Clause 1 - The National Identity Register
Identity Cards Bill
9:45 am
Mr Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), Home Affairs; Newark, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 3, in page 1, line 10, after 'others', insert 'who reasonably require proof'.
It is worth bearing in mind that the national identity register will exist for up to five years before a card is physically available to the population—if that length of time is incorrect, I am sure that the Minister will correct me. My concerns are exactly that: how long this is for and what the registrable number will mean before the advent of a card. For instance, when will it be necessary to provide this registrable number? In what circumstances will it be asked for and who will ask for it? All these questions are important, because, whatever one thinks about the card itself, the introductory period of the national identity register will serve to get us used to this new atmosphere in which we will be required to exist, to get us to understand precisely when and how the card will be used and as a time for precedents to be set. Therefore, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain.
Earlier comments that we have never before needed to have identity cards or a national identity register outside a time of war are not quite correct. In the 1970s in Northern Ireland we imposed a driving licence that was wholly different from anything that was used—if hon. Members will forgive the phrase; I use it for convenience—on the mainland. I have personal experience of this, which I will expand upon in a moment. The driving licence in Northern Ireland initially carried a photograph, but was later amended to have a photograph and a fingerprint. It was a wholly different document from that in force on the mainland. On top of which, of course, the security forces could demand this card. In the absence of the driving licence being available, they could ask a driver, or indeed someone who was on foot, to provide the number of their driving licence. How does that compare with the national identity register and the registrable number as a result of this Bill?
Who will ask for this number? Is it a question of being pulled over by the police or other members of the security services and this number being demanded? Or is it a number much more required, for instance, by anyone going into a bank? Will the bank clerk say, ''If you wish to withdraw money from or put it back into the bank, I need your personal number from the national identity register to identify you''? How will one's entry on the national identity register physically manifest itself? In what circumstances will it be required? Will that be an everyday occurrence? Is it something that everyone will need to know? Will they need to present it when they go, for instance, into a video store? Will one's registrable number be required at that stage? Will they have to render their number to the person behind the counter? Will it be needed when they register at a hotel? Will there be something similar to the system on the continent at the moment—[Interruption.] I hear someone say from a sedentary position that that may completely change how people conduct their private life. Who knows? Will people have to render their registrable number in the same way that they have to hand over their passport when booking into a hotel in France or Ukraine, for example? I should be grateful for an explanation of precisely what the clause means.
My amendment is intended to find out who may reasonably ask for the number: will it just be someone in uniform, and will that include a community support officer, because that is a moot point at the moment, or will there be a much broader requirement that leaves us needing to know exactly what out numbers are? Will children or young people have to have the number written on the inside of their wallets, or will they, perhaps, tattoo it on their flesh? Will it have to be embedded in their memory so that they will be able to prove who they are? [Interruption.] Again, from a sedentary position I hear a chip being suggested.
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
Just to clarify the Conservatives' position, we know that they are in favour of the ID card in principle, but is the hon. Gentleman saying that they are worried about mission creep—that the function will spread in a way that was not anticipated in the original Bill?
Mr Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), Home Affairs; Newark, Conservative)
I am grateful for that helpful intervention. We are indeed concerned that the registrable number and the card that follows it should be used for the reason for which it was established. Later amendments will probe to find out precisely the function of the registrable number and card. I am concerned that this measure will go beyond a means of combating terrorism and fraud and dealing with entitlement, and that there will be mission creep, to borrow the hon. Gentleman's phrase. I wish that the Minister would tie down the point of the number, who can ask for it and in what circumstances they can do so, and what it will become in society. Will it be accessed occasionally, or will it have to be engraved on the memory and be required several times a day?
I am used at the moment to being asked for my name and address more times than I care to mention. That has served perfectly adequately. In recent times we have all been given different numbers on payment, debit and credit cards and we are also used to giving a number of different identifying code words for banks, credit societies and the like. However, I am confused about to what this number applies, who can ask for it and in what circumstances. I should be most grateful if the Minister furnished me with some answers.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
I want to add to what my hon. Friend has said. I will say this only once, but it is an important preamble. So many people out there believe that the ID scheme that we are debating is simply about a piece of plastic, but as is demonstrated clearly in the Bill, that is only one small part of a much larger scheme. The Government are establishing a vast, complex and far-reaching system that will involve an unprecedented use of personal information. The fundamental purpose of the Bill is to establish the database, and ID cards will be merely a by-product of that.
Put in simple language, clause 1(3)(a) tells us that the purpose of the register is to make it convenient for me to prove registrable facts about myself to other people. So far in our lives—the Minister may share this experience—we have all, from time to time, had to establish various facts about ourselves. It is not uncommon to be asked one's address, full name, date of birth and even one's passport number. So far, one has not often had to prove more than that.
My understanding is that the clause and schedule 1 set out no fewer than 51 registrable facts that an individual will have to establish with the database. The individual will have to provide those registrable facts and face a penalty of £2,500 if they fail to do so. It is a very heavy undertaking for an individual to have to respond to a Government who say, ''We require this information and you must provide it under penalty.''
Clause 1(3)(a) simply sets out that we are talking about
''a convenient method''
to enable an individual
''to prove registrable facts about themselves to others''.
My first question is whether the clause really suggests that the individual will have to prove all 51 registrable facts to others. Secondly, who are the ''others''? I am not talking about the part of the clause that says that other people can check on an individual; that is in subsection (3)(b). Subsection (3)(a) enables an individual to prove a little about themselves to someone else. The real question is who are the ''others''?
