Clause 62 - Cases that may be retried
Criminal Justice Bill
9:10 am
Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield, Conservative)
The hon. Lady raises an extremely important issue. I was intending to reserve my arguments on that to the clauses that cover the procedure by which the mechanism will operate rather than trying to deal with it now. However, the hon. Lady raises a key issue of principle, because if a fair retrial is impossible, that may be a compelling argument for voting against this entire part of the Bill. I am perfectly alive to the viewpoint of those members of the Committee who decide to take that approach—I do not know how many of them there are—because it is totally legitimate and in conformity with our old principles of law. This part of the Bill introduces profound difficulties in principle, because, historically, the principle of double jeopardy offered powerful
protection to the individual against the actions of the state. There are also difficulties with the details of how one would still ensure a fair trial, but I was going to reserve my arguments on that procedural matter for later.
The principle of double jeopardy can, perhaps, properly be dealt with now, and I am grateful to the hon. Lady for raising it. It is an extremely important principle for ensuring that the citizen is not harassed by the state. That said, its introduction in the middle ages reflected a state of society and a relationship between the subject and the King that is, mercifully, different from that which exists today. If one looks at the records of state trials in the 15th century, one can see how judges were involved in trying to bludgeon juries into returning a verdict that conformed with the wishes of the judge and the state. When the Anglo-Saxons, who were under the Norman yoke, miraculously succeeded in establishing the rule that they could, at least, be put through that process only once, it became one of the most powerful tools in asserting their rights against those of the King and the court. That was a key development in our national history. One only has to read about the occasions when juries dug in their heels and refused to conform, and the penalties that were visited on them as a result, including being locked up for their presumption, to appreciate that it was the most powerful tool in securing liberty.
Although in 2003 we are, perhaps mercifully, not in that situation, such a setting could easily return. In putting part 10 on the statute book we will, without the slightest doubt, be providing a tool that will be very important if our system of government deteriorates and departs from the high standards that we enjoy today—