Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment No. 149, in

clause 31, page 13, line 36, after 'may,' insert 'subject to subsection (1A)'.

Mr Edward O'Hara (Knowsley South, Labour)

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 150, in

clause 31, page 13, line 39, at end insert—

'(1A) the Secretary of State may only make regulations under subsection (1) if he has secured the agreement of the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly to collaborate in a scheme, the effect of which is that the bodies created under subsection (1) will also have the function of negotiating the conditions of service of employees of fire and rescue authorities in Wales and of fire authorities in Scotland.'.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

This is an important clause. The Committee may be relieved to hear that it is the last clause about which there is likely to be controversy. I will not say the last clause about which there will be lots to say, because I am sure that the Committee will

want to investigate the pensions area thoroughly, but I do not think that that is controversial.

There are a number of issues arising from the clause. In speaking to these amendments, and later to the other groups, I shall try to be narrow because I am particularly anxious that we get the opportunity for a stand part debate on the clause. As you will know, Mr. O'Hara, some amendments which were tabled have not been selected, so it will not be possible to consider in debates on amendments some of the issues that members of the Committee wished to investigate. I therefore hope that we will be able to have a stand part debate as well.

The clause provides for the Secretary of State to be able to establish a negotiating body, and effectively then to give that body exclusive rights and instructions as to how it is to go about its business. Although the Minister of State may be a little coy about this, the provision is a linchpin of the Government's strategy to reduce the Fire Brigades Union's influence over the fire services, increasing the influence of other representative bodies and ensuring what we might regard as a more balanced situation. The term ''negotiating body'' looks like a slight misnomer when the body will be susceptible to direction from the Secretary of State in how it conducts its deliberations. We will explore some of those areas a little later, in succeeding debates.

The amendments address a particular concern arising from the splitting of responsibilities for England, Wales and Scotland. Amendment No. 149 is a paving amendment for No. 150, the substantive amendment, which would require the Secretary of State to establish a negotiating body only where he has reached agreement with the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly to the effect that the negotiating body could negotiate pay and conditions for fire and rescue or Scottish fire service employees throughout the whole of the United Kingdom.

I am a long-term believer in local pay flexibility and negotiation. I remember during the strike last year talking to firefighters from my constituency who, with some cause, were complaining about the difficulty of living in Surrey, with housing costs the way they are, on £21,000 plus £256 weighting allowance. Equally, I remember having a discussion with somebody from the north-east, who honestly, if privately, admitted that £21,000 was not a bad salary considering his local economy. He was faintly embarrassed at striking for £30,000 when most of his friends and neighbours were certainly not earning significantly more than firefighters were before the dispute.

My purpose in tabling the amendment is to voice a concern felt by fire and rescue authority employers. Hitherto, there has been a UK-wide approach to the matter, which includes Scotland. Under the current negotiating arrangements, the Scottish fire authority employers are represented alongside their English and Welsh counterparts.

We need to understand how the Secretary of State would use his powers to impose a negotiating machinery if the current negotiations with the national joint council were to fail to agree a new

structure. I understand that his powers would extend only to England. Unless he were to meet the arrangements in the amendment, the negotiating machinery would relate only to England, and Scotland and Wales would have separate machinery.

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming—

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

I was concluding my remarks when we were interrupted. I would like to know whether the Minister recognises and intends that there should not be separate national negotiating forums for Wales, England and Scotland. That is not to say that there should be a single negotiating structure, as there may be horizontally separate negotiating structures for different groups of employees. If his intention is as I have described, how does he intend to ensure that it can be given effect, if he is in the position of imposing the negotiating machinery via the powers in this clause?

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

The current negotiating machinery, which is under discussion by the parties, is crucial to the modernisation of the fire and rescue service. As I expect that we will have a more ample debate on the wider principles of the negotiating machinery, I shall make no further comments about it now, other than to repeat the obvious point that it was the subject of a central recommendation of the Bain review of the fire service. In this, as in so many other areas, we are working on the basis of recommendations in that report.

As I said, the existing negotiation arrangements are under review. We hope that the review will lead to improved arrangements that meet the needs of a modern fire and rescue service. The clause provides the Secretary of State with reserve powers to establish statutory negotiating bodies for England should the review fail to deliver appropriate improvements.

Amendments Nos. 149 and 150 seek to ensure that a negotiating body established under the clause would negotiate conditions of service for employees of fire and rescue authorities in Scotland and Wales, as well as England. As the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge has rightly pointed out, the existing negotiating arrangements work on a UK-wide basis. We would prefer that to continue.

If, however, we were to decide to draw down the powers in the Bill and establish a statutory body, it would make sense for England and Scotland to legislate in their respective areas of competence. That is logical, in view of the fact that responsibility for the fire and rescue service is already devolved to Scotland and Northern Ireland and will be devolved to Wales as part of the Bill. The financial and policy framework is already devolved. It is therefore possible that over time our financial and policy positions may diverge and we would not wish to be bound by statute to negotiate as one. However, I repeat that we have no intention at

present to vary the existing arrangements for UK-wide negotiation.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

I think that the Minister is saying that he does not want to be bound in the Bill to proceed with the use of these powers if he has been able to reach agreement with the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. If I am interpreting him correctly, he is also saying that he would seek to reach such an agreement. In other words, if he were imposing a negotiating body, he would prefer it to have a UK-wide remit.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Our intention is to continue with the current arrangements for UK-wide negotiating machinery, and to agree that through administrative arrangements if necessary.