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
I am following carefully what the hon. Gentleman is saying. He has an understanding of the nature of this part of the provision. If I might say so, with respect, I am not sure whether his hon. Friend the Member for Newark had such an understanding. However, I will come to that in more detail when I respond to the debate. This matter is about writing into the Bill the statutory purpose of convenience for the individual. It is about people making decisions for themselves, and not about anybody else compelling them to do anything. The answer to the question put by the hon. Member for Woking about how much is convenient is a matter for the individual.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
I am grateful to the Minister; he gave me a fairly plain answer. However, he will understand that so far in my life—and I daresay I speak on behalf of all of us—I have had to establish only a very limited number of facts about myself to other people who may reasonably require from me the establishment of those facts; I mentioned them a moment or two ago. Under the Bill, I believe that the requirement on me is to provide up to 51 registrable facts, under severe penalty if I fail to do so. I think that the Minister is saying that the purpose of clause 1(3)(a) is simply to make life easier for the individual, though I am bound to say that life is relatively straightforward at the moment. I venture to suggest that the imposition of clause 1(3)(a) on me as an individual will not necessarily make my life easier, particularly as I will have to, if required, demonstrate every address that I have ever had.
We want the Minister's assurance that in the free world out there, during a normal commercial transaction—and that is a key point—nobody will be able to say to me for their own convenience that they think that it is for my convenience that I have to give them 51 registrable facts about myself. I undertake such transactions from time to time, when I open a bank account, book in at a hotel or book with travel agents, for example. I think that the Minister will give that assurance. He will understand why we propose inserting the words ''who reasonably require proof''. We were not sure whether during a normal commercial transaction an individual could be put in a difficult position under subsection (3)(a), which is separate from (3)(b). I hope that the Minister will confirm the position.
Mr David Curry (Skipton and Ripon, Conservative)
I want to comment briefly just before the Minister replies, to help my understanding. Clause 1(3)(a) refers to ''registrable facts'', which the Minister said are to be used for the convenience of the individual who will offer them to establish his identity. However, subsection (3)(b) also deals with ''registrable facts'' that might be required to fulfil the purposes that are specified in the following subsection. Are those the same registrable facts?
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
Yes.
Mr David Curry (Skipton and Ripon, Conservative)
So are the registrable facts that are used for combating terrorism merely the ones that I offer to put forward? That is what the Minister said a while ago. Is it up to the individual to decide and choose what they put forward?
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
I have to say that I am immediately concerned about the level of understanding that has been displayed in the contributions that have been made so far.
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
I am not seeking to be unkind to the hon. Member for Woking; it is not my style. However, I am genuinely concerned about the level of understanding and I will seek progressively—although perhaps not in this response—to answer all the questions to the entire satisfaction of the hon. Member for Newark. With respect, it is not appropriate to answer all the questions at this stage, although I do not suggest that it is inappropriate for him to ask them, because they have to be asked.
A number of fundamental questions need to be answered at this point and I will endeavour to do so. First, I shall deal with the distinction that the right hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon drew between registrable facts in subsection (3)(a) and (3)(b), having inappropriately ascribed that distinction to my intervention on the hon. Member for Woking. The words ''registrable facts'' mean the same thing in the Bill, wherever they appear, and as the hon. Member for Woking has identified, those are the ones that will be entered in the register.
The specific point that I was making to the hon. Member for Woking was that subsection (3)(a) relates to the convenience of the individual, in that it allows them to make known whichever registrable facts they choose to make known in the context of private communication. I was not saying that the registrable facts under the Bill would be registered at the convenience of the individual for one purpose or another, but that they could be made known, which is precisely what this part of the provision is about. That is an important distinction. I do not want the debate to proceed on the basis that I have referred to some difference between registrable facts for different purposes, because I have not done so.
Secondly, in answer to the hon. Member for Woking, the national identity register will be available to coincide with the issue of the first identity cards, which is planned for 2008. As we will see as we go through the Bill and the structure of the scheme, people will be entered on the register as they apply for an identity card under the first phase of the scheme, whether in the context of a passport application or some other designated document. It will become compulsory to register only in the second phase of the scheme.
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to finish this point?
Clause 8(4), which we will come to in due course—and I ask the Committee's forbearance in dealing with some of the issues as we progress—says:
''Except in prescribed cases, an ID card must be issued to an individual''
who is entitled to registration and for whom an entry has been made in the register. It is intended that there should be a coincidence between the entry in the register and the issue of the cards. It is not intended that the register will exist and people will not have cards.
The reason for the phasing, to which we will come in due course, is the scale of the project and the development of the scheme, as I mentioned in our discussion of the programme motion, and because, as the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam said, no one has devised or put in practice a scheme of this nature before. I will make a final point and take an intervention from the hon. Gentleman thereafter.
I assure Members that this Bill does not contain any power for the police or CSOs to demand the registration number of any individual in any circumstances or to demand an identity card.
As I clearly stated in my short contribution on Second Reading, if we were increasing the powers of the police, we should have that debate in the context of police powers. This Bill offers the police, among others, the opportunity to have certainty with regard to proof of identity in circumstances in which they already have powers to ascertain identity. There are no additional powers for the police to demand the production of registration numbers or cards. It would be entirely inappropriate to use an identity card scheme to increase the powers of the police. The fact that people continually say that the Bill does that does not mean that that is the case. It does not and nobody can point to anywhere where it does.
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
It would help if the Minister could follow up on a point he made earlier about routes on to the identity database over the next few years. Will he make it clear that the only route is if somebody has applied for a passport once passports have started to be issued as registrable documents, or if they voluntarily come forward and explicitly say, ''Will you stick me on it?'' Will he assure the Committee that there will be no hoovering up of data from other sources, such as the existing passport database? Is it the case that there will be no transferences into the register, and that there will only be those very limited routes into it over the next few years?
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
It is not the Government's intention to allow the hoovering up of anything, and the Bill does not allow for that. The hon. Gentleman exactly describes the process that the Government envisage. I expect that we will have a debate about how voluntary that process is, and I will be happy to have it at the appropriate time.
Mr Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Assistant Chief Whip, Whips; Cotswold, Conservative)
Will the Minister clarify what is meant by ''others''? Does it mean that every member of the public will have the right to inspect the register and establish all the 51 facts that will be punishable with a £2,500 fine if they are not given?
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
I can clarify that concern, which goes to the heart of the confusion. The measure we are discussing relates to private transactions. It is about people voluntarily agreeing to use the facility to prove their identity to a certain standard. ''Others'' depends on the people to whom individuals relate.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
I understand that, but is there an element of compulsion? If someone approaches me when I try to conduct a normal transaction, will that person be entitled to say that I must prove all my registrable facts to them, and what recourse will I have if I say that I do not choose to do that?
