Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

I beg to move amendment No. 164, in clause 5, page 4, line 35, leave out 'must' and insert

'may, if the applicant so chooses,'.

The Minister was correct to say that the debate on the previous clause was a preface to this debate. In clause 5, we explore the mechanism for how the designated document procedure will work. The amendment seeks to break the link between the designated document and the ID card as a form of compulsion. It says that the only circumstances under which an ID card would be issued, or someone would be entered on the register when applying for the designated document, would be if the applicant chose it. It reverses the presumption, so that the applicant has to request the ID card rather than the Government being able to insist that they take it. I am grateful to the Minister for the clarity of his remarks on the previous clause about compulsion.

It seems to us, however, that the field of play has shifted as we have gone through the ID cards debate, and it has sometimes been difficult to keep up with where we are. My fear is that the legislation still reflects a previous stage of the political debate. The Minister has just accepted that the designated document procedure will now be subject to slightly more robust parliamentary procedure. As originally drafted, it was very weak in terms of scrutiny. All the scrutiny is piled up in clause 6, where we have the super-affirmative, gold-plated procedure. However, we understand from the last debate that the provision in clause 6, which deals with requiring the last 20 per cent. to get ID cards, is not the important one. By the time we get to that debate, we will have discussed compulsion. We are doing compulsion now—on this amendment and these clauses—and we will not be doing compulsion in the sense of clause 6. The decision, in principle, is being taken now.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

I rise to reinforce the point that I have consistently made in this debate. We should have the debate about compulsion in the context of this legislation. We had it on Second Reading, and that was the appropriate place to have it. We should have it here in Committee when it arises, and not in relation to one clause or another but across the aboard. We should have the debate about compulsion now. People who do not agree with compulsion do not vote for this Bill.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

I am grateful to the Minister for being so forthright. Because of earlier debates about how the ID card would work, there was a perception that we could introduce a voluntary scheme now. That was the situation that I have been trying to describe. The Government's intention was to introduce a voluntary scheme, and then to have a later decision, perhaps five years down the track or in 2008, when they would come back to the House and have a super-affirmative procedure to decide on compulsion. I suggest that the structure of the Bill still reflects that situation, although the Minister has now made it absolutely clear that the politics is not as such. The impact of   accepting the Bill is to accept compulsory ID cards today.

I have been trying to describe the situation that I saw in the legislation. Certainly a reason for tabling this amendment is to reverse that position to an earlier stage in the political debate, when the suggestion was of genuine voluntarism. I will set out the reasons why the amendment seeks to do that.

Ms Kate Hoey (Vauxhall, Labour)

I support the hon. Gentleman's amendment, but does he not agree that it would have been much more transparent and honest if the Government had called this Bill the compulsory identity card Bill?

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

The hon. Lady is correct. There is still confusion among the public. The terms of the Bill are such that there is a sense of voluntarism, which is only partial.

There is another debate at the moment, about the digital switch-over of TVs, which will find echoes here. At some point, the analogue TV signal will be switched off, which may be far more resented by people than anything to do with ID cards. That will be a more contentious decision. The Government have set up a genuinely voluntary procedure, in which they are saying, ''Please go out and buy digital TV equipment. At some point we will switch the analogue signal off.'' Some of the features are parallel. The decision is about numbers at any particular stage. How many people have digital TV? How big is the rump that we have to deal with with the big stick? How upset are people going to get when we deal with them? How much will things cost?

In these clauses, we are talking about the principle of compulsion, as set out by the Minister. When we get to clause 6—to the implementation of the regulations required some years hence, in 2008 or whenever—the debate is going to be about cost rather than any issue of principle. Who picks up the tab for the last 20 per cent.? I accept that we are now going to move on. However, the extraordinary thing is that we started out with a super-affirmative procedure for something that is, in a sense, quite trivial—a debate about the costs of dealing with this last 20 per cent.—and a very understated procedure for the big debate, which is the imposition of the ID card on the 80 per cent. It seems back to front to do it in that way.

If we are going to have this compulsory scheme, there are still some important questions about costs. Is there going to be a clear separation of costs in the Passport and Records Agency between those associated with the ID cards and those associated with passport? That is important for scrutiny purposes. The Minister may say that it is value for money to wrap all this up together, but we wish to establish the difference between our proposed scheme in which the ID card is a voluntary bolt-on to the passport, and the Minister's scheme in which everything is wrapped up together.

Unless we break the costs out and see those associated with ID cards, we will not be able to judge the success or failure of the Government's ID card scheme. My fear is that that is precisely the Government's intention—that all should be fudged   and put together. From a parliamentary point of view, on a debate this contentious, it is important that we are able to see that. I hope the Minister can assure us that the true costs of the two things—passports and ID cards—will be presented separately.

Mr John Taylor (Solihull, Conservative)

Not very long ago the hon. Gentleman referred to—I use his expression, as it is not one that I would have coined—the ''rump'', the sans culottes, those who have not signed up. Is not part of the difficulty with the rump that we will not know who they are?

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

I think the sans culottes were those at the barricades.

Mr John Taylor (Solihull, Conservative)

They probably will be.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

Yes. We will know who those people are, because, as we established in an earlier debate, the Government will have a huge amount of data on them in other databases. Their only defining feature, in my understanding, is that they are people who do not have passports. Again, that is where the cost issues may come into it. It is more likely that elderly people and those on lower incomes will not have passports or will have not applied for them. Therefore, they will be subject to the clause 6 compulsion. I am sure that we will debate that in detail later.

