Clause 63 - Application to Court of Appeal
Criminal Justice Bill
4:50 pm
Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 303, in
clause 63, page 39, line 12, leave out 'quashing' and insert 'suspending'.
The clause provides a mechanism by which the application to the Court of Appeal is made. Subsection (1) says:
''A prosecutor may apply to the Court of Appeal for an order—(a) quashing a person's acquittal in England and Wales, and (b) ordering him to be retried for the qualifying offence.''
Given the plain meaning of what is intended, that has to be read in conjunction with clause 71, which sets out what happens if a retrial does not take place. Clause 71(2) states that the retrial must take place within two months of the date of the order, and if the person has to be arraigned, leave must be given to arraign him. He may apply to the Court of Appeal to set aside the order and
''for any direction required for restoring an earlier judgment and verdict of acquittal of the qualifying offence''.
I do not want to get involved in excessive semantics, but on the whole it is quite clear that it is expected that a person may normally be able to rely on his previous acquittal. If the acquittal is quashed, it is envisaged that the trial will take place and either a verdict of guilty or a fresh acquittal will be recorded. What happens if between the date that the original acquittal is quashed and the expected date of the retrial the defendant drops down dead? There appears to be no mechanism in the Bill to restore the original acquittal, because it says that he has to apply in order to have that set aside. It is a more than esoteric point, because we have had a number of cases recently in which people have gone to the Court of Appeal seeking to have various verdicts changed posthumously. It is a small point, but I should like the Minister to consider it.
There is a slightly wider issue, which is perhaps satisfactorily answered, although I am not completely happy about it. It concerns the need to go back to have
the original verdict brought back into force. In the absence of a trial within a set period, although we can return to look at clause 71, it is at least arguable that the original acquittal should be suspended only for the purpose of bringing a new trial. If a new trial is not brought, that original acquittal should stand without the person having to do very much at all to have it restored. The point that arose first in my mind when I read the clause was that there was no provision for the circumstances in which the defendant died, having had his earlier acquittal quashed. His relatives would argue that he ought to be entitled to rely on it.