Clause 5 - Applications relating to entries in Register
Identity Cards Bill
2:30 pm
Mr Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), Home Affairs; Newark, Conservative)
I join in welcoming you to the Chair, Ms Anderson. Things have been light-hearted so far. The proceedings have been extremely efficient, and I have no doubt that they will continue in the same vein.
I am sorry that the hon. Member for Reading, West (Mr. Salter) is not in his place, because a number of his interventions in earlier debates were telling. He expressed grave concern about the need for identity cards being associated with needs other than those purely of counter-terrorism. He mentioned control of illegal immigration, assistance to track down criminals who are about to commit, or are in the execution of, serious crimes, and money laundering.
Terrorism and all those subjects are inextricably linked. That is why I want to echo the words of the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis). He talked about the need for two tests, as exemplified by amendment No. 152. The first is whether the biometrics of the card will work. The second is whether the Government, and, therefore, the Home Office, can put these things in place.
I will not talk about biometrics, but about previous examples where technology has either failed or been introduced too early. I will use historic examples, because that is what I am familiar with. I am not talking about biometrics, but the technology in question was the biometrics of the day. I am talking about the Northern Ireland driving licence, which was used as a form of identity card in Ulster in the '70s, the '80s and indeed the '90s. We were promised that the card would help considerably in countering terrorism. I mentioned in an earlier debate how the card came to be seen more as a pass than anything else, perhaps abetting terrorism rather than countering it.
There were practical issues with the biometrics of the day—namely, the technology of the day—which made sure that the card did not work. First, the card was extremely shoddily produced—it was not waterproof. That meant that after two or three exposures to the driving rain of Ulster the thing started to fall to pieces. Secondly, the licence was desperately easily faked. The photograph contained inside it could be levered out, replaced with another and sealed up in such a way that the card became completely meaningless. Again, that assisted terrorism rather than thwarted it.
Are the biometrics on the card that the Government are talking about going to be successful? Again I take the point that the hon. Gentleman made—when are we going to indulge in biometrics? Are we going to wait for them to be perfect or are we going to use them now? I thought that that was a persuasive argument. The fact remains that we must not try to use a technology of biometrics which is in any way less than feasible, if not perfect. If we do, the scheme will be worse than useless. If we do, we will be making a stick with which to beat ourselves rather than an asset for our security forces.
Let me give another example. Again, I am talking about the use of technology to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland. In the late '80s it was decided that a plate checker would be introduced for service, a piece of technology that would assist by automatically reading the number plates of cars as they passed through permanent vehicle checkpoints. It was introduced prematurely; it did not work. It did not work to the detriment of that particular brand of terrorism. Cars were able to pass unchecked. Plates were easily faked. The terrorists became used to what was required of the plate checker. In other words, the technology—for which we might substitute biometrics—was not up to it.
On the point about fingerprints mentioned earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins), serious and organised crime in Ukraine has put a finger—forgive the pun—on the fact that fingerprints can be removed. The process is painful, but can be done. If we are going to have fingerprints on the card, then all eight fingerprints will have to be on there, as discussed. At this point, are we in a position to say that biometrics are useful, that we can make them work and underlie the utility of this card?
Secondly, there are the logistics of the card. We have had many examples so far showing how difficult it will be to get software and other computer programmes physically to ensure that these cards are correctly configured and distributed.
Sticking to the subject of terrorism, the Government told us last year that households were going to be warned about the threat of terrorism and how to cope with that threat. A leaflet to tell every household was produced. There are 1.5 million households that have yet to receive that leaflet—that is 1.5 million households that have yet to understand what message the Government are trying to put across. That is relatively simple stuff.
What chance do we have of ensuring that such technical details for identity cards—with all the biometrics required on them—are going to be feasible? I would be grateful if the Minister responded to those two challenges, in terms not only of the technical aspects that the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan) and a number of my hon. Friends have outlined so clearly, but of the straightforward, practical elements of historical examples that I have seen fail.