Clause 25 - Duration
Civil Contingencies Bill
3:30 pm
Mr Richard Allan (Shadow Spokesperson for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office; Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)
Amendment No. 121 is an unusual example of us offering to give the Minister and the Crown more, rather than less, power. Normally we spend our time in these Committees trying to strike out powers exercisable by Ministers and saying that everything should be in regulations, but under these circumstances we think that it would be appropriate for a Minister to have the power to end their extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary activity, that is, the emergency regulations that they brought into play. As we read the clause, there are only two circumstances in which the regulations would lapse: at the end of 30 days, which we accept as a sensible safeguard, or at a time specified in the regulations—in other words, if the regulations themselves state that the power exists only for, say, 15, 20 or 25 days.
We think that a third option should be available to Ministers. They should be able to say, ''Okay, we haven't reached the 30 days''—or the 25 days—''but the emergency is over.'' We can imagine circumstances in which an emergency is predicted to be more severe than it turns out to be. In those circumstances, it would be sensible for a Minister to be able to say after five or 10 days that the regulations had lapsed. That would put an extra limitation on the force of the emergency regulations and would be helpful in this context. I hope that the Minister can accept amendment No. 121 in the helpful spirit in which it is intended, and that he will respond positively.
The spirit of amendment No. 121 might be acceptable, but I suspect that amendments Nos. 122 and 124 are less acceptable. They would remove the ability to make new regulations after 30 days and to extend the powers beyond that time. We think that that is an important area to explore. We understand that the emergency regulations, as introduced outwith Parliament by the Executive, have to be brought to Parliament within seven days. That is entirely sensible and under normal circumstances, in which the Government have a parliamentary majority, one would expect Parliament to approve those emergency regulations, but we do not want continued extensions to the emergency regulations. If the Executive were able to get parliamentary approval for that, it would not be unconstitutional. However, we believe that that is a far less satisfactory solution than specifying that, after the initial period for which the emergency regulations have been in force, primary legislation must be sought. The example I cited before is the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which was a parliamentary constitutional response to the events of
11 September, and passed through both Houses of Parliament quite rapidly.
In seeking to remove the Government's ability to extend their emergency regulations, we do not seek to deny them the ability to continue with the kinds of powers that they need in an emergency. Instead, we are suggesting that the powers should be dealt with only through primary or secondary legislation, in the normal way, rather than by extending emergency regulations again and again. We think that there would be a temptation to do that. The Government could cite a lack of parliamentary time or the fact that getting the provisions through Parliament would be more difficult and that it would be more straightforward simply to approve an extended emergency regulation. We are trying to assist the Government by leading them out of the valley of temptation into pastures in which they would have to come forward with primary or secondary legislation—that is a mixed biblical reference. Essentially, we are trying to limit Ministers' options in those circumstances.
Amendment No. 121 offers Ministers an additional power and I hope that the Minister approves of that. It is a power to self-limit. Amendments Nos. 122 and 124 are quite clearly trying to limit Ministers. We think that the limitation would be sensible and would ensure that parliamentary sovereignty is maintained.