As I am sure the hon. Gentleman will understand, the difficulty with the amendments is that not only would they bind the Government through statute to seeking agreements from Scotland and Wales before any arrangements could be put in place, but they would effectively give the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly a veto over the establishment of a statutory negotiating body for England. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that that would not be a satisfactory position. I put it to him that it is slightly curious for a party that is constantly quoting the West Lothian question at us to believe it appropriate for the Scottish Executive and Welsh Assembly to be able to dictate negotiating arrangements in England.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

For the record, the amendments go further than that. I said very clearly that my own instinct is for local pay negotiation. What we are doing is performing one of the functions of an Opposition, which is to bring forward questions from qualified outside bodies that have concerns, and to air them in a way that allows Ministers to respond to them. I hope that the Minister will take the amendment in the spirit in which it was tabled, that of inquiry on behalf of fire and rescue authorities that perceive a problem.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that, and I return the compliment by saying that I hope that my explanation satisfies him, and that he will withdraw his probing amendment.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

What the Minister said makes perfect sense, but the fact that this issue arises points to one of the items of fall-out—I will not call it a difficulty—from the devolution settlement. Increasingly, things that have been done on a pan-UK basis, to the extent that they require statutory powers to be done, cannot necessarily continue to be done on a pan-UK basis, and that may cause difficulties. However, I am reassured that if the Minister has to use these powers, he will seek arrangements that will allow the body to operate on a UK-wide basis.

There are some funding questions. We all know that Scotland is better funded than the rest of the UK, and that may create tensions. We have seen that in other areas. Without wishing to digress, I point out the example of the funding of elderly people in care homes, to which the Scottish Executive have been able,

because of the greater availability of funding for a public service in Scotland, to take a different approach from that taken by the UK Government for the rest of the country. I foresee potential difficulties.

I invite the Minister to tell the Committee whether, if he goes down the route of using these powers, he will seek to agree how to proceed with his Welsh and Scottish colleagues. Has he had discussions with those colleagues on this matter, and is he confident that a UK-wide solution would be reached?

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

The answer is yes—I have had discussions with colleagues, and I am confident that such an arrangement can be reached.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

The Minister's words will be read with great interest by the people who suggested that this amendment be tabled in order to hear what he had to say. I say, job done, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr Richard Younger-Ross (Shadow Minister, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Local Government & the Regions; Teignbridge, Liberal Democrat)

I beg to move amendment No. 182, in

clause 31, page 14, line 3, leave out subsection (2)(b) and insert—

'(b) Persons representing the interests of some or all employees of fire and rescue services, such persons being representative of organisations considered by the Secretary of State to be appropriate and the number of representatives being proportionate to membership of the organisation.'.

Mr Edward O'Hara (Knowsley South, Labour)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 183, in

clause 31, page 14, line 26, at end add—

'(8) A fire and rescue authority will grant leave to representatives of trade unions representing employees in accordance with (2)(b) above, such leave to be granted subject to the provisions provided for in the ACAS Code of Practice—Time off for trade union duties and activities.

(9) The pay and conditions of all part-time employees will be on an equal pro-rata basis to full-time employees.'.

Mr Richard Younger-Ross (Shadow Minister, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Local Government & the Regions; Teignbridge, Liberal Democrat)

These are both probing amendments, in much the same fashion as the previous amendments in the name of the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. I hope that they will take us, in part, to the area to which the Minister referred, and which he was, I think, hoping to discuss in the stand part debate. They may elicit some responses.

Amendment No. 182 deals with the balance of the negotiating body, and the sort of structure that would be acceptable to the Minister. Obviously, we will have to wait and see what happens in the negotiations. Will the negotiating body be proportionate to those who represent the different parts of the Union? Without going round the houses, we are asking whether the Retained Firefighters Union would have a place at the table to negotiate terms and conditions.

Will the Minister go further and say that if fire service middle management decided that they wished to be represented, and they are not directly at present, such a structure would be represented on the negotiating body? We use the word ''proportionate''

in the amendment, meaning representation on a fair and even platform.

Amendment No. 183, is about terms and conditions, and I am not sure why it has been lumped with No. 182.

Mr Edward O'Hara (Knowsley South, Labour)

Order. I should point out that there is a misprint on the amendment paper. Amendment No. 183 has subsections (8) and (9). Subsection (9) is a misprint, and the debate should be confined to subsection (8).

Mr Richard Younger-Ross (Shadow Minister, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Local Government & the Regions; Teignbridge, Liberal Democrat)

Thank you, Mr. O'Hara. I had been advised that we should consider only subsection (8).

It has been brought to our attention that the resources made available to trade union officials are well in excess of the current recommended time off for trade union duties and activities in the ACAS code of practice. It had been put to us that ACAS recommendations should be seen as a maximum, but that would remove local discretion, which we do not seek to do. There should be a reference in the terms and conditions to the ACAS code, which should be the benchmark by which local authorities and fire and rescue authorities are judged.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

Amendment No. 182 is an interesting probing of the Minister's intentions. As the hon. Member for Teignbridge (Richard Younger-Ross) said, we all know that the issue is about getting a proper voice at the table for representatives of firefighters other than the FBU, particularly retained firefighters, who require an appropriate voice in any future negotiations.