It is important that the separation of costs is clearly set out and that we know whether there is cross-subsidy in the passport system between the passport applications and the ID card system. We may end up with a situation in which those who apply for passports today and over the next few years will subsidise the free or discounted ID cards for those who are brought in under clause 6. That might be a proper policy for the Government to set out, but they need to be explicit. I fear that there is, again, a complete lack of transparency.

It would be helpful to know whether there will be full cost recovery. The Government's regulatory impact assessment says that all the money for setting up the scheme will be recovered from people who are applying. The clause and the Government's procedures clearly define a set of people who will pay for the setting up of the scheme: those who are applying for passports now. We must be clear whether all the costs will be recovered.

I want to advance the case for the amendment both specifically and in terms of saying that there should be a voluntary extension. This debate has given rise to a question: why have the Government not advanced a policy that says that getting the 80 per cent. of people who will have biometric passports on to the system correctly should be the priority? The passport database and those documents that have a defined specific purpose—making it possible for a citizen to travel—would be available to the law enforcement agencies for their purposes under all the normal procedures and with all the normal safeguards. Therefore, why has the focus not been on getting biometric passports sorted out? It should be recognised that that would cover 80 per cent. of the population? Perhaps there could be a voluntary ID   card scheme for people who do not want to have a passport and who want the convenience of an ID card. However, we should not go to all the hassle, expense and fuss of coming up with this all-encompassing, all-singing, all-dancing scheme.

We should allow the Passport and Records Agency to do its work issuing passports to citizens. We should get that sorted out and deal with the challenges that it will have to face, which are big enough on getting biometric passports right. Should that not be a higher priority? Our amendment would allow it get the passports right while accepting that the only people who would go on to the ID card system are those who choose to do so voluntarily. Going for the solution that the Government have set out is overkill.

Mr Chris Mole (Ipswich, Labour)

If the hon. Gentleman is sincere in his protestations that we should disaggregate the costs of the introduction of the biometric passport from the other aspects of the ID card system, can we rely on him and his hon. Friends on Third Reading and in the public presentation of the debate on this matter not to present the overall costs of the introduction of biometric passports as part of the costs of introducing ID cards? They did that on Second Reading and in other forums.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

The hon. Gentleman knows that we are in a propaganda war. We are chucking figures around and the reality is that none of them are clear. If we are to be accused of talking about the excessive cost of the ID cards, I would throw back at him the view that the Government are excessively understating the potential costs.

We are much more reasonable and rational in Standing Committee than people tend to be when they are on more of the bashing-away platforms. We are trying to get at the truth. We need transparency and clarity about the true costs of this system. I am pleading for that today. If we are given those costs, we will use them.

To date, we think that we have been given duff figures by the Government. If they want to accuse us of using duff figures, can we please have the true ones? We have been given figures that the Government have described as indicative. We have not been given the gateway review stage zero information that we need. I understand that we will not be given the other gateway review stage reports that might contain some of the clarity to which I referred. Until we get that clarity, it is hard for anyone to talk seriously about the true costs of the card.

There is an issue of principle. When the Government put their figures forward for accounting purposes and the review of the ID card system comes before people such as me and the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Mr. Curry) on the Public Accounts Committee, should not the costs be clearly spelled out separately? I hope the Minister will be able to accept that principle today.

The amendment would ensure that the ID card proposal is genuinely voluntary and would knock a hole out of the Government strategy of compulsion through designated documents. The debate has been helpful in establishing that compulsion is happening   today, but my concern still remains that the public debate is somehow divorced and is still behind the legislative debate. There is no clear understanding that issuing passports is the route to compulsion, as the Minister has said, and I seek to reverse that through amendment No. 164.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam is designed completely to undermine the basis of the scheme. We had an exchange during the last sitting about whether the amendment that he spoke to then could be described as a wrecking amendment. However, although this is a wrecking amendment, it is helpful because it enables me to be as clear about the Government's position as I was in the earlier debate.

My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made the position clear in his introductory speech on Second Reading. I accept that the discussions on ID cards that have brought us to where we are have gone through a change. There has been a process of development and there was discussion at one stage about voluntarism. It must have been clear to everybody when the draft Bill and consultation document were published that there was a basis of compulsion associated with the scheme. Although I cannot speak for everybody else who has spoken on this issue, I have never made any bones about the fact that I consider this a compulsory ID card scheme. Indeed, I have challenged people who have suggested, as the hon. Gentleman did, that there was some implied voluntarism or stealth behind the measure.

Anybody who understands the scheme understands that there is an element of compulsion. It is the element of compulsion that the hon. Gentleman seeks to undermine and remove by making registration and the issue of the card an optional extra for persons applying for a designated document—for example, a passport or a residence permit.

The Government have been entirely open about the fact that linking ID cards to the issue of designated documents is an important part of the scheme and it will enable a sensible, phased introduction of ID cards as British nationals renew or apply for their passports and foreign nationals apply for or renew residence permits after those documents have been designated. We have also been open about the administrative arrangements. We have announced that we will establish a new agency to issue ID cards that will build on the existing UK Passport Service and work in close conjunction with the immigration and nationality directorate of the Home Office. There will not be two completely separate processes for people applying for a designated document and an ID card. It will be a single, seamless process.

