Clause 12 - Notification of changes affecting accuracy of Register
Identity Cards Bill
2:30 pm
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
May I add my welcome to those of other hon. Members to you, Ms Anderson? I am grateful for this opportunity to concentrate briefly on the issue of the accuracy of the register, which is at the heart of the whole scheme.
The Government are mindful that all practicable steps ought to be taken to ensure that data are entirely accurate, and that those to whom they relate are notified of information in that regard, where it is practical to do so. That would do nothing more than make us conform with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998, which was partly enacted for this very purpose. I want to say where the basis of that accuracy will lie, and how it will be achieved.
In passing, I point out to the hon. Member for Newark that the Australians do not have an identity scheme; he is probably aware of that. For all I know, he may be right about the practices he mentioned to the Committee, but they might relate to the social security card scheme that the Australians have, rather than any identity card. However, that does not detract from his point.
If this scheme is to provide the standard of identification that we need, it is vital that the applicant's identity is verified in the first instance, before an entry is made in the register. Clause 11 enables us to do that, by virtue of checks and other sources of information. A Cabinet Office study on identity fraud published in July 2002 recommended greater use of biographical checks on applicants to prevent identity fraud; that is why the clause has been drafted in this way.
The national identity register will be a new database, and applications will require checks to be made against other databases, such as Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency driver information, Department for Work and Pensions information on national insurance, and birth, marriage and death records, in order to establish a biographical footprint, and to protect against fraudulent applications, among other things. That information will give us a basis from which the register can go forward. It will be verified at that early point, and it will reach the highest possible standards.
The amendment would require the Secretary of State to send to each individual to whom an identity card has been issued a copy of the details recorded in his entry on the register every two years. Some countries—the Netherlands, for example—do that in their identity card scheme; a statement is delivered to the individual's recorded home address. We considered doing that, but we have rejected it for security reasons and to ensure that personal information is available only to the person to whom that information relates. We do not consider that it would be an appropriate way of ensuring that an individual is aware of the information recorded in his entry.
However, that does not mean that an individual will not be aware of his or her entry. All applicants will have data subject access rights under the 1998 Act, and we are looking at ways of ensuring that an individual will be able to read his or her card and the register entry as easily as possible. For example, we might be able to offer a service whereby an individual could read the information held on his or her entry securely via the internet or public service kiosks.
I hope that what I have said reassures hon. Members that we will be able to maintain security from the base of having the highest security standards from the outset, and that they will agree that the amendment is unnecessary.