Mr Simon Hughes (North Southwark & Bermondsey, Liberal Democrat)

I beg to move amendment No. 96, in page 2, line 38, at end insert

'provided the citizenship was obtained by registration or naturalisation'.

Mr Alan Hurst (Braintree, Labour)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 35, in page 3, line 9, after 'subsection (2)', insert 'or (3)'.

No. 11, in page 3, line 10, at end insert—

'(4A) The Secretary of State shall not make an order under subsection (2) or (3) if the relevant person was born in the United Kingdom.'.

No. 12, in page 3, leave out lines 18 to 26.

No. 80, in page 3, line 25, at end insert—

'(7) The Secretary of State shall not make an order using powers provided in this section where the person acquired citizenship status within the meaning of subsection (1) more than five years previously.'.

Mr Simon Hughes (North Southwark & Bermondsey, Liberal Democrat)

This is an important clause. It is about the deprivation of citizenship. My amendments seek to change what we believe is the Secretary of State's excessive power. I hope that the Bill does not reflect what the Government plan to do.

I can do no better than read the brief supplied to members of the Committee by the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association, in which Laurens Fransman QC makes a strong case. His words are better than mine.

''The proposed new section 40(2) of the 1981 Act''—

that is the Act that will be amended by clause 4—

''provides a sweeping power to deprive a person of British nationality not just where that nationality was acquired by grant in response to an application but also where it was acquired automatically by birth in the UK by descent. This draconian new power arises as presently drafted wherever the Secretary of State just 'thinks' that the person has done something 'seriously prejudicial to the vital interests' of the UK or an overseas territory, he may remove that person's citizenship. ILPA is concerned that these expressions are far too vague, that a requirement only to 'think' there is prejudice lays down an unacceptably low threshold for the Secretary of State to attain in invoking the power.''

It is unprecedented in ILPA's experience to use the phrase

''the Secretary of State thinks''

in legislation and it is outrageous to use it in so important a matter.

The opportunities for litigation on whether the Secretary of State is entitled to think irrationally, or what his thought processes were in coming to a conclusion, are almost infinite. Amendments proposed by both the opposition parties substitute a phrase which is already understood in the law, which explains the standard of proof required. We succeeded in getting such an amendment, incorporating a reasonableness clause, included in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill before Christmas:

''Without this limitation, the Home Secretary's power would be unfettered.''

The example of Lotfi Raisi has been given. He is the Algerian who was held in Belmarsh prison, in south-east London, for five months, without any evidence being produced against him. Would the Secretary of State be allowed to get away with presuming that evidence would be produced when, in the end, it was not? Similarly, would it be possible to suppose that someone had failed the test, and to deprive him or her of citizenship, even if that person had not failed the test? The worry is, first, that the threshold in the provision is low; secondly, that the proposal is

retrospective; and, thirdly, that it is too general. Even more surprisingly, it applies to people who were born here, not just to those whose citizenship, it could be argued, needs to be more conditional because they have to apply for it and it could be regarded, at least in the initial phases, as something that could be taken away from them.

We know from other cases and discussions on other Bills that the ''seriously prejudicial'' test is poor and can cover a multitude of sins. The ''vital interests of the United Kingdom'' test is a general test, which allows the Home Secretary vast discretion. That is why amendments have been tabled to tie down those tests. However, the crucial issue is what happens if the Home Secretary exercises the power. Amendment No. 96 deals with the consequence—that someone would become stateless. I know that international conventions deal with that, but my understanding is that, under the Bill, the Home Secretary will have the power to deprive even UK-born nationals of UK citizenship, except if that would leave a person stateless. We want to ensure that such people could not be deprived of citizenship, even if it would not render them stateless. That is a strong point because many written constitutions declare that citizenship is a fundamental identity right. In the United States, the Supreme Court Justice, Earl Warren, said just that. We must be very careful not to leave people stateless.

I want to mention two linked points relating to amendments Nos. 35 and 12. Amendment No. 35 would prevent the Secretary of State from using his deprivation powers under new section 40(2), if it would make the person involved stateless. No such limitation is included in the criteria listed at the top of page 3, which includes:

''(a) fraud,

(b) false representation, or

(c) concealment of a material fact.''

I am told that that would be consistent with the convention on the reduction of statelessness and the European convention on nationality. I gather that those documents are designed to ensure that people do not end up with no nationality or state.

Lastly, on amendment No. 12, there is a real worry about the retrospective deprivation of citizenship. That point was not only made by ILPA, but by the Immigration Advisory Service, whose director is Keith Best. The obvious example is that people who may be thought to be involved in terrorism, such as Muslim extremists, could suddenly find themselves, whether they were born here or acquired British citizenship later, having that citizenship taken away from them on a charge for which there was a lesser threshold of proof than reasonable doubt. That could happen on the basis of the Home Secretary thinking something, and that could not easily be reviewed by the courts.