Of course, if the scheme were optional, I believe that most applicants for these documents would choose to enrol on the register and obtain an ID card because of the additional benefits that that would bring. However, we cannot provide the choice that the hon. Gentleman proposes, because if we were to provide two types of document—one whereby the holder has had their identity checked to the highest   standard needed for entry on the register and another for those who have not—that would be an open invitation to anybody who wanted to defraud the scheme.

It is argued that compulsion is being introduced by the back door or by stealth, but I have made it clear that it is not. Nobody is forced to obtain a British passport or to travel abroad. No foreign national is forced to come here—as a student, for example—and obtain a residence permit. If people feel strongly and decide not to apply for their passport to be renewed when it expires, it will be a matter for them. Until the second phase of the scheme is introduced, there will be no obligation on people to register.

We have always been clear about the fact that the identity card scheme is intended eventually to become compulsory for everybody over the age of 16 and for everyone who is resident in the UK for more than three months. We expect that most people will obtain an ID card and enrol on the register during the first phase when registration will be linked to applications for and renewal of documents, such as passports or residence permits that have been designated under clause 4.

The second phase will then become a requirement under clause 6 for those specified and who are not already registered so to do within a set period. Only then will people become liable to a civil penalty if they fail to register and obtain an ID card.

The stage at which it will be possible to require everyone to register requires further parliamentary approval by way of a report detailing the proposal to be approved by both Houses, following by an affirmative procedure order under clause 7, which we shall debate later. I hope I have reassured the Committee that a definite link between the application for a designated document and an entry on the register is essential. I ask the hon. Gentleman not to press the amendment.

As for costs, the hon. Gentleman is right that the Government have published only a revised figure, which is £85 for a combined passport and ID card that lasts for 10 years. Clause 37(3)(d) allows the fee to include the cost of issuing designated documents. A combined fee for a passport and an ID card can be issued and charged for as a single package and the new agency that will be based on the UK Passport Service will issue the documents.

As the costs of checking identity will be same for both purposes, it might not be possible to accede to the hon. Gentleman's request. However, it will be the Government's intention as the process is being developed to publish information on costs. We have put certain information in the public domain. I am not in a position to add to it today, nor would it make the debate clearer if we were to guess what information might be available as the scheme develops. It will become available on the basis of the enabling legislation.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

The Minister has responded frankly and we have a clear difference of view. I will not waste valuable debating time by pressing all the amendments   to a Division, but in this case it is appropriate for hon. Members to give their opinion of the proposal.

Question put:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 3, Noes 10.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

I beg to move amendment No. 79, in clause 5, page 5, line 12, leave out paragraph (b).

Mr Derek Conway (Old Bexley & Sidcup, Conservative)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 80, in clause 5, page 5, line 12, leave out

', and other biometric information about himself'.

No. 152, in clause 9, page 8, line 28, after 'allow', insert 'all of'.

No. 97, in clause 12, page 11, line 2, leave out paragraph (b).

No. 98, in clause 12, page 11, line 2, leave out

', and other biometric information about himself,'.

No. 106, in clause 14, page 13, line 20, leave out paragraph (a).

No. 107, in clause 14, page 13, line 21, leave out paragraph (b).

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

The amendments are designed to explore an important part of the Government's proposals, which is the use of biometric data. They cross over a group of clauses in which reference is made to biometric data. I want to explore the implications of using biometric data and the use of three biometrics in particular, which is the direction in which the Government are heading. I want to tease out from them the meaning of the phrase ''other biometric information'' and to ensure that we have on the record as much clarity as possible on the specific biometrics that the Government intend to use.

We had a brief debate on biometrics in response to an amendment spoken to by to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Anniesland (John Robertson), who discussed the concerns of organisations such as the Royal National Institute of the Blind about eye-related biometrics. However, we also need to refer to an important body of work that the Government themselves commissioned. I will try not to get too technical here, but a certain technical understanding is needed if we are to make sensible decisions on the use of biometrics.

I refer to the document that the Government commissioned from Tony Mansfield of the National Physical Laboratory and Marek Rejman-Greene of BTexact Technologies, ''Feasibility study on the use of   biometrics in an entitlement scheme'', which is available on the ID cards website. It contains a number of points that need responding to here, as we are deciding whether the Government should be given permission to proceed with the scheme.

In the context of the clause, the most significant issue to draw from the study is the fact that the costs of enrolment are potentially a major factor. They could end up being far greater than has been anticipated. This is clear in the early stages of the report—for example, in paragraph 5.e of the executive summary:

''The use of biometrics will add to the cost of an entitlement card system.''

That is obvious. It continues:

''The most significant component of this cost is the time and effort to enrol individuals and collect biometric data. However, this is one of the least well-understood aspects of biometric technologies.''

In other words, we are proceeding with something that, as the Minister said, has never been tried on this scale.

We are talking about the mass enrolment of people using complex biometric measures that take a significant time to record correctly. All we have to go on by way of experience are some very small-scale pilots, which the Government ran and which were not always entirely smooth, and such things as fingerprinting and recording biometrics in the criminal justice context, where the system required and the volumes are on nothing like the scale we anticipate here.

Certain features again emerge, such as the fact that the number of people with disabilities will be significant in computing the cost and effort involved. A range of disabilities might render people unsuitable for particular forms of biometric measure, which will have to be further explored. There are also questions as to the number of posts that the Government might have recording. We will come to the nature of those posts and how the Government should fulfil their responsibility to ensure that people can have their data recorded when it is demanded or it is their duty that they do so.

