Clause 8 - Tests for registration: utility and least suffering
Hunting Bill
2:30 pm
Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire, Conservative)
There is not actually that much difference. One was ''important . . . or momentous'' and the other was about something having an
''observed value that is too large to be attributed to chance''.
The word ''significant'' means extremely large, gigantic, extraordinarily important, overwhelmingly important. Those rough definitions would suffice.
The Minister says that it is important that we use definitions that are recognised in English law. I hope that he will give me examples, and use case law. Doubtless officials, on hearing the challenge, will have to rush off and look up the case law. As he wants us to use words such as ''significant'' and ''serious'', which are defined clearly in English law, I need to know from him in his reply in which animal welfare or cruelty cases the word ''significantly'' or ''serious'' has been clearly defined. If he can do so and advance them this afternoon, under Pepper v. Hart, that will then become part of English law. It will become important that we know precisely the meaning of ''significant'' and/or ''serious''.
If the Minister wants to be so helpful to the registrar by giving us those useful examples, why has he not put a definition of ''significantly'' or ''serious'' in the Bill? It would be logical and sensible to say to the registrar, ''If you want to judge what is significant or serious, here is our definition of what is significant and what is serious. Use that and don't use your own judgment.'' The Minister has not chosen to do that. He may come back with a precise definition under English law. We would welcome that. Under Pepper v. Hart that will then itself become part of English law. He has not chosen to do so.
The truth of the matter is that it is difficult to tell the precise way in which hunting using dogs fulfils utility definitions. Lord Burns, who did so much extensive research into the management of populations of the quarry species—fox, deer, mink, and hares—and the various methods of control came to no firm conclusion about the best way to achieve species management. We should advance the notion that species management is one of the most important utilities that hunting with dogs can bring about. Lord Burns and the scientists at Portcullis house came to no sensible conclusion about it.
Given that the scientists have not agreed, the civil servants have not agreed and the lawyers have not necessarily agreed—although I stand to be corrected on that if the Minister comes back with examples from previous case law—and that we as legislators have not agreed what is significant, how on earth can the
applicant do so? Under the clause, the applicant is required to demonstrate that there are significant benefits—I shall talk about serious damage in a moment—but how can he prove significant benefits? Does he come along and quote extensive tracts from learned reports by such people as Professor Macdonald of the wildlife conservation unit of the department of zoology at Oxford university, or by the Game Conservancy Trust?
Perhaps the applicant comes along and says, ''Here are the extensive scientific treatises that demonstrate significant benefits''. If he does, the rich campaigning organisations such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and the International Fund for Animal Welfare would simultaneously bombard the registrar with their huge scientific treatises, produced by Professor Stephen Harris from Bristol university and others. How is the registrar to decide whether Professor Harris or Professor Macdonald is right? We are giving the registrar an unacceptably difficult task. He will have to judge between two learned bodies of scientific evidence what is significant. That should be a job for us as legislators. It should be a job for the Minister. He is refusing to do it.
The only people capable of judging what is or is not significant should be us and the land managers, although we heard in the previous debate that the Minister does not believe that the land manager's opinion is necessarily overwhelmingly important. The land manager or the farmer is the one who can judge whether significant benefits are gained by using dogs to get rid of pests on his farm, but he is not allowed to do so.
The judgment required by the registrar is predicated on an unknowable future situation. As the Bill is drafted, the assessment of hunting's ability to contribute significantly relies on the idea that the quarry species would otherwise cause serious damage; in the future, not the past. We are saying to people, ''You can apply for your registration to hunt using hounds if you believe that a significant benefit will be caused in the future and that there is a likelihood of serious damage in the future.'' The applicant will have to prove something that, by definition, is subjective and difficult to prove, and is dependent on balancing two bodies of scientific evidence. He will have to prove in advance that he is certain that it will give significant benefit and prevent serious damage. That will be virtually impossible for any land manager or applicant to achieve. There is thus an unachievable hurdle in the way of the applicant.