In the interests of equity and a more rational and moderate debate about fire service matters, I welcome the opportunity for the Minister to confirm that any negotiating body, either established by him or as a result of current discussions, but ultimately sanctioned by him by virtue of his deciding not to use his powers under the clause, will be a body that contains a mix of employee representatives.

I would be grateful if the Minister were to confirm that any voluntary solution that he accepts, having been persuaded not to use his powers under the clause, must include representatives of employee bodies other than the FBU.

I say to the hon. Member for Teignmouth—

Mr Richard Younger-Ross (Shadow Minister, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Local Government & the Regions; Teignbridge, Liberal Democrat)

Teignbridge.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

I am not sure where ''Teenmouth'' is. Is there such a place?

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

It is pronounced ''Tinmouth''.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

Not another pronunciation error.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

It is not to be confused with Tynemouth.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

I am not entirely sure about direct proportionality. The key point is representation on the body. Perhaps the Minister will say more about that.

The hon. Member for Teignbridge made some interesting additional points about the representation of middle management. I strongly urge the Minister to establish a separate negotiating body for them. It

appears to me, as an observer, that one of the problems with delivering any kind of emergency cover during an industrial dispute is that there is no middle management outside the dispute process. Typically, when train drivers strike, there is a cadre of middle managers who can be hauled out of their offices and sat at a ticket barrier, or behind a train driver's console, where they can deploy their former skills to keep a skeleton service going.

A large proportion of the work of fire and rescue services is routine and, as we saw during the dispute, the amount of work that is emergency, ''must-respond'' work is really quite small. Such work could probably be managed quite well by a relatively small number of middle managers, perhaps with some support from small numbers of military personnel. That opens up a prospect of a much more manageable industrial relations situation in the fire service. I suspect that the Minister will not want to be drawn on his precise intentions in that regard, but I hope that he is thinking of having separate negotiating bodies for middle managers. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Teignbridge to think carefully about his suggestion that middle managers should be represented on the negotiating body.

I am a little confused about amendment No. 183, Mr. O'Hara. Are we supposed to be considering part of it, but not the other part?

Mr Edward O'Hara (Knowsley South, Labour)

We are considering subsection (8) only.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

Will we come to the subject referred to in subsection (9) in due course?

Mr Edward O'Hara (Knowsley South, Labour)

Yes. It is simply that the two are not connected.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

It was not selected for this debate; I understand. So there will not be an opportunity to discuss what was a rather interesting suggestion from the hon. Member for Teignbridge. However, we will have the opportunity to discuss it under clause stand part.

I look forward to hearing the Minister's comments.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

The hon. Member for Teignbridge will not be surprised when I tell him that I believe that amendment No. 182 is unnecessary. However, it has been helpful to have this short debate. As the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge anticipated, it is helpful to have an opportunity to spell out the Government's intentions in this respect.

Subsection (2)(b) will ensure that employee representatives will be included on the negotiating body. Following consultation, regulations will be drawn up setting out how places on the negotiating body will be allocated. Although the general principle of proportionality is reasonable, there may well be exceptions. In the first place, a strict adoption of the principle of proportionality might result in pressure for a very large negotiating body. Alternatively, if it were kept to a more manageable size, which was one of the strong recommendations of the Bain review, with which we concur, that might mean excluding some of

the minority interests. Neither outcome, in our view, would be desirable.

I will quote from the Bain review and the White Paper to make our objectives absolutely clear. Paragraph 10.26 of the Bain review talks about the new NJC, which is envisaged as replacing current arrangements, and states that on the union side it should represent

''the Fire Brigades' Union, the Retained Firefighters Union, the Fire Officers Association, the Association of Principal Fire Officers and Unison.''

In our White Paper, which responded to that, we said:

''We also agree with the Independent Review that a new negotiating body should involve representatives of the Retained Firefighters Union, the Fire Officers Association, and the Association of Principal Fire Officers.''

That is why we intend to specify who should be involved. We envisage three separate negotiating bodies, covering different groups within the present grading structures: first, chief fire officers and assistant chief fire officers; secondly, middle management; and thirdly, firefighters and control room staff. The composition and chair of each body would be determined by the Deputy Prime Minister. The arrangements for non-uniformed staff, who are predominantly represented by Unison, would continue as at present: matters would continue to be handled predominantly through the local government negotiating arrangements.

I hope that that clarifies our intentions and how they fit in with our overall objective. It is compatible with the purpose of the amendment, it but might not be feasible if the amendment were accepted and we were strictly bound to follow its terms.

I fully understand the thinking behind amendment No. 183, but, again, it is unnecessary. The Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 requires that employers permit officials of recognised trade unions time off during working hours to carry out union activities, including collective bargaining. The purpose of the amendment is already covered in statute and it is unnecessary to duplicate that.

With those assurances, I hope that the hon. Member for Teignbridge will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Mr Richard Younger-Ross (Shadow Minister, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Local Government & the Regions; Teignbridge, Liberal Democrat)

I thank the Minister for putting that clearly on the record. I shall have no difficulty in withdrawing my amendment. I accept that the word ''proportionate'' was not intended to be precise to the ninth decimal place; it can mean something that is reasonable rather than exact. We totally accept that a small committee would be more manageable and better. I thank the Minister for his comments and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment No. 111, in

clause 31, page 14, line 5, at end insert

'appointed in accordance with advice to the Secretary of State from the Commissioner for Public Appointments.'.