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
The hon. Gentleman would not be in a different position after the Bill is enacted than he is now. In my normal everyday affairs, I expect people to require different levels of proof of my identity depending on the person with whom I am involved in a transaction. I would be grossly disappointed if in serious transactions people did not expect me to prove to a significant level who I am. I am sure that he shares that view.
We conduct a number of transactions in our ordinary everyday lives. We are entitled to be assured that no one will steal our identities and that those we transact with are ensuring that they are dealing with the right person. That protects our security and that of the businesses with which we are dealing.
This part of the Bill does exactly what it says on the tin, as it were. It would provide a convenient method for people to prove whatever registrable facts needed to be proved in those circumstances, depending on their relationship. To answer the hon. Gentleman's question directly, that would depend on the degree to which, in their private or commercial relationships, a person was prepared to accede to the requirements made of them. That is what this is about and that is the situation in which we currently live.
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
The Minister has helpfully picked up a good example of where a change could be made: the anti-money laundering legislation. If the card is to be genuinely voluntary, an individual opening a bank account would have to be able to use either the card or some other form of documentation. If, at some point, through regulation or case law, the Government made it clear that banks would not be safe from anti-money laundering measures unless they demanded the ID card, the cards would suddenly become compulsory rather than voluntary. Many of us do not think that we have had sufficient assurances on such concerns.
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
I do not know how many assurances the hon. Gentleman needs. The Bill would not give the police additional powers to require registrable facts or identity cards. I have said that repeatedly in and out of the House, and repeatedly Liberal Democrat Members say that it would.
There is nothing in the Bill that would allow that sort of compulsion on banks or anyone else.However, if the Government wanted to persuade Parliament that, for the security of the movement of money or for other reasons to do with organised crime, it was necessary to compel banks or other financial agencies to require people to prove their identities at a particular level, Parliament would have to debate that, and the reasons that the Government had put forward, and make its decision.
I have said repeatedly that the Bill is about giving people the opportunity to prove their identities to the highest possible standard for their own security and for the protection of their liberties. The second provision under clause 3(1), which we shall come to, is about providing an opportunity for public services to check the identity of the person to whom they provide services, should they choose to do so. However, that of itself would require legislation to be passed by Parliament.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
The Minister tells us that the Bill would give no extra powers to the police. I shall ask him a specific question. Under clause 1(3)(b), the register would help to provide other people with information when that was
''necessary in the public interest.''
Under subsection (4)(b), something would be necessary in the public interest if it were
''for the purposes of the prevention . . . of crime''.
Does that not mean that, if they deemed it to be for the prevention of crime, the police would be given powers to access 51 registrable facts about an individual, to which they did not have access before? Would they not have more powers to access information?
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
To that extent, the hon. Gentleman is right, and we shall come to the detail of that. There would be limited circumstances in which the police could access the information on the national register—the database—to ascertain a person's identity. However, as for the relationship of police powers to the individual, the police would not be able to ascertain the identity of the individual in any circumstances other than those in which they are entitled to do so now, under legislation passed by Parliament. All the police could do would be to use that different method of fulfilling a power that they already have. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Newark makes a semantic argument about whether allowing the police to do that with certainty would increase their powers, even though they are allowed to do it in any event. Presumably, they are expected to do it with some certainty under the current powers.
On the amendment, which has become somewhat secondary to the debate, its aim is to ensure that no one is asked to produce an identity card unreasonably. I can tell the hon. Member for Newark, and anyone who intends to support the amendment, that there is no reason for concern on that point. There is already a safeguard in clause 18 to ensure that no one can be required to produce an ID card as the only method of proving identity in any private transaction until it has become a requirement to register and be issued with an ID card. That, to some degree, answers the hon. Gentleman's question about timing, which I tried to answer earlier.
Once it becomes a requirement to register and to hold an ID card, it will—as I have repeatedly said—surely be a matter for personal judgment rather than Government regulation as to whether an individual decides it is reasonable, given the circumstances, to be asked to produce the card. The words suggested by the hon. Gentleman would, in any event, be difficult to enforce. In the case of private transactions, the provision could only be enforced by the individuals themselves. If it cannot be enforced externally, there is little point in including it. In any event, people will behave in a certain way, in my experience.
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
I am grateful for that clarification. Am I correct in taking the Minister's reference to clause 18 to mean that, until it becomes compulsory to register for an ID card, Parliament could not pass, for example, a money laundering regulation requiring banks to demand ID cards? In other words, does the interaction of the clauses mean that that would not be possible until the cards become compulsory, because clause 18 prohibits it?
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
The hon. Gentleman is quite right in that as long as clause 18 exists in law, no one can be required to produce an ID card as the only method of proving identity in any private sector transaction.
We are getting into arguments to do with the powers of Parliament. We all know that Parliament can pass primary legislation. The point is whether the Bill empowers people to demand to see an ID card, and it does not. However, I cannot say—no Member of Parliament ever can—that Parliament will not in any circumstances ever pass legislation saying the contrary. That is another assurance that people are constantly asked to give in this context, but it is a nonsense of an assurance. It cannot be given, and everybody knows that. This Parliament cannot bind its successors.
Under the scheme we are considering, our intention, and the specific legislative provision, is that no one can ask for the card as the only method of establishing identity until the card becomes compulsory. That will be prohibited.
Mr Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), Home Affairs; Newark, Conservative)
May I be clear about what the Minister said? Recognising all the points that he so eloquently made about lack of compulsion, is he saying that the current system for commercial transactions, which uses code words and passwords—we will all have to remember a series of them—is likely, on a voluntary basis, to give way, as the system evolves, to the use of the registrable number, and indeed the card when it comes into place? Is that how the Minister sees things developing?
