Clause 72 - Serious default
Proceeds of Crime Bill
3:35 pm
Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield, Conservative)
On the face of it, it is unlikely that I would vote against clause 72. However, if there were no meeting of minds at the end of our debate, we would—leaving aside for a moment my amendments, which might be voted on—want to return to the issue on Report because it is of considerable importance.
I am looking forward to the Minister's explanation of the provisions. Are we talking about compensation only in cases when the prosecution has been improperly investigated and conducted, or also when the confiscation and restraint procedures have not been properly conducted? I accept that the one is, in a sense, rolled into the other. If somebody is to be eligible for compensation, it must be found that their criminal lifestyle or criminal conduct should not have led to a confiscation, but that is not the same thing as their being acquitted of the offence, which is why I am unclear about who falls within the category of being capable of committing a serious default.
I am assuming, for the moment, that we are covering a wide category of individuals, and that confiscation procedures and restraint procedures would be covered. If that is the case, does the use of the term ``serious default'' create far too defensive a criterion from the point of view of the investigators and prosecutors? I accept that if somebody ends up without a confiscation order, his assets will be returned to him, but—as the Minister acknowledged in an earlier debate—that will not necessarily compensate him for the financial disaster that might have overtaken his businesses when they were out of his hands.
Another issue must therefore be addressed. What sort of compensation are we talking about? It is described, in wide terms, as such compensation as the court believes is just; I assume that that definition is broad enough to extend to economic loss. Will the Minister clarify whether he considers that to be the case?