I share the view that this appears to the most dangerous clause that we have considered so far. I hope that the Minister will consider the amendments seriously and come up with a better and safer drafting of this measure that does not take away the rights of

people to citizenship under any of the circumstances that we have discussed.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Woking, Conservative)

I support a great deal of what the hon. Gentleman has said. My amendment, No. 11, is designed as a safeguard against a potentially very dangerous aspect of the Bill. I do not feel easy in my mind about the deprivation of citizenship, which is basic to one's life. A person born in the UK, even someone who was not a citizen at birth but who has subsequently been naturalised or registered as a British citizen, should not have their citizenship taken away from them. If I were such a person and I committed a bad crime, I would expect to be prosecuted for it in the Crown Court or at the Old Bailey and serve my sentence if found guilty, but still come out with my citizenship.

The measure worries me. The ability to take someone's citizenship away in those circumstances is a draconian power to give to a Home Secretary. I would have thought that many on the Government Benches would agree with me and have some real concerns about it. Is it not troubling that the clause states that the Home Secretary can deprive a person of their citizenship if he thinks that they have done anything seriously prejudicial? The issue is whether he thinks—reasonably or unreasonably—or has reasonable cause to think. We should examine that carefully.

I am conscious that I am not putting this in quite the erudite way in which the members of ILPA did, but I have an uneasy feeling about the power to take away citizenship in such circumstances. I never thought that I would see it happen in this country—a Bill allowing the Secretary of State to so act if he thinks that a person has done something seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK. Can anybody think of something that a person might do that would be seriously prejudicial to our interests but is not a crime? If they can, I will listen to their argument. However, if the act constitutes a crime, why should the person not be charged with that crime and punished for it? Goodness knows people do some heinous things in life. They are charged and punished, but their citizenship remains intact.

I am worried that the measure gives too much power to the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary would do well to ensure that no order is made under the power if the relevant person was born in the United Kingdom. Such a person could justifiably feel very aggrieved at such a draconian power. There is time for the Minister to take this away, have a think about it and come up with some more suitable wording. There is time to rethink generally this aspect of the Bill, which my heart tells me is not fair. The Government should take that on board.

Mr Alan Hurst (Braintree, Labour)

With the Committee's leave, I propose to group the next set of amendments with this one. The debate has been wide-ranging and has strayed into the next group, and with the group currently under discussion it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 7, in page 2, line 40, leave out 'thinks' and insert—

'has reasonable grounds for believing'.

No. 9, in page 2, line 40, leave out 'thinks' and insert 'is satisfied'.

No. 33, in page 2, line 40, leave out 'thinks' and insert—

'has reasonable grounds to believe'.

No. 8, in page 3, line 4, leave out 'thinks' and insert—

'has reasonable grounds for believing'.

No. 10, in page 3, line 4, leave out 'thinks' and insert 'is satisfied'.

No. 34, in page 3, line 4, leave out 'thinks' and insert—

'has reasonable grounds to believe'.

No. 36, in page 3, line 22, leave out 'thinks' and insert—

'has reasonable grounds to believe'.

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

I hope that I shall be able to calm people down, and satisfy them over some of the worries that they have. Some of the worries that were expressed, quite legitimately, are misguided. I hope that I will be able to persuade hon. Members of that as we go through the issues.

The existing plans to withdraw citizenship by deprivation order are contained in section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981. Under that Act, liability for deprivation is confined to those who acquired British citizenship, British overseas territories citizenship or the status of British national overseas through registration or naturalisation. The potential grounds for deprivation that exist currently are that the person obtained the nationality by fraud—I hope that there would be no worries about our depriving someone of citizenship if it had been obtained by fraud—has shown himself to be disloyal or disaffected towards Her Majesty, has unlawfully traded or communicated with an enemy in time of war and, provided that deprivation of nationality would not make him stateless, has been sentenced within five years of becoming British to at least 12 months' imprisonment.

Those, particularly the last, are quite draconian provisions in terms of deprivation for those who are naturalised. In each case, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that it is not conducive to the public good for the person to retain British nationality. A person against whom it is proposed to make a deprivation order has the right to have his case referred to a committee of inquiry. That is the current law. The powers in that law have never been used. That is the first thing that I hope will calm everyone down a little: such things do not happen often. The last deprivation order to be made was made in 1973 under the British Nationality Act 1948, and related to one person.

Clause 4 replaces the existing section 40 and introduces a new section 40A to the 1981 Act. The new section has two main effects, the first of which is that the liability to deprivation is extended to all British nationals, including British protected persons,

irrespective of the means by which their nationality was acquired. In other words, people who were born British, as well as those who have acquired their nationality subsequently can in theory—provided that they are not going to be made stateless—be deprived of their nationality if they behave in ways that I shall describe in a minute.