This is very much a probing amendment. I struggled with the drafting of it and recognise that it is rather inelegant. Indeed, I am not sure that the language is appropriate. I seek an assurance from the Minister that a genuinely independent chairman will be appointed. Independence is defined in subsection (3) by excluding certain categories of people. I can think of lots of people who do not fall into any of those categories but would not be considered independent by the layman. In the context of a Secretary of State-imposed negotiating body, we are looking for someone of unimpeachable standing who is recognised, if not warmly, by all parties involved in the negotiating body as beyond pressure from Ministers or any other party, and as being of a robustness and, perhaps, public standing that would give the body the stature that it needs to be genuinely independent.

I imagine that the Minister will be able to tell us whether the advice of the Commissioner for Public Appointments would routinely be sought on such appointments. The amendment seeks to ensure that that advice would be not only sought but listened to. I would be happy to withdraw the amendment if the right hon. Gentleman could assure us that any person appointed as chairman would be someone about whom the Secretary of State had taken advice from the commissioner and that the commissioner had indicated that the person in question was appropriate for appointment.

The commissioner does not approve or make appointments, so it was difficult to draft an amendment that makes sense, and it may not work. However, I hope that that Minister will accept the general thrust of the point and provide some reassurance.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman quite properly tabled the amendment. He admitted that it may not be drafted in the most professional parliamentary language, but it has the reasonable purpose of obtaining assurances about the process of appointing an independent chair. I assure him and the Committee that the Government regard it as essential that the chair is independent. I also wholly concur with the hon. Gentleman that the person who chairs the body should be of an appropriate stature and character to ensure its effective operation. That is important for the success of the negotiating machinery,.

We believe that the subsections (2)(c) and (3) will ensure the chairman's independence. The detailed process would be a matter for the regulations. If we decide to establish statutory negotiating machinery, we shall consult appropriately before making the regulations.

It is the ODPM's current practice to comply with the principles set out by the Commissioner for Public Appointments, and we would certainly apply those principles in this instance if an appointment was to be made. I hope that, with that assurance, the hon. Gentleman will seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

The only caveat that the Minister mentioned there was that it is the ODPM's current

practice. I hope that he was not suggesting that there might be a change in practice ahead.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

If I may repeat what I said, it is our current practice to comply with the principles and it would be our intention to apply them in this instance, if we had to make an appointment. I have to use the conditional tense, because we will not definitely apply this process. If agreement is reached voluntarily in the existing negotiating framework on the creation of a more satisfactory framework, there will be no need for these provisions. The hon. Gentleman should not draw any inference from my use of the conditional tense, other than that it is to guard against the possibility that we never have to use the procedures because agreement is reached through the existing arrangements.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification and I welcome his assurance that it will be a genuinely independent chairman. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment No. 112, in

clause 31, page 14, line 12, leave out subsections (4), (5) and (6).

Mr Edward O'Hara (Knowsley South, Labour)

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 163, 164 and 165.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

We tabled amendment No. 112 to probe the way in which the special status given to agreements made by the negotiating bodies worked and to raise some issues about the status of local negotiations, which have long been a part of fire service employment practice and tradition, but which appeared to be outlawed by clause 31.

That is another issue that has been raised by a number of fire authorities on their initial reading of the Bill. They were clearly able to get to the Minister and the ODPM in double quick time. The amendment, the purpose of which was to draw attention to the issue and to probe the Government's intentions on local negotiating machinery, has been largely obviated by the Government tabling amendments that address those issues and make clear how they intend to proceed. None the less, as a result of the accident of my having tabled the amendment first, I must now go first and ask the questions that the Minister would probably have answered anyway had the order of tabling been different.

Government amendment No. 163 answers the charge that there is no recognition in the Bill of local negotiation, but it permits it only to the extent that the negotiating body allows. The Minister will tell me with great pedantry that that is different from the extent to which the Secretary of State allows. However, if he reads the Bill carefully, he will see that in the next clause the negotiating body is bound to have regard to ''guidance'' given to it by the Secretary of State. Therefore, on an issue such as this the end decision rests, in effect, with the Secretary of State. If we cut through the machinery, it is the Secretary of State who will ultimately be in a position to determine the extent to which local negotiation is permitted.

Clearly, local negotiation is important to create flexibility in the system and has always been part of the system. Equally, if people felt strongly that the negotiating machinery that had been imposed was oppressive, or that they did not like it in some way, local negotiation could be used as a way of circumventing that negotiating machinery. I think that we are entitled to ask the Minister what the intended scope of local negotiation is. Will it include pay and weighting or only local conditions' issues, perhaps about the location of people's workplace and other such relatively marginal issues? I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about those things.

Government amendment No. 164 is welcome because it recognises the weakness of over-centralising the bargaining process by providing for local negotiation. We welcome that. The mechanism, as I have said, reinforces the Secretary of State's power yet again. He dictates to the negotiating body, which authorises the local negotiation in terms that it has defined. That means that there is not a negotiation in the sense that the layman would understand the term. It is a process the scope and breadth of which will be constrained and determined from the top down.

