Clause 75 - Criminal lifestyle
Proceeds of Crime Bill
10:45 am
Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield, Conservative)
My hon. Friend is right. We have the duty to decide what should fall under the term ''criminal lifestyle''. If we want to create an extensive list, we can do so. The hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok will agree that there is nothing to prevent us from listing in the Bill all the offences that the Government consider indicative of a criminal lifestyle—the Minister could easily do that. Such a list might extend subsection (2) but would not cause any real harm.
We are not legislating: we are handing the Secretary of State the power to define ''criminal lifestyle'', and we know that the term will not be scrutinised adequately. I accept that there are circumstances in which it is reasonable to give a Secretary of State such executive power, because he has to take daily executive decisions that Parliament could not try to define. Nevertheless, as we are defining a new category of ''criminal conduct'', an offence that is punishable by confiscation of assets, it is incumbent on us to be careful about allowing him too much leeway.
If the Bill created a criminal offence where none had previously existed, it would be unusual and surprising for Parliament to give the Secretary of State the power to create any number of other criminal offences at will. Unfortunately, we do that too frequently with many
Euro directives, which we incorporate into our law through statutory instruments. It would be undesirable to give the Secretary of State those powers for such an important provision. I look to the Minister for a justification of the course of action adopted in subsection (2)(c), because I cannot find one.
We have already discussed the issues raised by amendment No. 271, but they should be considered further. The amendment would provide some small fetter on the extensive use that could be made of the power to decide what constitutes conduct that
''forms part of a course of criminal activity''.
I do not wish to repeat extensively the arguments made last week. I accept that this is a similar debate, albeit in a slightly different context. I simply signal that subsection (3) allows conduct that
''forms part of a course of criminal activity''
to apply to virtually any offence in which financial benefit is shown to have accrued. That could apply to an offence as far down the scale as a failure to have a rear light on a motor vehicle, as arguably a defendant could benefit from not replacing the light bulb. It is as simple as that.
Perhaps the Committee feels that we should include the provision that we have called the Al Capone'' or Al Capone principle, because it offers the state a powerful tool with which to find an excuse for bringing confiscation proceedings against someone who has never had anything more against him than such minor offences as any relatively law-abiding citizen might accrue in six years. The provision is an excuse to go after his assets through the confiscation procedure. Given that there is a civil recovery procedure in the Bill, there are powerful arguments, when one is dealing with such minor offences, to say that the burdens placed on the state, in respect of the civil recovery provisions, should not be arbitrarily removed to allow an excuse for confiscation. The debate, and the Minister's comments, have made it clear that the justification for including the confiscation provisions is that you already know, by virtue of a person's previous criminality, that he falls into a category whereby some of the protections that might be afforded to law-abiding people can properly be dispensed with.
Where do we draw the line? That is a question for the Committee to answer. However, if you decide that offences of level 1 on the standard scale should still be included within the trigger provisions, it could be argued that you are going too far. That is why I tabled amendment No. 271.
The Liberal Democrats propose a minimum limit of £5,000 in amendment No. 280. I will allow the hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker) to speak to that amendment, but I may seek to catch your eye, Mr. McWilliam, to comment on it. It would introduce a more powerful protection than amendment No. 270, and the Committee might wish to ponder those alternatives.
The hon. Member for Lewes also tabled amendment No. 279, which I shall comment on after he has spoken to it. However, leaving out subsection (2)(e) would be problematic, because it provides some protection, in
relation to the types and nature of offence. I assume that he wishes to remove it to strengthen the scope of the legislation, and I am interested to hear how that would operate.
With regard to amendment No. 270, the Minister must provide a careful justification of the power in subsection (2)(c). Definitions can be provided, and he has, helpfully, already done that. Why, therefore, should we give an unfettered discretion to the Secretary of State?