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
With respect, I have no crystal ball. The system will develop in the way that people find convenient. That is why the word ''convenience'' is used in the provision. In an environment in which a significant number of adults, or all adults, have identity cards, the people of this country may find that the production of an identity card is a convenient way of proving who they are to a high standard and that it facilitates ordinary, everyday transactions. That does not seem to me to detract in any way from people's liberties. In fact, it may assure people that those they are dealing with are asking for, or accepting proof of, identity to a high standard, which means that their liberties and identity are being protected from any possible abuse. That is a facility that we as a Parliament should provide to ordinary members of the community and, indeed, ourselves if we can. If we can make the system work—we will, of course, have debates about that—it will be a facility that we should allow people to have. That seems to be a positive of the proposal, and it should not be described as detracting in some way from people's opportunities or liberties in life.
One of the statutory purposes of the register is to provide a convenient method for individuals to prove their identity. If there were no legal requirement to produce an ID card, it must be for the individual to decide what is reasonable and what is not, just as people decide already for themselves whether they consider it reasonable if, for example, licensed premises require proof of age or even standards of dress to obtain entry. Such matters are up to individuals to decide in their relationship with people who provide such services. If they do not accept that level of proof or those standards, they know what to do: they do not transact with that particular organisation.
As for public services, a requirement to produce a card is governed by regulations made under clause 15, which require consultation with those likely to be affected as well as parliamentary approval under the affirmative resolution procedure. That is enough to ensure that whatever is proposed is not unreasonable. While I understand the hon. Gentleman's concern, I can reassure him that adequate safeguards are already in place and that we should leave it to individuals to decide for themselves when they wish to produce an ID card in certain transactions.
We should not overlook the fact that we are creating a new commissioner—the national identity scheme commissioner—who will have oversight of the whole scheme, including
''the uses to which ID cards are being put'',
as set out under clause 24(2)(d). If the commissioner believes that ID cards are being requested unreasonably, he can bring it to the attention of the Secretary of State and Parliament.
I want to make it clear to the hon. Gentleman that the police do not have access to the register. We might have slipped into a careless use of language when referring to access to the register and I may have conceded that, in certain limited circumstances, police would have access to it. The power under the Bill will provide them with information from the register, especially the power under clause 19(3), which I hope we will come to in due course.
In response to an issue raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam, the provision is not intended to hoover up existing databases. The national identity register will be built from scratch in the way the hon. Gentleman suggested. However, for completeness, clause 2(4) allows people to be entered on the register who have not applied to be entered. We shall debate such matters when we reach them, but the provision is intended to be used in exceptional circumstances—for example, information about deportees as a guard against attempts to re-enter the United Kingdom on a false identity. The provision makes perfect sense and it must be in the Bill for such purposes. Whether we agree in principle with such a provision or not, any such scheme could not operate without that power.
I do not think that I need to deal with any other issue at the moment, but, as we all warm up a bit in Committee, if I have missed anything I can hoover it up later. I conclude by asking the hon. Member for Newark to withdraw the amendment in light of my response.
Mr Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), Home Affairs; Newark, Conservative)
I am grateful to the Minister, as I am to others who have spoken in this short debate. There is no doubt that there are some misapprehensions about the point of the national identity register and how it will be used in due course, as there are about the cards, who can demand them and in what circumstances they can be asked for.
The Minister reassured me by what he said about the powers of the police. I understand that the process will be one of evolution as much as anything else and that practices will be established, and if the scheme turns out to be convenient, it can be used according to how people think it will be best used.
Several issues have been raised and I understand exactly the points that the Minister made, in that there will be further expansion in other parts of the debate. I am relatively satisfied by what he has said so far and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr Derek Conway (Old Bexley and Sidcup, Conservative)
Before we move on to the next group, may I make two observations to the Committee? First, the amendments are very wide ranging, so within the scope of the clause concerned I intend—I hope the other Chairmen intend this too—to be fairly relaxed about how far and wide members of the Committee range. If such a number of amendments are tabled and we have a wide-ranging debate, it is unlikely that we as Chairmen will then call for a clause stand part debate. That might help to guide colleagues in their contributions.
Secondly, if any Member wishes to force a Division on any proposal other than the principal amendment in a group we are about to deal with, it will be helpful if they advise the Clerk of that. We now move on to amendment No. 1.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 16, leave out from beginning to end of line 4 on page 2 and insert—
'(a) of assistance to the Secretary of State in preventing or detecting terrorist acts in the United Kingdom or elsewhere or otherwise in the interests of national security;
(b) of assistance to the Secretary of State in preventing or detecting serious crime;
(c) for the purposes of controlling illegal immigration and enforcing immigration controls; or
(d) for the purpose of securing proper provision of relevant public services.
(4A) For the purposes of subsection (4)—
''relevant public services'' means the public provision of—
(a) healthcare,
(b) housing,
(c) education, and
(d) social benefits;
''serious crime'' means crime giving rise to an offence triable only on indictment.'.
Mr Derek Conway (Old Bexley and Sidcup, Conservative)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:
No. 4, in clause 1, page 1, line 17, leave out 'prevention or'.
No. 5, in clause 1, page 1, line 17, after second 'of', insert 'serious'.
No. 111, in clause 1, page 2, line 3, leave out from first 'of' to end of line 4 and insert
'establishing entitlement to a particular public service'.
No. 2, in clause 43, page 36, line 32, after first 'crime', insert
'(other than in section 1(4A))'.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
We have had a good debate so far, simply focusing on the ability of the individual more easily to prove things about themselves to someone else, probably in a commercial transaction. We now move on to what I think will be a lengthy debate. I am grateful, Mr. Conway, for your observations about wide-ranging debate. Inevitably during consideration of a Bill of this sort, one is not always certain where one can fit in one's arguments. Of course, provided that they are made once, that can often cover the problem.
I shall speak to my amendment No. 1 and it is very likely that my hon. Friends and I will vote in support of it. Amendments Nos. 4 and 5 are incidental and, in a sense, encompassed within amendment No. 1, so I do not need to speak to those separately. Amendment No. 111 is slightly different and I hope to say a word or two about that. Amendment No. 2 is technical, affecting as it does clause 43.
We are dealing with the second aspect of clause 1(3). We have dealt with how I can prove things about myself to someone else. We are now focusing on the other statutory purpose, which, in the simplest of language, enables other people to check on me, when it is in the public interest.