The number of those posts will be critical. I understand that the current proposal is for the UK Passport Service to have about 70 places where biometric data can be recorded. The cost of biometric data recording equipment is clearly significant, but the convenience for the citizen will depend on the spread, range and nature of the places where they can have their biometric data recorded.

There is a step change—from somebody filling in a form at the post office and sending it off to turning up somewhere—in the hassle factor. I assume that people will have to turn up during office hours, unless the Government plan to offer an out-of-hours service, which would be much more convenient. They are going to have to sit through the recording of their biometrics and potentially difficult intrusion and discomfort could be involved. If there are any problems with that biometric recording, this could be a lengthy process. These are all factors that may be important in terms of citizen acceptance, so the   organisation is significantly challenging for the Government.

We also keep coming back to the costings. Some paragraphs in this report stand out in highlighting potential problems. Paragraph 105 gives some cost estimates:

''We estimate that including a biometric component in a national identity database will increase costs by approximately £500 million (over the originally specified 10 year rollout period). By far the largest component of this cost will be the resources expended in collection of the images for biometric enrolment.''

The report then breaks down all the different costs involved—this is quite a bonanza for some hardware and software manufacturers.

The figures are based on an estimate of there being 2,000 offices, which is considered a reasonable number to deliver the service needed. That is for one biometric component. The amendments relate to clauses that allow the Government to specify a number of biometric components, some of which are as yet unspecified. The phrase ''other biometric information'', which we want to remove, could permit anything to come in.

So, we are considering a scheme that the Government themselves say may use three biometric components. If it does, I think that we can expect significant cost escalations beyond the figures set out in the Government's feasibility study. The Government are suggesting that biometric data collection will be £500 million over 10 years; that is £50 million per annum. That is within the Government's window of £85 million a year—the specified cost of the new system—but if we multiply the costs for each additional biometric, and if one biometric costs £50 million and three cost £150 million, we are straight away out of the cost envelope. If the Government are saying that they can fit three biometrics within their budget, they will have to justify that, and say why they think that the incremental costs above the original £50 million will be sufficiently low to fit their projected costings.

Paragraph 109 of the report, which is about the selection of technology, tells us:

''The fourth option of using all three biometric systems—fingerprint, iris and face—has been rejected both on the grounds of cost and inconvenience to citizens as well as on the likely perception by critics of this as being a 'solution too far'.''

I assume that that was the state of play, but that things have moved on. Again, it would be helpful if the Minister clarified exactly which biometrics would be used at what stage, and said exactly how he envisages the ultimate system will look.

The final subject that we need to explore is false match data. Some horrible numbers are being bandied around. I am trying to understand exactly how false match data works, because there are false positives and false negatives. Someone could fail to be recognised as themselves; also, someone could be recognised as being someone else. Both carry different problems and have different probabilities. The probabilities vary greatly. For example, the chance   of a false match with facial recognition is significantly higher than for fingerprinting or iris recognition.

Mr Chris Mole (Ipswich, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman referred to the number of biometrics. Does he accept that the probability of mismatches decreases exponentially as the number of biometrics used goes up?

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

The increased number of biometrics allows double checking to take place, but that opens up other questions, too. I think that everyone accepts that a biometric system based purely on facial recognition would be not entirely useless; in fact, it would be a significant advance on where we are now. We use one of the best computing systems available to mankind; it lives in the head. Passport officers perform facial recognition to a very high degree of accuracy using their cerebral computing devices, and for many years we have accepted that that is a very good safeguard.

Similarly, if someone goes into a police control station, as I am sure most hon. Members here have done, they will see that the police have a wall of villains—pictures of the people whom they know are the villains operating in their area. The police memorise those, go out into the streets and do a pretty good job based on their human form of facial recognition technology. Biometrically recorded facial recognition added to our method of facial recognition is actually a significant advance. But if we are going for the levels of accuracy that the Government want, and if the Government want the results to be computationally accurate—that is important—they will go for iris recognition and fingerprints, too, as that will allow those things.

Using multiple biometrics opens up questions about the algorithm used for trying to deal with competing claims of those different biometrics. It is quite possible that, when someone goes through passport control, their face will be recognised but their irises will not, or that their irises will be recognised but not their face. There has to be a system to establish whether someone is allowed to pass on the basis of having gotten through one or two of the biometric tests but not the rest. Exploring those algorithms is important.

There are levels at which the systems can be deemed non-functional—in other words, levels at which they would be so much hassle that they would not work at all. If a passport control system based purely on facial recognition were set up, and the number of failures was very high and each failure required somebody to go off into a separate cubicle and check a person and their documentation and to go through a great bureaucratic process, that system would be unworkable. The queues at Heathrow would be unmanageable, and the system would grind to a halt.

There are levels at which systems are effectively unworkable; they are computed by the people who study such things. The biometric feasibility study establishes that a false match rate needs to be less than one in 1,000. It states that

''a false alarm rate of much above 1 per cent. would probably make the system unworkable.''

We need to find the right compromise between cost, hassle, accuracy and a system that is genuinely   workable. In order to avoid false alarms, one goes for more biometrics; if one goes for more biometrics, the time required to check them increases; and thus we return to the search for that delicate balance.