Government amendment No. 165 brings great relief to me because I spent more time trying to understand and get advice on the meaning and relevance of subsection (6) than on any other subsection in the whole Bill. I assume that the exclusion of subsection (6), which says that subsection (5)—the subsection that gives exclusive rights to deals made under the negotiating structure to have the protection of legal enforceability—has

''effect despite section 179 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992'',

is not a change of policy, but a recognition that there is no conflict between the two.

If that is the case, I will have to congratulate the person who advised me way back in the procedure that that was the case. I will also have to confess that a small excursion into the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 reminded me why considering a fire and rescue Bill in Committee is much less hard work than considering an employment relations Bill, one of which I was involved with in a previous incarnation. If the Minister could clarify that there is no practical effect or change of policy direction arising from the elimination of subsection (6), that would be helpful confirmation of my understanding.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

I start by saying that we understand the importance of local negotiations in the fire and rescue service. It was never our intention to make the outcome of local negotiations unenforceable. Hon. Members may well, therefore, reasonably inquire why the provisions that we propose to remove from the Bill were included. The original formulation was designed to avoid the effectiveness of any new negotiating machinery that is put in place being subverted by a deliberate ploy to negotiate at a local level, and thereby avoid the national machinery. That was the thinking that led us to the original formulation. Since

publication of the Bill, we have looked again at the draft, and we have tabled amendments Nos. 163, 164 and 165 to enable local negotiations on certain conditions of service to continue to be legally enforceable.

The hon. Gentleman asked me which conditions would be open to negotiation. I say to him that we would not see this as extending to pay, because that could subvert the national framework for agreement. In our recent debate, we talked about the benefit of a UK-wide national framework for negotiation on pay. Clearly, it would be inconsistent if we opened the door to local pay negotiations through these amendments.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

My understanding is that London weighting has been negotiated at a local level, as a local matter. If weighting is allowed to be negotiated at a local level, there is no reason why it could not become a much larger element, which would have a significant impact on pay.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

I do not intend to be drawn into too detailed a consideration of the scope for local agreement, as against national agreement, on matters of weighting and any additions that may be made to national agreements. Clearly, this is a very difficult area, and it is probably right that there should be a measure of discretion. However, I can say to the hon. Gentleman that a certain number of items are traditionally negotiated locally, and these can have a significant impact on the level of pay that people will ultimately take home, even if the rates of pay are negotiated nationally. Shift and duty systems, certain redundancy arrangements and mobility and redeployment arrangements have all traditionally been subject to local negotiation, and it is not our intention to cut across those particular elements.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

I am sure that it is not the Minister's intention, but I think that he is sending the wrong signal here. He is saying that elements other than pay are traditionally negotiated locally and could have a significant impact on take-home pay. That suggests a lack of transparency—a national pay structure, negotiated publicly and nationally, and a series of local arrangements that subvert that in an untransparent way. The use of supplements and dodgy shift arrangements can add to pay in a way that is not transparent. I hope that that is not what the Minister had in mind.

I ask the Minister specifically about London weighting. It is a significant issue in London, and my understanding is that it has always been negotiated locally. Is he saying that that important local negotiation would not be permitted under this clause?

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman is quite wrong to assume that I was opening the door to the subversion of national pay negotiations. I was making exactly the opposite point. He will recall that I stressed that the reason for the original formulation of the clause was that it would avoid the scope for subversion of a national agreement. He will know that there is quite widespread variation in practice in terms of shift systems and patterns, and those do affect people's take-home pay. They are subject to local negotiations, and we do not intend to cut across that.

Indeed, the whole basis of the new policy that underpins the Bill and is part of the integrated risk management planning framework that is coming in, is that local fire and rescue authorities will be free to explore the right responses to risk in their area and to put in place arrangements that respond to them in the most appropriate way. That is the framework that we want.

There will be scope for local agreement. That would potentially cover local allowances such as London weighting, with the agreement of the new statutory body. That is the key to the new framework. Local discretion will be allowed, but it will be subject to agreement by the new national body to avoid the risk of the national framework being subverted.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

The Minister will have to accept that, because of the Secretary of State's power to give guidance to the national body, we will want to probe him a little further than just allowing him to say that that will be with the agreement of the national body. Does he envisage the national body putting limits on the scope of local negotiation, for example, limiting weighting arrangements to a certain percentage of pay? Or will he allow negotiations that have taken place locally in the past to continue unfettered?

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman is confusing two quite separate processes. When we deal with the next clause, we will consider the circumstances in which the Secretary of State may give guidance. There are very good reasons for him doing so, which go back to the Bain report. I remind the hon. Gentleman of the reasons for that review.

That situation is quite different from what I was talking about a moment ago, which is the procedure under which the new national body, if one is created, with an independent chairman gives an overall framework and agreement to local negotiations. It is designed to ensure a coherent national framework with scope for local negotiations and will not be susceptible to the kind of direction that the hon. Gentleman fears will be given by the Secretary of State.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

I am curious. I am not sure whether the Minister is saying that the powers under clause 32 would not allow the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the national negotiating body about the extent to which it should allow local negotiation. Surely, that would be precisely the kind of thing on which the Secretary of State would want to reserve the power to give guidance.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

We are getting dangerously close to pre-empting the debate on clause 32. I am perfectly happy to discuss the matter now, but I had assumed that it would probably be better to deal with it when we came to that clause.