The real focus is on the words ''in the public interest''. Subsection (4) is one that I seek to replace, because my definition of when something is in the public interest is different from that in subsection (4). When is something in the public interest? When should something be in the public interest? All this arises out of the second limb of subsection (3), enabling other people to check on me.
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) said on Second Reading, the Government must make clear the specific purposes for which an ID card is required. I put the same question about the national identity register. We must understand the specific purposes for which the register is required. What is its point? What is its use? Yes, it is useful, perhaps, for me to prove certain things to other people, but we are now dealing with how other people can understand 51 facts about me.
To keep it simple, I ask this: why would other people want to verify facts about me? Answer: because it is in the public interest to do so. The definition of public interest is absolutely critical. We will discuss later whether the identity card is, in itself, going to be useful in the fight against terrorism, and we must surely ask the same question of the national identity register. Hence, I want to provide that the public interest means that something is of assistance to the Secretary of State in preventing or detecting terrorist acts in the United Kingdom.
I also want to add the words ''or elsewhere'', and I hope the Minister can respond to this. The Bill relates to the interests of national security, which implies to me the interests of our security here, whereas I want to insert a provision relating to terrorist acts not just in the UK, but elsewhere in the world. Does the Minister agree that, if this register is going to be any help in the war on terror, the Bill should make that clear? What single event prompted the Government's initial proposals on cards and registers? We all know that it has to be the 11 September terrorist attack in New York.
This Bill has to be, in very great part, a reaction to that event and to other terrorist atrocities. There must then be some reference in the Bill to that purpose and to the public interest in relation to preventing or detecting terrorist acts. Is the register itself—forget the card—going to be of any use in relation to our attempts to fight terrorism?
The Home Secretary said, in an exchange with my hon. Friend the Member for Southend, West (Mr. Amess) in July 2002, that he could not rule out the possibility of ID cards making a substantial contribution to countering terrorism. Does the same argument apply to the creation of the register and the maintenance of 51 pieces of information about so many people? I expect the Minister will argue that there is a link between the register and terrorism. If so, I hope he explains that link to us in some detail and takes on board my argument that if, as I believe, terrorism is the greatest threat facing all of us in this country, there must be a reference to it early in the Bill.
I come to the issue of crime. My amendment would insert a different test of public interest, because the Bill says in clause 1(4)(b) that something is in the public interest if it is
''for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime''.
Leaving aside the fact that ''prevention'' is such a wide-ranging word as to smack of an over-zealous state—prevention is always different from detection—it occurs to me that clause 1(4)(b) is drawn terribly widely. We all know that the Government are trying to say that something is in the public interest if it is for the purposes of sorting out very serious crime. The Bill, however, says ''crime''.
The Minister will know that day after day in the courts people face charges of careless driving and crossing traffic lights, which are at the bottom end of the criminal scale, but such offences may lead to a criminal conviction. It would be inappropriate if I asked you whether you have ever been convicted of a crime, Mr. Conway, but 20 years ago I was convicted for speeding, which is a crime, although it must be off my record by now and I could probably declare myself of good character. Does the Minister think that ''crime'' is a very wide definition? Would it not be better to have a definition of crime as I have tabled it, which is
'''serious crime' means crime giving rise to an offence triable only on indictment.''?
I appreciate that my amendment may be faulty, because the Minister may be interested in certain crimes. I repeat that we are talking about others having access to the register if they are trying to prevent crime. There may be a case to be made for the police having access to the register to prevent some crimes that are not just triable on indictment. Indictable crimes, for example, murder and rape, can only be tried in the Crown court, whereas careless driving can only be tried in a magistrates court. Some crimes are triable in either court. It is worth having the debate to ask the Minister exactly what he means by ''crime'' and whether he thinks that there is anything in the argument that I have put forward that would restrict the definition to the more serious crimes.
Mrs Christine Russell (City of Chester, Labour)
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that there may be circumstances in which a considerable amount of police time could be saved if it were possible to validate a person's identity? The person in question, who may be a victim of or a witness to a crime, may be in no fit state, through trauma, drugs, drink, or whatever, to give their true identity, but they may be carrying their ID card in their wallet.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
The hon. Lady makes an interesting point. I am grateful for her courteous intervention. However, the argument, which I have heard before—that it would be much easier to establish someone's identity through the card if they were drunk or otherwise spaced out on drugs—is ludicrous. I must declare an interest, sitting as I do as part-time district judge. The prospect of the defendants who come before me having an identity card on them is absolutely zero. Many of them are down-and-outs. It is a completely unreal argument. The only people who have identity on them are the more responsible people who commit crime, who probably have a bank card, but I do not think that anyone involved in low-level crime will carry a card at all. However, the hon. Lady makes an interesting point.
Mrs Christine Russell (City of Chester, Labour)
I referred to victims of crime, for instance, victims of a hit-and-run accident.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
The hon. Lady makes a fair point about victims. In a sense she is talking about the identity card at this point, rather than the register, and, as the Minister would say, the identity card is a matter for another debate. Such cards have been helpful in identifying victims of certain terrorist acts and there is a lot to be said for that proposition, but my proposition is that the public interest arguably could be limited to the prevention or detection of what I would call serious crime, rather than minor crime.
I move on to the third aspect of the public interest:
''For the purposes of the enforcement of immigration controls''.
I have in my amendment sought to introduce the words:
''for the purposes of controlling illegal immigration and enforcing immigration controls''.
That is linked to the fact that my amendment would delete paragraph (d) on
''the enforcement of prohibitions on unauthorised working or employment''.
Will the register also ever help to sort out the problem of clandestine entrants into the country and of identifying those who have entered in that way? The Minister and his Department have done quite a good job in improving juxtaposed controls in France in the last year or two, and I pay tribute to him and his staff for those improvements. However, there are still many clandestine entrants from France; I pointed that out to the Minister recently, albeit briefly. Will the register help in dealing with that? That is one aspect of immigration controls, and the register is intended to deal with the enforcement of those controls. How can the register help tackle clandestine entry?
