criminal proceedings. In criminal proceedings, we seek to establish a person's guilt to a very high standard of proof. If there is evidence that can establish a person's innocence or guilt, that should   be made available, subject to the appropriate qualifications and restrictions.

I move on to the provisions of paragraph 9 of schedule 1. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam asked what sort of particulars would be recorded in the register. There would be an audit trail; the register is designed to record audit-trail information. I have no particular concerns about my or anyone else's understanding of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). Of course, other particulars could be recorded, such as what individual in an organisation made an inquiry allowed under sub-paragraph (c). That qualificatory information and any other that makes clear the nature of the inquiry may be recorded so that that inquiry can be properly understood, not least by the person to whom the register entry relates.

I have already dealt with the issue of the length of detention. I must admit that I fail to understand the concern of the hon. Member for Woking concern about religious profiling, although I understand that he raised it as a third-hand issue. No record will be made of people's religion as a registrable fact in the register. It will not allow people to do religious profiling; that is not the intention and there is no power to record people's religious affiliations.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

I should like to correct the Minister. He has properly addressed the issue, but I do not think that he intended to say that such concerns were necessarily mine. I made it absolutely plain that I was putting forward concerns expressed to me for his comment. I am grateful to him for commenting on them.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

The hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam asked about the interaction of clauses 19 and 20. In so far as I understood him, and I think that I did understand him clearly, his interpretation of the two clauses was correct. Subsection (4) would allow

''The provision of information falling within the provisions under paragraph 9 of Schedule 1'',

which is about the records of information provided from the register. It would allow the provision of such information to the police, the Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise and Departments. Provision of such information could also be authorised for criminal investigations or proceedings, but only if it were for purposes connected with the prevention and detection of serious crime. That will allow a higher threshold to apply when the information provided relates to an individual's use of an ID card, rather than to what might be called static information, such as names, addresses and other information clearly about identity.

That information may be provided to certain persons under other clauses, of course, and it is right to give the example of the security services, which are mentioned in clause 19(2). That clause is needed to ensure that the Bill is clear about the circumstances in which, and for what purposes, information can be provided without consent. A consistent thread runs through the Bill. Other than those agencies with particular responsibilities in relation to national security, which have their own statutory framework as a justification for having access to such information,   access for the investigation of criminal or related matters is restricted to the prevention and detection of serious crime, which is defined in clause 43.

I hope that that deals with all the matters that hon. Members have raised. I think that it does, with the exception of that raised by the hon. Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer), who asked me to speculate on the interrelation between these provisions and a piece of legislation that was described in the broadest of terms by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary yesterday. I regret that until the detail of that legislation is drafted, I will not be able to do for the Committee what the hon. Gentleman has suggested and I cannot assist the Committee any further on that point.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.