It is not the Government's intention for the Secretary of State to be directly involved as a member in the negotiations, although Bain recommended that the Government should be directly involved. We have not gone as far as Bain on that point, nor is it our intention to give directions in the way that the hon. Gentleman indicated, but

there is a proper role for guidance to be given by the Secretary of State for reasons that I will set out in full when we come to clause 32.

Government amendments Nos. 163 and 164 would allow a statutory negotiating body to make arrangements for local negotiation of particular conditions of service. We have dealt with that. Agreements resulting from those arrangements would be legally enforceable.

While reviewing the effect of clause 31, we concluded that subsection (6) did not add anything to the existing legal position. I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that he will not have to do any further quarrying in the infinitely fascinating territory of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. I hope that he will accept my assurance that there is no benefit from subsection (6), which is why we feel that its inclusion is unnecessary and that it can be deleted. Indeed, its inclusion might lead to misinterpretation. Government amendment No. 165 seeks to exclude subsection (6) from the Bill. In doing so, it addresses part of Opposition amendment No. 112.

Amendment No. 112 seeks to remove subsections (4) and (5) as well. That would mean that even if a statutory body were established, employers and unions could continue to negotiate legally enforceable agreements outside the statutory negotiating arrangements. I hope that on reflection the hon. Gentleman will recognise that that would not be a desirable framework, that Government amendments Nos. 163 and 164 have dealt with the concerns that were brought to his attention and that the clause as amended will provide a proper framework for the future. I ask him to withdraw the amendment.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

As I indicated in my opening remarks, Government amendments Nos. 163, 164 and 165 address the issue. I would not have tabled amendment No. 112 if the Government's amendments had already been tabled. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: No. 163, in

clause 31, page 14, line 21, after 'body' insert

'or in accordance with local negotiation arrangements made by the negotiating body in respect of employees of that description'.

No. 164, in

clause 31, page 14, line 21, at end insert—

'(5A) ''Local negotiation arrangements'' means arrangements made by a negotiating body established under this section for the purpose of enabling conditions of service of employees of fire and rescue authorities to be negotiated at local level.

(5B) Local negotiation arrangements may (in particular) include provision with regard to—

(a) the persons or descriptions of persons by whom, or by means of whom, negotiations are authorised to be carried out at local level;

(b) the conditions of service and descriptions of conditions of service authorised to be negotiated at local level.

(5C) Local negotiation arrangements may be made by a negotiating body in respect of employees of a particular description only if the negotiating body includes persons representing the interests of employees of that description.'.

No. 165, in

clause 31, page 14, line 22, leave out subsection (6).—[Mr. Raynsford.]

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

This is an important clause. We have already explored some of the issues relating to it. During the dispute there was a feeling that the Government were the spectre at the feast—I could put that point more aggressively, but I am in a relaxed mood this afternoon. [Interruption.] I will not be emollient as the Minister suggests, but I will not be aggressive. It was felt that the Government were party to the negotiations, but without taking any responsibility for their role. Negotiations progressed and civil servants were hovering in the wings—sometimes not so much in the wings—making known what the Deputy Prime Minister would find acceptable. Every time Ministers were challenged about the progress of the negotiations, they simply retreated behind the mantra that they were the responsibility of the employee representatives and the local authority employers, with Government as mere bystanders.

I understand why the Minister is reluctant to go down the route expressed by Bain and become a full party to the negotiations because it is much more comfortable to stand in the wings with all sorts of reserve powers that can be deployed, while being able to deny any responsibility for the progress—or lack of it—that takes place. We have to look at the structure in the round and envisage how it would work in the context of another dispute where employers and employees are negotiating and the Government are not a party to those negotiations but are able to give guidance that has to be taken into account. Some may say that that merely formalises the situation that occurred during the last dispute, where Government guidance in practice, as we saw in one or two of those famous moments of brinkmanship, turned out to be the determining factor.

I want to touch on the issue that would have been raised had amendment Nos. 109 and 110 been accepted. To some extent, the Minister has already addressed some of the concerns. Amendment No. 109 would have raised the issue of whether the reference to one or more bodies in subsection (1) was appropriate. The Bill refers to one or more bodies being established, and I thought that there must be a distinction between one body and more than one. Therefore, by removing the reference to one or more, I would be probing the Minister as to whether his intention was to create one body or more than one. However, I have subsequently been advised that ''bodies'' incorporates the concept of a single body, which does for my amendment, but also raises an interesting question about the Bill's drafting because it appears to contain redundant words. Since the advice that the phrase ''one or more bodies'' and the phrase ''bodies'' in line 37 mean precisely the same thing came from a reliable source, I am bound to ask why the Bill refers to ''one or more bodies''. Since the phrase does not add anything—we are authoritatively told—it must be there to send a message of some description. I am at a loss to understand precisely the

message that the Minister intends to send by using now officially redundant words. He told us that his inclination, which is set out in the White Paper, is to have three negotiating bodies for different horizontal strata of the service, so why the reference to ''one or more bodies''?

We welcome the late recognition of local negotiation and the belated clarification about the complexities of applying the 1992 Act. We also welcome the mechanics that he is putting in place to ensure that only matters negotiated through a Secretary of State-created body could be legally enforced.

