New clause 1 - Performance of functions and jurisdiction of the courts
Civil Contingencies Bill
4:45 pm
Mr Douglas Alexander (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Cabinet Office; Paisley South, Labour)
Let me endeavour to answer both those points. Last night, while checking that the reply to a query put to me by the shadow Attorney-General was accurate, I found myself a reading public law case book. One of that book's comments was that we should no longer be haunted by the decision made in Liversidge v. Anderson, although I fear that it continues to haunt some of our deliberations and discussions. On the point about reasonableness, I repeat what I said earlier: we have considered the implications of Liversidge v. Anderson and of subsequent case law. We are satisfied that it is now accepted that the dissenting judgment of Lord Atkin is good law, and that the courts will inquire about the reasonableness of the Minister's belief.
In relation to the specifics of this Bill, there was a question about what reasonableness of belief would mean in the context of particular ministerial deliberations. Clearly, there would be a genuine, objectively reasonable belief; that would be a matter for the deliberation of the courts in circumstances following the judgment exercised by the Minister.
I am not convinced that the hon. Gentleman's case for the need for an element of national interest adds much to the definition of emergency that we have set out, which clearly modernises the essentials of life and the terms on which the whole Bill is founded. The commodities of life were described in the 1920 Act in terms of issues such as locomotion. It is appropriate to
modernise the framework of civil protection, but also to ensure that there is a rigorous and clear definition of emergency. Much of the Committee's recent discussions has covered exactly that point.