We should not necessarily accept as a given the Government's proposed scheme. It is important that they flesh out precisely how they intend to use biometrics. It is a key issue, and it must remain on the table as we discuss the Bill. Biometrics are potentially very intrusive and costly. They carry particular implications for people with disabilities, and if we are going to implement them, we must ensure that that is done in the right way.

I can envisage circumstances in which we get it wrong. We might have invested in all the costly biometrics, but because things have not been done in the right way they might not get checked. I can also imagine a situation arising—at Heathrow, for example—where there is an inflow that cannot be stopped; people will keep coming, and if the systems do not work, at some point the decision will have to be made just to let them through. The holy grail of a biometric system is to get to a situation where the necessary checks are performed but excessive checks are not, and people can be kept flowing through the system.

A common theme that the Committee will return to throughout its scrutiny of the Bill is whether the Government have gone for an overkill solution for something that I described as a ''nut.'' The hon. Member for Reading, West (Mr. Salter) took offence to that, and asked whether I was describing illegal working and other things as nuts. I was describing the checking of identity as the nut. In many contexts, it is quite a minor problem, and other problems are more serious.

There are different solutions for certain services. Even if one has a national identity register, it is not necessary to use the gold-plated, belt-and-braces, all-singing, all-dancing biometric system for everything. It would be perfectly possible to implement something like a chip and PIN system for some services, which is much easier and quicker to operate. Biometrics only where necessary is an important principle if one is seeking to reduce costs.

That was a canter around the biometrics issue. It needs to be seriously debated. The amendments knock out all the biometric bits to give us a debating peg to hang this discussion on. I hope the Minister will be able to clarify the Government's intentions and flesh out their thinking. In particular, I would like to learn of their response to the biometric feasibility study. It was a useful piece of work that informed all of us about how these complex technologies work. In general, it is written in English rather than techy speak, and it poses important questions that the Government must answer.

Mr Derek Conway (Old Bexley & Sidcup, Conservative)

I shall use my cerebral recognition system to call Mr. Malins.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

I do not speak for the Chinese Government, nor for the decisions that they have made. However, I recognise that making decisions for 1.5 billion people—one in five of the world's population—is on an exponentially different scale, albeit that, in the United Kingdom, we face a significant challenge. I suggest that China's population size may have had some influence on the Chinese Government's decision.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

I am sure that the Minister is right. I made the point to illustrate that the Chinese Government, having researched biometrics very carefully, took the view that there comes a point at   which the population is such that the task would involve far too much. That point may have been reached in their case. We hope for reassurance from the Minister on why the task would not be too much for us, or alternatively, on why the ability to fake and spoof would not apply here, although it might in China.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

I make a supplementary point. The hon. Gentleman may not be aware that the Chinese have a sophisticated computerised register of their population that operates through local police stations—we would call them that, but they have a different name for them. I have seen it operate. They already have a sophisticated form of registering people by households, and the Chinese Government may have felt that it was unnecessary to go beyond that at present.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

That is, indeed, possible. I was going to say that Members of Parliament are all experts on some subjects; many would consider themselves experts on most subjects. However, the truth is that we all know certain subjects better than others. I speak for myself—and, I think, for others in the House—when I say that I am not utterly familiar with biometrics and their security and effectiveness. I repeat what I said earlier: I hope that the Minister can take us through some of the issues at a gentle and persuasive pace.

We should congratulate the Home Affairs Committee on its work relating to the draft Bill and to this matter, about which it had something interesting to say. Professor Anderson of Cambridge university appeared before it to discuss iris recognition, which has been presented as a highly reliable form of biometric identifier. He was asked:

''What evidence do you have that it is practically feasible to produce contact lenses to fake irises on a significant scale?''

The answer was illuminating. Professor Anderson said:

''Well, I have not done it myself but I have seen a photograph of one that was produced by one of the researchers in the field and, given the underlying mathematics, I do not think there is any difficulty in principle with producing a contact lens that will produce a certain iris code.''

I hope that members of the Committee follow that; I am not entirely sure that I do.

Professor Anderson went on to say:

''The manufacturers of iris scanning equipment will say in their defence that it is possible to measure the nictation, the oscillation in the diameter of the pupil. I understand that none of the equipment currently on sale does that and I would be worried that someone might produce a well printed contact lens with a sufficiently clear area in the middle where the movement of the underlying eye would be taken by the scanner as indicating that the genuine eye were present. There is room for further technological work here. As things stand I am afraid that iris scanners, like fingerprint scanners, are liable to be defeated by sophisticated attack if they are used in an unattended operation. Attended operation is different, of course, if you train the staff properly they can feel people's fingerprints, they can look carefully at the eye and check there is no funny business.''

The two words that stood out to me were ''sophisticated attack''. Dealing with real world, the truth is that the issue of faking, spoofing or forging some form of biometric identifier would not occur to   99.9 per cent. of the population. Even if it did, it could not probably be tackled satisfactorily by them.