Is the Minister sure that the arrangements ruling out enforceability of contracts freely entered into between consenting adults outside arrangements approved by him do not offend any measures, such as the human rights legislation or our compliance with International Labour Organisation agreements or procedures? As he will remember, they were much referred to during our debates on the Fire Services Act 2003, although not by me.

I addressed the other Minister on subsection (7). The Bill's architecture means that at the end of many of its clauses a subsection states:

''Before making regulations under this section the Secretary of State must consult any persons he considers appropriate.''

The wording is very strange, because to require someone to do something that they consider appropriate does not appear to me to require them to do anything at all. I would prefer a much more objective test of persons to be consulted: any persons who appear to the Secretary of State to be affected by the regulations, or any persons representing affected persons would be sensible. He ''must consult'' is rather meaningless. I have not seen that wording in a Bill before and I wonder why it has been chosen.

In more practical terms, will the Minister tell us whom he expects to consult if he were making regulations under the clause? We might then have a clue about who would be included and excluded. Rather alarmingly, the Under-Secretary told us that the Secretary of State might or might not think it appropriate to consult a trade union actively involved in an industrial dispute when consulting on directions for purposes of public safety during a dispute. I might be quite hostile to the position that the union has taken, but I would hardly think it inappropriate to consult someone engaged in the dispute. I can imagine that the Secretary of State—a protagonist—might take a different view at the time. That is why I seek a more objective requirement for consultation.

Mr Richard Younger-Ross (Shadow Minister, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Local Government & the Regions; Teignbridge, Liberal Democrat)

Two issues arise from amendment No. 109, which we have not been able to debate for what I accept are perfectly good reasons. They are the terms and conditions and the status of retained firefighters.

The White Paper stated in paragraph 8.27:

''A major problem for the fire and rescue service is the recruitment of retained firefighters. Nationally it is about 20 per cent. short of complement. . . . The recruitment problems stem in part from the level of pay, the lack of a pension, the lack of

development opportunities and the often inflexible availability system—in short, a lack of recognition of their contribution.''

After considering the White Paper and taking evidence, the Select Committee made a number of positive recommendations. One was that local government should set a good example by allowing flexible working, and another related to entitlement to paid leave.

The purpose of the amendment that we cannot debate was to encourage the Minister to give us his views on the status of retained firefighters and their pay and conditions. We believe that it is wrong that a retained firefighter, of which there are many in my home county of Devon, fights fires alongside a full-time firefighter, but earns far less. I know that that leads to resentment among some—not all—retained firefighters. The Government and the Select Committee recognise that that is a contributory factor in our inability to recruit enough retained firefighters. I therefore hope that the Minister can expand on the Government's thinking on firefighters' pay and conditions and on what he hopes for from the negotiating body on that issue.

Finally, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge asked about London weighting. There is a major issue about how those in the essential services, such as firefighters—retained or full-time—can afford accommodation. Does the Minister envisage that the new negotiating body will be able to assist firefighters in finding accommodation? If so, that would be a way to deal with the shortage in some areas.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

Clause 31 provides the Secretary of State with reserve powers to establish one or more new negotiating bodies and to determine their membership and chairs following consultation.

The fire and rescue service needs negotiating machinery that is effective and fit for purpose. In the June 2003 pay agreement both sides agreed to review the current negotiating arrangements, and that review is under way. The powers proposed in the clause provide the opportunity to put effective negotiating machinery in place if the review does not deliver improved arrangements. However, as I have made clear here and in many other places, we want the existing negotiating framework to lead to a voluntary agreement. The reserve powers are to be used only if that does not prove possible.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

What time scales are involved here? We are all aware of the discussions taking place, adjourning and starting up again. How long will they be allowed to run before the Secretary of State decides to establish machinery because a voluntary agreement is not possible?

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman was in his current post throughout the period of the dispute and is aware that anyone who sets a timetable probably runs a serious risk of being disappointed. As we know, the negotiations proved protracted. I would not want to put an arbitrary time limit on these complex and difficult discussions. We have expressed the view that a voluntary agreement should be the first and preferred route, but that if that fails there will be statutory provision. Until the Bill receives Royal Assent, scope

for statutory provision is no more than an aspiration. In the absence of the powers, it would be wrong to be too precise about the timetable. However, the hon. Gentleman may reasonably infer that once the powers have been enacted, if there has not been satisfactory progress or the prospect of it, it will become more likely that attention will be given to using the powers to create new and more effective machinery.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

Once the Bill has received Royal Assent, assuming it gets that far—[Laughter.] The Minister may laugh, but he would be well advised to remember that Bills must go through two Houses of Parliament. Although he might laugh in this place, he sometimes has to laugh on the other side of his collective face in the other place. The serious question that I want to ask is whether the existing machinery can survive the demise of the 1947 Act and the enactment of the Bill. Is there any part of the existing negotiating machinery that depends on any part of the 1947 Act structure?

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

My understanding is that if a voluntary agreement is reached to replace the existing NJC arrangements with new ones that satisfy the conditions that we have set out as objectives, that can happen without the requirement for a new statutory underpinning, but this is a technical issue on which I would prefer to seek further advice before giving a definitive response.

