Clause 6 - Making of order
Proceeds of Crime Bill
10:30 am
Mr Bob Ainsworth (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Coventry North East, Labour)
I am trying to fathom out whether I will correctly pronounce the constituency of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) this morning, given that it was such a point of contention in the Chamber last night. He has given us two options for changing the standard of proof that will apply to confiscation proceedings. Before we adjourned last Thursday, he said that the amendments were probing amendments following the Government's decision to change the wording in subsection (7). The issue is important, as it has a crucial bearing on the way in which confiscation proceedings are conducted in the courts.
Amendment No. 30 would apply the criminal standard to the process of determining whether the defendant has a criminal lifestyle, whether he has benefited from any criminal conduct and the amount of the defendant's benefit. That would mean that the prosecution would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt all matters relating to the making of a confiscation order. It would restore the position to that which prevailed following the decision of the Court of Appeal in 1990 in the case of Dickens, which ruled that the criminal standard should be applied by the court in confiscation proceedings under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986.
I recall that the then Government, whom the hon. Gentleman supported, said that they had always intended that the civil standard should apply to proceedings under the Drug Trafficking Offences Act. Indeed, amendments were introduced under the Criminal Justice Act 1993 to make it clear that the civil standard should apply both to the determination of benefit and to the amount to be recovered in drug and non-drug confiscation proceedings.
I am firmly opposed to amendment No. 30. If we were to change the standard of proof to that applicable in criminal proceedings, there would be substantial reduction in the effectiveness of confiscation proceedings. It would return us to the position that prevailed prior to the Criminal Justice Act 1993. There is a clear distinction to be drawn between the standard that applies to a defendant's trial and the determination of his or her benefits from such offences.
I come now to amendment No. 31. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield draws our attention to the current legislation, which stipulates
``the standard applicable to civil proceedings'',
and observes that we have changed that wording to ``a balance of probabilities''. The reason for the change is straightforward. In some civil proceedings, such as proceedings for contempt, the standard of proof is beyond all reasonable doubt. We wish to make it clear that that does not apply to confiscation proceedings. To avoid any doubt, we used the balance of probabilities formula in the Bill.