Clause 25 - Detriment for use of union services or
Employment Relations Bill
Public Bill Committees, 5 February 2004, 3:00 pm

Mr Gerry Sutcliffe (Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Employment Relations, Competition and Consumers), Department of Trade and Industry; Bradford South, Labour)
Clause 25 stems from a 2002 judgment by the European Court of Human Rights in the Wilson and Palmer case. Clauses 23 to 26 ensure that we fully comply with article 11. Although there were differences on either side, there was common ground that we had to do something.
For many years, it has been unlawful for employers to take detrimental action against employees on the ground of their union membership or non-membership, or on the ground of taking part in union activities at an appropriate time. The effect of clause 25 as required by the Wilson and Palmer
judgment is to strengthen the protections against suffering detriment in section 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Among other things, the clause adds the use of trade union services to the list of grounds on which an employer must not subject an individual to detriment, and this is important.
The Wilson and Palmer case concerned the relationship between union members and their union. That is a precious relationship, which is protected under article 11 of the European convention. Put bluntly, the judgment makes it clear that the law should not permit the employer to place themselves between the parties in that relationship by acting to block or to influence the dealing between individual members and their union. Such dealings can obviously embrace the use of the union's services, so we concluded, and there is common ground on this, that the law needed to spell out clearly the entitlements to use the services of the union. That thought finds expression in clauses 23 to 26 as well.
It is important to remember that the protections to use union services extend only to the use of such services at an appropriate time. That provides the necessary protection for employers, ensuring that there is no entitlement to use the services at times that would inconvenience the employer.
Section 146 already contains a definition of ''at an appropriate time'', which is amended by subsection (3), so that it applies in an appropriate way to the right to make use of trade union services. The effect is, and I paraphrase here, that the member is entitled to use union services in his own time or during working hours under an arrangement agreed with, or with permission given by, the employer.
The amendment adds a further condition at that point. It seeks to allow the employer to deter the union member from using such services at such times as long as it is reasonable for the employer to do so. Quite frankly, I cannot see the point of adding that qualification to the entitlement. Does the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk want the employer to interfere with the worker's use of his own time? Does he want to allow the employer to aim to go back on agreements he had reached with the worker or the union about accessing union services during working time? We do not want such effects. It undermines the protection and thus our compliance with article 11. At the very least it complicates the law unnecessarily, and it could give rise to uncertainty, confusion and dispute. The entitlements that I have discussed already provide ample safeguards to the employer, and show that business is not disrupted in any way. In the light of this explanation, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.
