Clause 137 - Powers of Tribunal
Gambling Bill
2:45 pm
Mr Malcolm Moss (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; North East Cambridgeshire, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 265, in clause 137, page 61, line 17, at end insert
'including reference to what will constitute reasonable belief for the purposes of section 60 and other defences under the Act.'.
This is an attempt to tease out what would constitute reasonable belief about a person's age, which would hopefully provide a defence under clause 60, and other defences available under the Act, which could be usefully incorporated into a code of practice issued by the commission, possibly under clause 23.
Mr Richard Caborn (Minister of State (Sport and Tourism), Department for Culture, Media & Sport; Sheffield Central, Labour)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his explanation of the amendment, but it is unnecessary. The tribunal is charged with hearing appeals against certain decisions of the commission. The decisions over which it has jurisdiction to hear appeals are listed in clause 134. None of those decisions contains any defence of reasonable belief, and nor are they amenable to any such defence. In addition, clause 60 provides a defence of reasonable belief against criminal charge under part 4 of the Bill, which relates to children and young persons. Although I have sympathy with the hon. Gentleman's sentiments, the commission will have no power to assist in the interpretation of reasonable belief under clause 60; it will be a matter for the ordinary criminal courts. The defence of reasonable belief does not appear in any other clause. It is not necessary for me to require the commission to make any statement in its code of practice about interpretation and the concept of reasonable belief; nor are there any circumstances in which the tribunal might apply that concept. Reasonable belief will have to be judged in each circumstance. For example, reasonableness will vary between the betting office and the children's arcade. With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.
Mr Malcolm Moss (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; North East Cambridgeshire, Conservative)
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr Malcolm Moss (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; North East Cambridgeshire, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 334, in clause 137, page 61, line 21, at end add—
'(6) The appeal is a rehearing de novo.'.
Mr Roger Gale (North Thanet, Conservative)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 268, in clause 139, page 61, line 39, at end insert—
'(2A) Rules under this section shall provide for all appeals to be a re-hearing de novo.'.
No. 338, in clause 193, page 88, line 40, at end add—
'(6) The appeal is a rehearing de novo.'.
Mr Malcolm Moss (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; North East Cambridgeshire, Conservative)
Amendments Nos. 268 and 338 are consequential. If the tribunal is to exercise its powers fully under this clause, any hearing should consider all relevant facts or material, as originally considered by the commission when making its decision. The clause sets out the tribunal's powers, including the ability to uphold or overturn all or part of the commission's decision. If, as the clause states, the tribunal is able to consider material not previously available to the commission, it goes without saying that the tribunal's deliberations should be in the form of a re-hearing of the original application. For that to be possible, it must hold a full, de novo hearing. Although that may be the intention of the clause, it is not spelt out clearly enough. The amendment seeks to replicate the provisions in the Gaming Act 1968, whereby operators can appeal to the Crown court against refusal of a gaming licence by the licensing magistrates.
Mr Richard Caborn (Minister of State (Sport and Tourism), Department for Culture, Media & Sport; Sheffield Central, Labour)
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his explanation of the amendment, as its effects were not immediately clear to us.
All appeals to the gambling appeals tribunal can be based on law and fact. When a person appeals to the tribunal against a decision taken by the gambling commission, the commission will have already heard the facts of the case. The tribunal will hear those facts again and will also be able to consider any additional evidence that may not have been available to the commission. That means that there are always two opportunities for the facts to be heard. Any onward appeal from the tribunal to the High Court or the Court of Session may be permitted on a point of law only. That is standard practice. Likewise, for appeals to the magistrates court or sheriff court under clause 192, the court will hear the facts again and will be able to consider any additional evidence that may not have been available to the licensing authority. With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.
Mr Malcolm Moss (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; North East Cambridgeshire, Conservative)
The Minister did not allude to the current Gaming Act, the 1968 Act, in which I understand there are provisions similar to those in the amendments. It would be helpful if the Minister were to flesh out whether the current legislation—the 1968 Act, which we have tried to replicate—is working, and, if it is, whether this clause embraces those provisions and whether our amendment is necessary.
Mr Richard Caborn (Minister of State (Sport and Tourism), Department for Culture, Media & Sport; Sheffield Central, Labour)
As I understand it, the provisions that we are taking from the 1968 Act and incorporating in this Bill are operating satisfactorily. There are no lesser appeal rights in this Bill than there are in the 1968 Act, and we believe that the current provisions operate quite effectively and will cover all circumstances.
Mr Malcolm Moss (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; North East Cambridgeshire, Conservative)
I am most grateful to the Minister for clarifying that point, and on the basis of what is now on the record, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 137 ordered to stand part of the Bill.