I recently received a communication from the British International Freight Association informing me about an interesting problem, and I wonder whether the register would help deal with it. In July 2004, all major ports around the world had to upgrade their security to comply with the international ship and port facility security code agreed in December 2002 as part of new International Maritime Organisation regulations. Significantly, the BIFA reports that
''members moving goods by road from the Continent still report significant instances of 'clandestine entrants' getting into and hiding on trucks in order to gain entrance to the UK. They are said to be usually armed (sometimes with firearms). The point being that these trucks move through supposedly ISPS compliant in France and the Low-countries (some of which have British Customs/Immigration staffed 'juxtapositioned' control zones at them), go aboard ISPS compliant ro-ro ferries/ships and through UK ISPS compliant ports the other side, yet such armed stowaways can remain undetected.''
Will such people be deterred or affected by the register? I ask that because the Bill refers to the enforcement of immigration controls.
I move on to another aspect of immigration referred to in subsection (4)(d), which my amendment omits in order to draw the Minister out on the issue of ''unauthorised working or employment''. There is no doubt that people are working illegally in this country; that has been happening for years, and it is possible that there are very many such people, but we cannot know how many. Will the register help with that at all? Would it not be more appropriate if the existing law in relation to illegal working under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 were properly enforced? About a year ago, I asked the Minister how many employers had been prosecuted and convicted for an offence under section 8 of that Act in each of the last six years for which figures were available, and what penalties had been imposed. The answer stated that those in the Home Office charged with the enforcement of that aspect of legislation had been nothing short of negligent in the previous five years. In truth, between 1998 and 2002, only 22 persons had been prosecuted for an offence under that section, and only eight had been found guilty.
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
We are now having a wide-ranging debate, but I cannot allow the hon. Gentleman, whom I respect greatly, to get away with that unwarranted criticism of those whom we charged with responsibility for that issue. He knows—and I remind the Committee—that the figures were so low for that period because of legislation passed in 1996 by a Government whom he supported.
There were a significant number of loopholes in the provisions on the documents that employers could accept as proof that people were entitled to work, and the prosecution of employers who accepted such documents was rendered almost impossible. The documents were so open to forgery and fraud that they had to be removed from legislation by a provision enacted only months ago by this Government—with, I might say, the Conservative party's support. It is unfair to accuse those whom we charged with the responsibility when we did not, as a Parliament, provide them with the legislative base to enable them to do the job properly.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
I tell the Minister, whom I respect utterly, that if the legislation was poorly drafted and resulted in problems, I can only say that it was passed in 1996, when I was not in the House and thus not able properly to influence it—so there we are.
I should like to draw the Minister out on the question of illegal working. Preventing illegal working is one of the stated aims of the scheme under clause 1(4)(d). However, how would prospective employers check on job applicants? Would that involve online verification? As has happened with criminal record checks, more cautious employers might well check on all applicants rather than just on successful ones. If so, details of the checks would be recorded in all applicants' data trails in the national identity register, irrespective of whether they had secured employment. I hope that the Minister will focus on that point.
I shall speak briefly to amendment No. 111, which would replace part of clause 1(4)(e) with the words:
''establishing entitlement to a particular public service''.
Paragraph (e) is extremely vague. I do not know what it means. It states that something is in the public interest if it is
''for the purpose of securing the efficient and effective provision of public services.''
If that does not catch everything, I do not know what does. It is so wide-ranging as to bring on board anything to do with public services. We must realise that we are talking about the ability, under the second part of clause 1(3), for information about a person to be provided to others who want to find out about that person in the public interest. Paragraph (e) would give such a wide scope; I think that it is time to narrow it, so that it establishes entitlement to a particular public service. Hon. Members will note that I have set out those public services as being health care, housing, education and social benefits. We need a definition of public services because the list might be much more lengthy. If it is to be more lengthy than mine, let us hear about it.
I was tempted to table an amendment removing paragraph (e) in its entirety, but the Minister would undoubtedly have said that removing the paragraph would stop entitlement checks for public services, and he might have been right. I hope that my amendment is better, because it narrows the scope of the provision to checks on entitlement to a service only. The Minister may or may not oppose the amendment; if he opposes it, I suggest he describe the wider data-sharing service delivery agenda in full, because that, of course, was not part of the public consultation.
The purpose of my amendment, so far as paragraph (e) is concerned, is to limit use of the database to use for the entitlement purposes associated with the public consultation. Ministers claim that the consultation showed that ID cards had the support of the public, but that consultation was limited to issues of entitlement and identity, without a focus on the role of a central database; that is the essential point. For example, individuals were not asked in any consultation whether they would get an ID card so that they could register themselves for the administrative convenience of central and local government service delivery.
The police have a simple access path to the database, and it can be seen that all ID card holders will effectively be obliged to register with the police security services and to provide up-to-date details about themselves to those services whenever the police need them. It is not surprising that the police will find that helpful, but so will the public authorities.
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
The hon. Gentleman has just summarised—with respect, very unhelpfully, because inaccurately—the relationship between this Bill and police powers. I do not know where he got his summary from but I suspect that it was from a briefing note provided to him by some external interested party. Perhaps he could point out to the Committee where in the Bill there are provisions that could properly be summarised in the way that he has just done. I do not recognise them. I ask the hon. Gentleman to point out where in the Bill such powers exists, because they are not in any Bill that I have read or presented.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
The police have certain powers over the Minister and me if we are walking along the street. They are very limited powers, and we guard our safety and independence in that respect very carefully. Under the Bill, if a police officer deems it to be for the prevention or detection of any crime, he can go to the central register to identify me. He will have access to 51 registrable facts to which he has not had access hitherto. All he has to say is that it is for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime. It is as vague as that. There is no test of reasonableness, and that widens the provision immensely.
