Clause 62 - Cases that may be retried
Criminal Justice Bill
10:30 am
Mr Hilary Benn (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Leeds Central, Labour)
I am sure that the Committee is grateful for that contribution.
It is important to acknowledge that exceptional tests have to be met because, while holding clearly to the principle that it is wrong that a person who has committed an offence should get away with it, we recognise some of the arguments about how it might apply in practice.
I accept the point that was made with great passion by the hon. Member for North Down. She asked how fairness could be assured. When we reach clause 66(2), she will see that there is a specific provision to test whether a fair trial can occur, because we recognise that fairness issues are an important consideration.
With great respect, I found the argument of the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey about finality and retrospection with regard to acquitted defendants profoundly unconvincing. If the person did not do it, it is hard to see where the new and compelling evidence that would meet all the tests for which the subsequent clauses provide could come from. I do not accept for one minute that the change is intended to be an instrument of oppression directed against people who are rightly acquitted. It is meant to be a mechanism for ensuring that the guilty are held to account by a court, on the basis of the evidence, in a subsequent retrial.
I do not accept the argument about retrospectivity. It seems that the injustice felt—the point was made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar—is just as great if it relates to a murder or another serious offence that occurred some years ago. We all recognise the changes that have made it more possible to establish the identity of the person who committed the crime. The obvious example is DNA evidence, which has brought about a fundamental change in the evidence base, but it is not the only one. There are other ways in which evidence can come to light subsequently.
I cannot understand the argument that, in those circumstances, we should change the rules of the game, although I accept that the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey did not put it that way. The fact is that, 10 or 15 years ago, it was an offence to murder someone. If we accept the case for changing the principle of double jeopardy, I see no possible argument whatever for saying that it should apply only to murders committed after the date of the legislation.