Clause 4 - Orders implementing changes in the - number of United Kingdom MEPs
European Parliament (Representation) Bill
3:10 pm

Mr William Cash (Stone, Conservative)
The clause, which relates to orders implementing changes in the number of UK MEPs, troubles me. We have been through the arguments about the manner in which changes are due to take place and objections have been stated. Clause 5(4) states that if a motion for the approval of a draft order, containing the arrangements of which I have been so critical,
''is rejected by either House or withdrawn by leave of the House the Lord Chancellor may, after consulting the Electoral Commission, alter the draft order.''
Clause 5(5) states:
''the Lord Chancellor may not, without the consent of the Electoral Commission, alter any amendments to section 1(3) of the 2002 Act contained in the draft order.''
Clause 5(6) states:
''The Electoral Commission may not give its consent under subsection (5) unless it is satisfied that the distribution of MEPs proposed by the altered draft order could have been recommended under section 2.''
Clause 5(7) states that a
''statutory instrument containing an order that is not subject to approval . . . under subsection (3)'',
which is an order containing amendments to section 1 of the 2002 Act, is subject to annulment procedure.
What will happen if either House—the House of Commons or the House of Lords—decides that it does not like the arrangements produced? We must bear it in mind that the whole procedure begins with a Council of Ministers decision based on part of a protocol, which will already have been decided by majority vote and the provisions of which cannot be changed because it ''shall'' have ''effect''. Following that, the European Commission may or may not become involved in the process; according to the explanatory notes it will ''inform'' the Government, so the Lord Chancellor will then take his marching orders and the subordinate Minister will have to bring an order before what the Commission would like to believe is a provincial assembly, in order to implement arrangements that have been agreed, of course, without a referendum. We called for a referendum on the Nice treaty, but that was rejected.
We are here really talking about the democratic will of individual states, whether accession states or member states. The procedure of co-decision in the European Parliament means that it has a dramatic impact on the way in which we live our lives and are legislated for. All this paraphernalia is actually about some very simple questions. Who governs us and how is that done? What is the democratic will, and has the democratic deficit, to use that much-vaunted expression, been removed? From what I have been saying, the Committee might gather that I regard the democratic deficit to be alive and kicking. This provision is a very good example of that. It is monstrous that a Bill should give the Lord Chancellor such powers, when they could have been
exercised in a much more transparent and efficacious fashion.
Turning to what will happen when the procedure does ultimately reach the lower echelons of the provincial legislative arrangements that this House of Parliament is deemed to represent—I find that an astonishing thought, but that is what things seems to boil down to—we have some acknowledgement that the arrangements could be rejected. There is a provision that says:
''If a motion . . . is rejected by either House or withdrawn by leave of the House the Lord Chancellor may, after consulting the Electoral Commission, alter the draft order.''
So we are back to square one. Here is yet another twist and turn in the charade to which we are being subjected. We will be allowed to discuss arrangements, but not to arrive at any settled conclusions.
I hope that some Labour Members will be open-minded enough at least to acknowledge that there is something seriously wrong with a procedure that goes through such convoluted mechanisms to no effect. The bottom line is that it is a charade to be legislating on a matter that in itself determines the manner in which we legislate and exercise power, which is dependent on such things as how many MEPs there are and what coalitions and alliances they have entered into. At bottom, when we scratch away all the surface, as on one of those scratch cards, we will find just about zero.