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
I shall not debate the issue with the hon. Gentleman at this stage, because we will come to the issue later, but I suggest that what he says is a gross misunderstanding of the Bill and the powers that the police will be given. The hon. Gentleman may think it appropriate to attach his interpretation to the clause, but I suggest that it is the wrong interpretation. However, we will deal with the issue in due course.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
The Minister conveniently says that we will deal with the subject in due course, but let us grab the bull by the horns now. The provision relates to a secure method for registrable facts about me to be ascertained or verified when it is necessary in the public interest. It is a matter of public interest if a policeman decides, without challenge or without any reasonable tests, as far as I can see, that he wants to have access to all 51 of my registrable facts for the so-called purpose of preventing or detecting a crime.
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
The technical interaction is between the clause, clause 18, which defines the powers to access it, and, importantly, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the new serious and organised crime provisions, which redefine what is an arrestable offence. When all those measures are put together, one gets an idea of when the police can and cannot demand the information that is held in the register.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
The hon. Gentleman, with whom I have served many times on Committees considering criminal justice Bills, makes a good point. However, we want to know what the police's powers are.
I will summarise extremely briefly. The central part of this Bill is to establish a national identity register. Individuals will have to provide up to 51 personal facts about themselves to go on the register. We need to know whether the register will be of real help in curing the mischiefs to which the Government refer in clause 1(4). The mischiefs relate to national security, detection of crime, immigration controls, illegal working, and the efficient provision of public services. My amendment seeks to put the mischief of terrorism, which began all this, at the top of that agenda. It is important that clarity of purpose is established in the Bill and I have tabled the amendment to enable a wide-ranging debate to take place.
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Woking for tabling the amendment. The group of amendments goes to the heart of the most important provision in the Bill, which is the national identity register. ID cards are as nothing compared with the importance of that. In a sense, they are a side issue—an optional extra—and if the Bill were to give due prominence to the real significance of the changes that are to be put in place, it would be called the national identity register Bill.
I will briefly touch on the issue of illegal working, although this will not be the main substance of my comments. It is one of the most dishonest selling points for the legislation. If there is a fault in the enforcement provisions against illegal working, it is in a lack of will rather than a lack of means to enforce. The lack of will relates to a much wider debate. It is because of economic factors; there is a gamut of reasons why there is a lack of will to enforce provisions against illegal working, with which all European countries are dealing. Indeed, a large number of European countries are contemplating amnesties and other things in order to regularise workers. They are not enforcing because they recognise that they have economic incentives not to enforce provisions against illegal working.
We should be honest about that situation, rather than saying that it is because we have not got ID cards. They will not make any significant difference to whether or not we tackle illegal working. That is a function of whether we are prepared to enforce the provisions that already exist. They were brought into force by this Government and therefore, presumably, they are perfect in terms of their legal ability to be enforced. I have sat through discussion of the immigration Bills that introduced them. As I said, we should be honest with the public.
We will probably end up with three categories of workers after the introduction of ID cards. The first will be those who are legal and have an ID card that says so. The second will be people who are definitely illegal, because they will not have been entitled to register for an ID card under clause 2. They will be aliens who have no right to be here, but, as the Minister said, the Secretary of State might have required them to be registered. The third will be, so to speak, status unknowns.
We will develop a market in which those who have not got ID cards or who are definitely illegal will be put on to illegal workers pay rates, as they are now. I do not think that anything will functionally change. We shall only make more concrete the distinction between the pay rate paid to a legal worker and that paid to an illegal worker. That is a dishonest selling point for the Bill.
The substance of the clause is important. The words that I have introduced are ''necessity'' and ''proportionality'', which are important tests that have to be applied. The purposes of the register are critical to whether the Government can establish that it passes the test of necessity and proportionality in the context of article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which relates to the right to privacy. It is important that the proposal continues the tradition under UK law of having databases. The status quo is that the Government have access to a huge variety of databases, ranging from the criminal records database, which is specifically for law enforcement purposes, through the driving licence database, which ensures that we have good order on the roads and that parking tickets get to the right person, and NHS databases, to the database that is perhaps the closest one we have to a full adult national database—the electoral register. That is enforced by law; there are penalties if one does not register for the electoral register.
Currently, the Government have a right to demand data only as long as they deliver the service to the citizen. In other words, the Government are the citizen's servant. Our fear is that the new database reverses that and that the citizen is the servant of the state and has a duty to hand data over whether or not the state needs that data. In talking about the purposes and defining them accurately, we are trying to ensure that they genuinely warrant the state taking extra powers to itself. We have some sympathy with some of the purposes. I can understand that biometric data are particularly convenient for the purposes of border control, for example, because there is no other contextual information at border control. People have to decide whether to let an individual in. They can take their physical characteristics, but they have no other contextual data.
Mr Jon Owen Jones (Cardiff Central, Labour/Co-operative)
I am listening to the arguments about where rights and responsibilities lie. Could not it equally be argued that the situation is the mirror image of what has been described? The citizen has rights to services and the state has a responsibility to provide the services. The citizen expects the state to deliver those services efficiently and properly and to use money well, in which case it is the state's responsibility to the citizen to ensure that it spends its money properly and gives services to those who are entitled to them and not to those who are not so entitled.
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
The hon. Gentleman is correct, and in a sense I would follow his logic. At the heart of my argument are concerns to do with the principle of the state having data in a broader sense than it specifically needs to deliver services, but I can also follow up the hon. Gentleman's point about value for money. For the state to do what I see happening here, which is to take a form of register that is appropriate for one specific purpose—we started off with biometric passports and then rolled it on to all these other functions—and to use an overkill solution, an overengineered solution, for something for which it is not necessary, is a gross waste of money. We could, for example, come up with 100 solutions for accessing NHS services that are different from the current system, under which people turn up and staff assume that they are who they say they are. I am thinking of systems ranging from chip and PIN to many cheaper ones. Or we can apply the massive overkill solution that we are discussing here, but which is grossly disproportionate to the perceived benefits that will come from it. Across the range of purposes set out, that solution will not be the most appropriate one, so we have an objection in principle and in relation to value for money.
Mr Jon Owen Jones (Cardiff Central, Labour/Co-operative)
Can the hon. Gentleman correct the impression that I gained from the debate on Second Reading? Liberal Democrat Members shouted across the Chamber that any person requiring medical attention should be treated regardless of entitlement. Did I gain the wrong impression?