The hon. Gentleman asked how the provisions would change the framework from that which applied during the dispute that occurred last year and the year before. The answer is that the Government were in a curious position throughout that dispute, because unlike in every other major area of public service, there was no provision for us to indicate through the negotiating procedures the overall financial framework within which both employers and employees would need to negotiate. As he will recall, as a result, there were one or two moments when it was suggested that highly inflationary settlements had been agreed, imposing huge additional costs on fire and rescue authorities, which did not have the means to meet them. Inevitably, they would have come to the Government and said, ''Can we have more money to meet these costs?''

Against that background, it is only reasonable that the Government should have the ability to inform the negotiations by setting out in advance a proper framework of understanding showing what employees and employers can expect in terms of financial subvention from the Government. Anyone who suggests otherwise is frankly living in a world of fantasy. It is precisely to address the problems of the failings of the former machinery that we have proposed these changes.

The hon. Gentleman went on to ask about the significance of the phrasing and the reference to ''one or more bodies''. The Interpretation Act 1978 gives us helpful guidance. It tells us that the singular includes the plural except when the context indicates otherwise. I am not sure that that leads us any further forward. However, that is the correct interpretation of the provision. We included the plural to avoid any possible doubt. In line with what I said earlier, our

view is that there probably should be three separate bodies, which would represent: chief fire officers and assistant chief fire officers; middle managers; and firefighters and control room staff.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether local agreements might not be consistent with human rights legislation, with International Labour Organisation agreements, and with the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede & Weybridge, Conservative)

Perhaps I did not express myself clearly. My question was whether the exclusion of agreements not reached through machinery sanctioned by the Secretary of State might offend those conventions and arrangements. One can readily imagine—not, of course, in this context, but in that of other, less benign nations and regimes—a situation where Government-sanctioned negotiating machinery having an exclusive right to negotiate enforceable labour agreements might be regarded with a sideways look. I wonder how the Minister has been able to assure himself that measures designed to deal with despotic regimes do not bite on a Government-sanctioned negotiating machinery.

Mr Nick Raynsford (Minister of State (Local and Regional Government), Office of the Deputy Prime Minister; Greenwich & Woolwich, Labour)

The hon. Gentleman will probably recall the years when his party was in government, and no doubt that was what prompted his reference to despotic regimes.

It is our approach to avoid unnecessary confrontation, to ensure that there is a sensible framework for resolving disputes in a way that avoids disruptive strike action, such as occurred in the fire service 18 months ago, and to ensure that the negotiating machinery works properly. I am advised that there is nothing in the provisions of the Bill that would in any way disapply the requirements of other legislation, including that relating to human rights and the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

The hon. Gentleman asked why the phrasing

''the Secretary of State must consult any persons he considers appropriate''

is included in the consultation obligations. The problem with any over-precise definition of obligations to consult is that it leaves scope for litigation if parties who believe that they should have been included are not. Inevitably, in a sensitive situation, it is desirable not to take the list approach, which we have debated on previous occasions. That can have the perverse consequence of implying that organisations that are not included in the list should be excluded, when that is not the intention; they were simply not thought of at the time the list was compiled. The other unsatisfactory outcome is a very general definition that is open to widespread interpretation and potential litigation.

Against that background, it seems entirely proper that the Secretary of State—who has indicated clearly, throughout the dispute and subsequently, his wish to consult and involve all parties—has had regular meetings with the full range of parties involved. The Under-Secretary and I have also been involved in

discussions with many of the parties involved and will continue to be involved. That is our intention. We have a positive approach to consultation, and the wording of the Bill allows some discretion without vulnerability to litigation. I would have thought that the hon. Gentleman would recognise that that is appropriate.

The hon. Member for Teignbridge asked about the position of retained firefighters. I assure him that the Government is determined that retained firefighters should have full recognition and should be treated in a way that ensures parity with full-time firefighters. Obviously there are variations in terms of the conditions, because retained firefighters also receive a retainer and a fee for individual call-out. There has to be a proper framework for reaching agreement about what the balance of those components should be and how that relates to the position of full-time firefighters. The principle of parity, though, is one that we agree with.

We believe that retained firefighters perform a hugely important role. It is right that they should have certainty and confidence. As the hon. Gentleman rightly highlighted, that may help recruitment in those areas where there is a shortage of retained firefighters. The service's only recruitment difficulties are for retained firefighters, and we want to ensure that practical steps are taken to help overcome those problems.

As far as involvement in the negotiating processes is concerned, the hon. Gentleman will know from my earlier answers that we have made it absolutely clear that we want representatives of retained firefighters to be involved. Some are represented by the Fire Brigades Union and some are represented by the retained firefighters union, but we believe that both representative bodies should be able to play a full part in the negotiating machinery, and we have made that quite clear.

The hon. Gentleman raised a question about accommodation for firefighters. He will know that our initiative to provide opportunities for affordable housing for key public sector workers—the starter home initiative—has provided some genuine opportunities for a range of public sector workers. There is indeed a possibility that that will extend to cover certain groups of firefighters. I am keen that that should be the case. We are well aware of the issue of accommodation.

With those remarks, I hope that hon. Members will agree that clause 31 is an important new component that allows the Secretary of State to act if necessary to ensure that there are appropriate negotiating arrangements in place in future that will remedy the deficiencies that were highlighted during the dispute of 2002–03, and will improve enormously the working of the negotiating arrangements for pay and conditions issues in the fire and rescue service. I hope that hon. Members will agree that clause 31 as amended should stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.