Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill. - Clause 81 - Inspection of overseas information systems
Crime (International Co-operation) Bill [Lords]
9:10 am
Mr James Paice (South East Cambridgeshire, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 154, in
clause 81, page 54, line 23, after 'inspect', insert '(but only in person)'.
I welcome your return to the Chair, Mr. Benton. This is a probing amendment. The clause states that ''The Commissioner may inspect'', but the commissioner is expected to inspect data not only in the United Kingdom but abroad. For instance, he will be inspecting the Schengen and Europol information systems; and the clause also refers to a power to
''inspect, operate and test equipment which is used for the processing of personal data.''
That implies that the commissioner will be able to go anywhere to check the systems. It is self-evidently improbable that the commissioner himself will do all that. The purpose of moving an amendment that stipulates that it should be only the commissioner is to discover who will do the work.
I recognise the validity of the case for inspection. I appreciate that the system should be capable of being inspected, because of the possibility of British citizens being subject to judicial process. It is therefore sensible that the system should be inspected. I have no problem with that. However, the inspection system should not be open to abuse. One assumes that the Minister will say that it will not be the commissioner himself but those whom he permits—I shall be interested to hear her phraseology. However, I am concerned about the security of that information, which will be significant.
Not only does the clause state that the commissioner may ''inspect, operate and test'' equipment to be used for the processing of personal data; it also states:
''The Commissioner may inspect any personal data''.
The people doing the work will therefore have access to personal data.
The purpose of the Data Protection Act 1998 is to protect personal data. If we allow people to inspect personal data, there will be a security risk. It is therefore important that the information is protected as much as possible, commensurate with the need to ensure that the systems are working. It is a question of finding the right balance. Most important, we do not want information falling into the wrong hands—which the Act is meant to prevent.
It is a straightforward probing amendment. I do not suggest that the commissioner should roar round the world inspecting systems—I hope that the Minister accepts that—but it provides the Committee with the opportunity to probe the Government on precisely who they mean by the commissioner, how the inspection will take place and how the anticipated security will be maintained commensurate with the inspection of data under subsection (3).