That brings us back to the purpose of the register and the ID card scheme. The principal purpose, which we have always sought to ask the Government to confirm, is a reaction to terrorist attacks in New York and elsewhere. The scheme also aims to be a useful tool in the prevention of terrorism and terrorist attacks. I sincerely hope that that is the case. The professor's words that certain matters are liable to be defeated by a sophisticated attack mean that the 0.1 per cent.—I cannot give an accurate figure—of those within our shores who would wish us ill would be capable of such an attack.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

Iris recognition has been implemented only in very limited circumstances. I think that the largest scale trial involved 60,000 returning refugees to Afghanistan. It is the most accurate form of technology in preventing false matches. Only one person in 1 million will be matched to the wrong person. However, it still has a very high rate—one in 100—of false non-matches, where a person turns up, gets the scan done, and it simply does not pick up that person's record. If one person in 100 is not correctly identified as being who they are, that is clearly a big security problem.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

As always, the hon. Gentleman adds to the quality of our debates by such a useful intervention.

Does the Minister know that the Association for Payment Clearing Services, which has taken the lead in credit and debit card security, is reported to have doubts about the quality of biometric identification? I am grateful to the Library for confirming that information. Such a system was under consideration for the new generation of chip-and-pin credit and debit cards, but it was rejected because no system was found to be reliable enough.

I bring the discussion back to my own thinking. I am a layman in such matters. The Minister may or not be a layman, but I am faced with—as are all laymen who read the information—the proposition that an expert body such as the APCS has not found a system of biometrics that was reliable enough. If the association gave such evidence in a tribunal or court, we would first acknowledge that it was an expert in such matters and, secondly, that its evidence was be persuasive. The Government have much explaining to do in respect of biometrics. As my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary made plain on Second Reading, they will have to satisfy the official Opposition on several tests, of which the biometrics is one.

I recall the conclusion of the Home Affairs Committee—not the evidence that it heard or gave. It said:

''The security and reliability of biometrics are at the heart of the Government's case for their proposals.''

We accept that. Clearly, security and reliability must be at the heart of the proposals because it can be   nowhere else. To put it another way, if we had insecurity and unreliability, we have no case to answer.

The Committee went on:

''We note that no comparable system of this size has been introduced anywhere in the world.''

I did not know that until I read the report. The Minister now has the opportunity to talk to us about it. If we cannot explore such matters in Committee, we certainly cannot on Report or Third Reading, as a result of which the House of Commons will not have an opportunity to go into detail. It is essential that we do. Given that the Home Affairs Committee says that there is no comparable system in the world, I assume that the Government can confirm that. If there are similar systems, however, that involve many of the proposed elements of the system that we are discussing, the Minister is duty bound to take us through them and let us know their track record of satisfaction. I look forward to hearing from him.

The Home Affairs Committee continued:

''The system proposed would therefore be breaking new ground. It is essential that, before the system is given final approval, there should be exhaustive testing of the reliability and security of the biometrics chosen, and that the results of those tests should be made available to expert independent scrutiny, perhaps led by the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser.''

It took evidence over a long time and reported to the House and to the Government not many months ago.

If we consider that recommendation, we would naturally be slightly concerned. When the Committee says that, before the system was given final approval, there should be exhaustive testing of the biometrics chosen, two points immediately spring to mind. What will be the final approval date for the system? In parliamentary terms, if such matters are discussed on Report and Third Reading, we will be asked as a Parliament to give final approval in a matter of weeks from now.

The Committee said that the reliability and security of the chosen biometrics should be tested exhaustively before the system is approved, which suggests that the exhaustive testing that it felt was vital had not taken place; otherwise it would not have made the point.

Again, this is an opportunity for the Minister to outline lengthily, as he should, the testing programmes and processes that have been gone through in the past few months since the Home Affairs Committee reported. Perhaps he will make the results of those tests available to the Committee. We sit next week and it would be helpful if, before that sitting, we had on our desks an exhaustive list of the test processes that have been undertaken by the Government, which were recommended strongly by the Home Affairs Committee. Indeed, the Government said, in their response to that recommendation:

''We are engaged in a series of trials and tests to establish our technical requirements in the field of biometrics. However, the reliability, security and accuracy of the biometrics and of the enrolment and verification processes rely as much on organisational, procedural and environmental issues as technical ones.''

That made me pause to think, so I read it again, but was not sure what it meant. Will the Government give   us details of the series of trials and tests that they said that they were engaged in when they responded to the HAC? Those must have been done and we must, and would like to, hear the results so that we can be confirmed in our understanding.

One of the bodies that reported to me was Justice, and I am sure that every Committee member has its report entitled ''Information Resource on Identity Cards'', produced in December 2004. I do not propose to go into that marvellous document today, because we do not have time, but it was produced with the assistance of volunteers from Clifford Chance, the well-known and very expensive solicitors. Justice dealt with a number of issues in relation to biometrics, and the biometrics debate could sensibly last for a lengthy period.

One of the disadvantages of the Standing Committee process is that we are examining the Bill and—in my case, because I am not expert enough—possibly having to take what the Government say on trust. I am sure that other Committee members are in a similar position. However, in a sense, the more helpful approach, which we cannot adopt, is to act almost as a Select Committee and get people to tell us a little bit more about the matter.

I shall quote only two or three lines from the Justice report, but I ask the Minister to confirm that the Government have taken it on board and to tell us their response to the entire report. Paragraph 22, ''IC Biometrics: fingerprints'', says:

''Opinion as to the reliability of current technology is divided.''

I assume that that is expert opinion. Over a series of pages the report goes on to point out some of those divisions between experts. It is difficult to come down on one side or another when a technical argument like this is placed before me for consideration.

In a later paragraph, having set out many examples, the report says:

''Thus, it is clear that current fingerprint technology is not only susceptible to attack but there are also numerous accuracy and long term implementation issues that need to be thoroughly investigated before a large scale fingerprint identification system could be successfully introduced.''

