Clause 5 - The offence
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [Lords]
3:15 pm

Mr David Heath (Shadow Minister (Home Affairs), Home Affairs; Somerton and Frome, Liberal Democrat)
We come to a critical part of the Bill that covers the creation of a new offence to deal with the mischief of where a child has died in the care and protection of more than one person and where it is clear that one of those people has committed a very serious offence—a murder, in the case of the death of a child—and yet it is impossible to determine which of them dealt the fatal blow. That lacuna in the law has been identified for a long time; it is well documented.
This group of amendments will not greatly surprise anybody, because it has been well advertised by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and other organisations. It proposes to revert to part of the formulation that was encompassed by the Law Commission in its report on this subject, which went beyond the position of death to that of serious harm.
I seek to do that because very often what has occurred is a series of events that may or may not cause the death of a child but that is extremely serious in itself. It is inconceivable that we should wish to ignore circumstances in which, for instance, a child has been so badly beaten that it has suffered serious brain damage. Sadly, that is not an uncommon event. Why should that not be encompassed by these proposals? I agree that that falls short of death and of the specific offence that the Government have included in this Bill, but it is as serious. There may be no difference in intent between a case where a person beats, shakes and almost fatally injures a child, and a case in which a child dies.
It is essential at least to consider this. I was given some reassurance by Baroness Scotland in another place. She responded in a reasoned tone to the same amendments tabled there by my noble Friends. She made it plain that the Government have seriously debated this matter over some time and that there was doubt as to whether the Law Commission proposals in their entirety should have been presented or whether the provision should cover death alone.
I have mentioned children throughout my comments, but this also applies to vulnerable adults, and one of the arguments that has been adduced against these proposals is that there should not be the same arrangements for children as for vulnerable adults. I do not accept that argument for a moment. The more cogent argument, which we may hear today, is that the new offence is a matter of concern for the human rights of the accused. That is a legitimate argument, which has to be weighed extremely carefully. I am given some reassurance by those in the other place who have considered the matter purely on the basis of the human rights implications, and have considered that the balance should come down in favour of the new offence. My noble Friend, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, is a very satisfactory guide on what is appropriate.