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
There was a technical discussion and people argued —I think it was a misunderstanding—that ID cards would be checked in an accident and emergency department. Under current national health service policy, emergency treatment is given automatically to people, and other matters are worried about later. ID cards could be applied in cases such as elective admissions that are not so time critical, and that leads to another major source of concern about the unintended consequences of the enforcement of ID cards.
I do not imagine the NHS changing its practice significantly. No business case can be made for the suggestion that it would invest massively in ID card readers and biometric readers. Even if it were to do so, the unintended consequences may be that people, such as HIV sufferers, are deterred from seeking treatment at an earlier stage. That could have unintended adverse public health consequences, and such people could create a greater call on the NHS because they turn up later for emergency treatment. However, that is something to be put in respect of the business case.
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
The hon. Gentleman has engendered an interesting and helpful debate. Part of the reason why we cannot have a sensible debate about the process is that people construct behind it a series of interactions between public servants and individuals or between, as happened in the previous debate, individuals and individuals. Such processes do not exist at present, but it has been said that they will if people have identity cards.
There is no reason to believe that, in the context of the provision of national health services, people will be required to prove their identity to the standard that the Bill would allow any more than they are at present. That will happen only in important transactions in public services. For example, let us suppose that a person were registering with a general practitioner for the first time. If the GP did not know the person and was not satisfied that he was who he said he was, a check would be available.
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
I think that I agree with the Minister—something that I believe will be a rare exception in Committee. He is entirely right. There are two debates: one is the practical debate about how such a proposal will work and the other is like a Daily Mail debate. In light of the opinion polls that ask whether people are willing to pay £85 for an ID card, people respond to the impression that somehow illegal working will suddenly stop or that all the scrounging foreigners who are coming into this country and accessing our NHS services will be stopped from so doing.
The reality is that very little will change from now to when ID cards are in place, which is one of the strongest arguments against them. Legislation on illegal working and access to NHS is in place now. Checks can be made and a range of documentation is available, so why do we not use that rather than put in place such an expensive new solution? The Government's arguments are based on giving the impression that all the checks will take place and that misuse of the system will be stopped. If they were more honest and simply said that ID cards were about national security and policing, there would be a debate in which we could have a more serious engagement.
The Bill is a step change. It takes us an enormous way forward from where we were in the past when we hotly debated the electoral register and whether it should be extended for other purposes such as credit checking. We are incredibly careful about the extension of a database collected for electoral purposes being applied elsewhere. We have hotly debated under what circumstances DNA samples and fingerprints taken from suspects should be kept on the register and under what circumstances they should be destroyed. All these things for specific Government applications have been hotly debated, yet, in this clause and these amendments, we are saying that we will collect this mass of data from every adult for a huge range of purposes. That is a significant change from the status quo and one that we should be worried about.
On interaction with the police, we focus on whether one will have to carry identity cards, but this is a complete red herring. All of us generally carry our faces, irises and fingers. If the police are seeking to prove the identity of somebody, they will not worry about identity cards. The police will have the equipment to check faces, irises or fingers. The critical interaction is the circumstances in which that can take place in a legal fashion.
I come back to the point that the hon. Member for Woking explored: the interaction between this clause, the register, clause 18, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and a whole range of other legislation, particularly the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill. That Bill will make everything arrestable, which changes the PACE provision. We should be looking at those issues and making sure that people understand that something that is far more intrusive than producing an ID card could become the norm. Face recognition systems that automatically register faces and seek to pull people out of crowds—they have been used for hooligan spotting and in similar circumstances—could become the norm in the same way that automatic number plate recognition has become the norm.
That will be on the basis of accessing this register, and that will be on the basis of the test that the threshold is applied to that. That is why the serious crime amendment, to which we have added our names, is a sensible one. It is one thing for the police to stick a van in the street in order to do automatic face recognition to pull out people whom they suspect of serious crime. It would be quite another thing, in terms of the balance between state and citizen, for them to do that for much lower levels of criminal activity. We need to keep those tests. We do in all other areas of law, specifically when there is an intrusion on the individual's rights, such as those allowing the police to bug communications. We try to make distinctions as to when or when not it is proportionate and necessary for the police to make these intrusions. It is important that we should be testing that here. As with any efficient or effective provision of public services, these wide-ranging provisions are simply too broad unless there are further safeguards.
Mr Humfrey Malins (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Woking, Conservative)
I am following the hon. Gentleman's argument carefully. Referring back to the issue of crime and the Minister's observation about so few powers being given to the police. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that if he was arrested for a minor traffic offence under this Bill, in the police station, would not the police have the authority under this Bill and the provisions on the detection of crime to trawl through all 51 registrable facts about himself, including everywhere he had ever lived? I do not think that the police have that power now.
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
The hon. Gentleman expresses the concern precisely. We are seeking to explore whether the thresholds are there to make sure that action is always proportionate to the offence that has been committed. I am looking forward to the Minister's response, but we need to explore these issues broadly. I am grateful to you, Mr. Conway, for allowing us the breadth of debate on this critical clause.
Mr Patrick Mercer (Shadow Minister (Homeland Security), Home Affairs; Newark, Conservative)
I want specifically to address amendment No. 1, the particular provision in it referring to ''terrorist'' and to amendments Nos. 4 and 5, where they overarch the whole business of terrorism being a serious crime.
The amendments, which have provoked such a useful and wide-ranging debate, should particularly focus—to echo the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Woking—on the whole business of terrorism as it affects both the national identity register and the identity card. A register and a card can be extremely useful against terrorism, especially against international terrorism. That is why I think amendment No. 1 is so important, particularly paragraph (a) and the line
''in the United Kingdom or elsewhere''.
We must have specific reference in the Bill to terrorism and international terrorism, however we frame it.
Mr Des Browne (Minister of State (Citizenship, Immigration and Counter-Terrorism), Home Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
Before we reconvene, the hon. Gentleman might want to look at the definition of crime in clause 43, which covers the issue of abroad. A terrorist act is, of course, a crime.
It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.