That is a conclusion reached in the report. Who am I to say if that is right or wrong? However, as I said at the beginning, it is important, if we are to do our job properly, that we should be fully briefed on the issues.

Mr Gwyn Prosser (Dover, Labour)

I am listening to the hon. Gentleman's arguments with interest. On the use of fingerprints, compulsory biometric identity cards were introduced for asylum seekers in a brief time and were successful. In all the inquiries I have made of immigration officers in Dover—of which we have quite a number—there has not been a single reported incident of forgery or failure.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. He and I served together on the Home Affairs Committee, and I am well aware of his interest and expertise in matters of asylum. He is right that the new card for asylum seekers is probably effective, and that is good. However, he will understand my earlier comment about susceptibility to sophisticated attack. If asylum seekers are genuine, they are inevitably   fleeing persecution and are not necessarily equipped either in their minds or financially to move themselves into the area of serious forgery. That is why I said that it might be a minuscule percentage of those persons within our jurisdiction that are capable of moving into that sphere. Those are the people we should most worry about. They may be the ones we should seek to target if the purpose of the Bill is to counter terrorism and terrorist acts.

Mr Gwyn Prosser (Dover, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman uses the phrase ''susceptibility to sophisticated attack''. Those were the words of Professor Anderson to our Select Committee, but he also said that that possible flaw would be apparent only if those tests were done in an unattended manner. If we talk about the sharp end of the argument—the sophisticated attack by would-be international terrorists—those checks would have the best scrutiny. They would be attended, and attendants would be trained to look for those difficulties.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

The hon. Gentleman might be convinced that biometrics is not a difficult issue. However, he must accept that there is a division of opinion even among the experts. That troubles me, as I am not personally capable of coming down on one or other side of the argument with my own background, which is not in that form of technology.

Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

There are a couple of points on the comparison with the asylum seeker system. One is the difference in scale. Interestingly, some problems of false matching increase the bigger the database. There is also the question of motivation. One would have to be pretty weird to want to pass oneself off as an asylum seeker. The motivation to want to crack that system is much less than to crack the national ID card system, where the benefits of gaining a card falsely could be significantly greater.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

I take the hon. Gentleman's point. I will move away from pure and simple biometrics for a moment—

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

Before the hon. Gentleman moves away from the matter, we could have an endless debate about biometrics, but I do not think that any of us intend to have one. The key answer to most criticism of biometrics is that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dover pointed out, enrolment in the scheme will be supervised. It will not be possible for people to do many of the things that can spoof or beat systems. The putting of the biometrics into the register will be supervised by trained individuals. That is very important.

I do not say that there are no other concerns. However, I do not want to encourage a debate that assumes that the supervision will not take place, that lots of other things could therefore happen, and that we should start to deal with the relevant possibilities and consequences. Having taken advice, we have decided to supervise at a very high level the registration of the biometrics, and that will deal with a whole series of the arguments about spoofing. I shall not go on to the issue of whether people might want asylum registration cards. I have an answer to that, but it is not relevant.  

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

I am grateful to the Minister for his reassurance. Given what I have said about my own technical knowledge, he will readily understand that Committee members have been approached by reliable, respected outside organisations that have some queries. This is not a straightforward issue, about which the Minister can say, ''Don't worry, there are no problems.'' It cannot be as simple as that. Part of the purpose of today's debate is to tease from the Government their solution to some of the problems—all of them, I hope—that have been put to them by experts.

The fundamental first test is that we must be clear about the technology's capabilities. Will it work? The next issue is whether the Government are up to the challenge. We are embarking on the most immense organisational and technical programme. As I shall illustrate in a moment, our track record with some such projects has not been perfect.

Mr Martin Salter (Reading West, Labour)

Before the hon. Gentleman moves on to the legitimate question of whether any Government are capable of delivering a major information technology project as efficiently and effectively as we would like, may I throw the question back at him? He needs to deal with it. The thrust of his argument on biometrics seemed to be that because the technology might not have advanced to the absolute limit of its capability, the Government should not embrace it. However, there has to come a point in the development of any technology at which the Government say, ''This has a useful application.'' If his party were in government, how much longer would it wait before embracing the advantages of technological change and innovation?

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

That is a more general point, but the hon. Gentleman asks a very fair question. Owing to my lack of technical expertise, I cannot say how much longer that would be.

Mr Martin Salter (Reading West, Labour)

I am a Luddite too.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

I do not know the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question. If he is asking whether I am saying that, because the technology has not reached perfection, it is not time to grasp the issue and get on with it, he asks a sensible, real question, and I give him the answer that he wants to hear: I could never wait until I was 100 per cent. sure about something before I adopted it. There would have to be a point at which I said, ''Yes, subject to any blips, I accept it.'' However, the hon. Gentleman must also understand that the issue under discussion is linked to a much later debate on cost.

At the same time, a question is perpetually on my mind. If the system cost a certain amount, I would have another balancing exercise to do in my mind: would that money be better spent in another way to achieve the objectives? That debate is for a little later on. However, the hon. Gentleman made a good intervention.

Mr Martin Salter (Reading West, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman is most generous in giving way. Does he not accept that very similar arguments must have been made when the police   started using fingerprint technology? Although that technology is not perfect, it has undoubtedly resulted in the capture and conviction of many thousands, if not millions, of people throughout the developed world. Therefore, I ask the hon. Gentleman to be very careful about making inflammatory claims on the failure of biometrics because we are all on a learning curve. Does he not agree that the fact that many other sophisticated and developed societies and Governments are embracing biometric technology teaches us, as a matter of common sense, that Britain must embrace it because of its benefits, and also be mindful of the fact that it will continue to develop and improve?

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

If I may say so, that is another very fair intervention by the hon. Gentleman. I am looking forward to hearing about the experiences of other countries that are embracing the technology; there will not be another possibility for us to do so.

The hon. Gentleman raises the issue of fingerprints. In effect, he is asking me whether I think it is likely that before that technology was introduced there was a tremendous argument about whether that would be worth doing, and whether it has in fact been worth doing. I am sure that there were arguments against it at the time, and I know with my other hat on that the fingerprint match is a tremendously helpful asset in criminal cases, so I agree that they work.

I have repeatedly said that I am not an expert in the field of biometrics and I await to be convinced on all matters, but where I probe a little more than gently is in asking what practical effect the biometric scheme as a whole will have on the mischief that we are trying to cure by the Bill. What is that mischief? I do not need to go outside and identify myself very often, and I would say to anybody who wanted to discuss that subject, ''Please don't ask me to be interested in biometrics for the purposes of identifying myself because I don't have a problem with that.'' That is not what the Bill is about. It is principally about giving us the tools to fight a possible terrorist attack. If it is about that, the issue of biometrics must be discussed in the context of how effective it will be specifically in terms of the principal purpose of the whole system, which is to fight terrorist acts. After all, the previous Home Secretary—the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett)—and other Ministers have said that they think that the system will help in countering terrorism, although the extent to which they think it will help varies.

Mr Martin Salter (Reading West, Labour)

Will the hon. Gentleman reflect on the statement he has just made? The motivation for supporting an ID cards Bill cannot be purely to engage in the fight against terrorism. Does he not accept that Committee members have different reasons for supporting or opposing the Bill. The fight against terrorism is important to me, but the ability of any Government to know exactly who is in the country, and issues to do with serious organised crime, money laundering and the smuggling of drugs and people, are all of equal importance. I would like the hon. Gentleman to reflect on the fact that Committee members have been motivated to want to serve on the   Committee and to make the Bill work by many different issues.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

I do reflect on that, but I come back to my central point that none of this legislation would have ever been introduced but for the terrorist attacks of the past few years. The Bill was prompted by them, and it is proper for us to consider that.

However, I repeat to the hon. Gentleman that there are several balancing exercises involved here. A most important balancing exercise would be to ask, having decided whether the system before us can help in the fight against terror, whether we think that the money spent on the scheme could be better spent differently to achieve the same result. We shall come on to that.

Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock & Loudoun, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman is enormously generous in giving way. He has probably been on his feet longer than he expected, but this is an important debate, and if we can contextualise the issue properly, it may save us a significant amount of time, both in my response and in our debates on this and other clauses.

All parties in the House, as well as some on the Labour Benches who oppose identity cards, support the introduction of biometrics in travel documents. The hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten), who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, said that he supported expenditure on biometrics for passports, and thought it appropriate. That is what the bulk of expenditure on this scheme will go on. We will have to tackle the issue in any event. Just because we cannot answer all the questions properly now, does not mean that we have not all accepted that we need to face the challenge of developing the reliability and security of biometric technology for passports. That is a challenge that we all face, and something that we support.

I would not like to think that the continued support of the official Opposition was dependent on us having a perfect biometric system by the time Opposition Members come to vote for the Bill on Third Reading, as I hope that they will.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)

The continued support of the official Opposition will, inevitably, depend on meeting the five tests put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden on Second Reading. Before long, we will get to the issue of whether the money spent on the scheme could be better spent elsewhere. However, the Minister's intervention was helpful, and this has been a good debate so far.  

I move on briefly to the issue of technology, and the question of whether the Government can achieve what they want. All Governments are the same, in the sense that they are not necessarily bodies to whom I would trust a great deal, in terms of handling aspects of my life or anything with which I am connected. But that is the nature of Governments. The hon. Member for Reading, West suggested that I was being inflammatory; I hope not, as that is not my style. I do not want to be inflammatory now when I say that this Government have failed to implement successfully practically every large IT system that they have tried to implement. That has resulted in a loss to the public of many, many billions of pounds in the past few years.

The former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside himself said that

''it is important to recognise the past failures of Government technology systems''.—[Official Report, 3 July 2002; Vol. 388, c. 231.]

One has only to look at the Child Support Agency, the UK Passport Service, the Inland Revenue, National Air Traffic Services and the Criminal Records Bureau to see that the list goes on and on. Whatever Government are in place, it is never surprising to anyone on either side of the House when they read something that says: ''System Crashes, Chaos Results''. We think, ''My Goodness, another shambles!'' That is an entirely non-party political point. Every expensive project, in my experience, promises to deliver better and cheaper services to the public but inevitably fails to do so.

I ask the Minister to be as open with us as he can be on the issue of the companies and bodies that will be involved in the project. [Interruption.] I see hon. Members holding their papers. It is either because they have absolutely had enough of me or because time is moving on.

Someone somewhere has to administer the scheme. There may be considerations of commercial sensitivity that we need to discuss more privately, but I have read in an official report made to me that a company called—

It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.