We think that deprivation is a way of demonstrating extreme displeasure at the way that someone has behaved, and it has certain implications for certain people in certain categories. It has more implications for those who have another nationality, or dual nationality, but less for those who will be made stateless if they are deprived. The provision does not allow a deprivation if that person would be made stateless.

Mrs Angela Watkinson (Upminster, Conservative)

In an effort to be helpful on that point, when a person has done something seriously prejudicial to the vital interest of the United Kingdom, might the power be extended to the Secretary of State under circumstances relating to intelligence information that could not be made public?

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

If the hon. Lady will allow me, I will come to that in due course, because it is part of a process. It is certainly the case in some circumstances.

I want to say a little about how new section 40A changes the circumstances that I just described, remembering that none of the powers under the 1981 Act were ever used. The new section has two main effects. It applies to all British nationals regardless of how they acquired their nationality, whether they were born here or naturalised. However, people must bear in mind that if an individual were rendered stateless by a deprivation, we cannot deprive. That would apply to the vast majority of people born in this country.

Mr Richard Allan (Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

Will the Minister clarify that under subsection (3), when there has been fraud, false representation or concealment of a material fact, the statelessness provision does not apply, and the person could be made stateless? I know that the situation is difficult if the person has obtained their citizenship by fraud.

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

Yes. I think that such action is reasonable if a person has acquired their citizenship by fraudulent means. I do not want to deal with that circumstance yet, but acquiring a nationality by making fraudulent and false declarations is an appalling thing to do, and I do not see why any country should maintain that nationality decision. No international conventions to which we are signatories include the right to keep one's citizenship if it has been fraudulently acquired. I do not apologise for that. I do not think that there is an issue between us on fraud.

Mr Neil Gerrard (Walthamstow, Labour)

I understand the argument that my hon. Friend is making: if someone has obtained citizenship by fraud, why should we feel any responsibility whatever towards them? However, that still leaves the question of the level of proof of fraud and the proof being someone's thinking. Will she address that point?

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

I shall come on to address that point.

Mr Simon Hughes (North Southwark & Bermondsey, Liberal Democrat)

My understanding is that the definition could allow the reason to be fraud or concealment by someone else. The applicant does not have to be guilty: the Bill could allow deprivation of citizenship if a third party carried out the fraud. I have certainly had constituency cases in which people's immigration status, innocently as far as they were concerned, was fraudulently altered by someone's arranging it for them. If a third party is the fraudster, it is wrong for an innocent person to suffer as a result.

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

We must consider each individual case as it comes along, but as a general principle—I am sure that no one will disagree—the country that granted a nationality should have the right to take it away if it was fraudulently acquired. As I said, none of the international conventions on nationality or statelessness has ever sought to include protection for those who acquire a different status by fraudulent activity. I hope that we will not seek to do that in this Committee. The Government certainly do not intend to protect fraudsters.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Woking, Conservative)

What about the concealment of a material fact if that is not by the applicant? What is a material fact? Is it a fact that the Secretary of State thinks is material? Should he have reasonable grounds for thinking that it is material?

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

Let me get on to other aspects of the clause, and perhaps when I have dealt with them, hon. Members will be able to calm down a little.

We have dealt with the ability to deprive in relation to the Government believing that there should be no distinction between those who are born with British nationality and those who have acquired their nationality by naturalisation. The current grounds for deprivation will be replaced by two new grounds, which are in new section 40. These reflect the provision made in this respect by the 1997 European convention on nationality, which the UK was instrumental in negotiating and we wish to ratify and sign. If the Bill is enacted, we will be able to sign it, so we are working to modernise and restructure our system to bring it in line with that convention. That is a wholly non-sinister approach.

The new grounds in new section 40 are that a person obtained their nationality by fraud or that they engaged in activity that was

''seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of . . . the United Kingdom, or . . . a British overseas territory.''

That wording is from the European convention on nationality.

Under new section 40A, a right of appeal against deprivation, which replaces the existing inquiry procedure, will lie with an adjudicator in the first instance. If sensitive information might otherwise be disclosed—we reach the apposite point made by the hon. Member for Upminster, but this is the appropriate place in the argument—it would lie with the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The new section slims down the number of reasons from four to two and modernises them. The vital interest point is in the international convention.

We are introducing a right of appeal for the first time. An adjudicator would hear the appeal in certain circumstances, but if there were issues of national security or things that could not be raised in public, it would go to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.

The new right of appeal includes a challenge to the reasonableness of the Secretary of State's decision-making process, in addition to compliance with the law. The idea behind the European convention on nationality is that if nationality is conferred or removed, that is done according to law and with the right of appeal. A further factor that motivated those who drafted the convention on nationality, who included people from the Home Office, was limiting statelessness. Those two principles lie behind the clause. I hope that I can reassure members of the Committee that we are not trying to deprive people of their birthright.

Mr Simon Hughes (North Southwark & Bermondsey, Liberal Democrat)

Will new section 40(2) allow some people to be stateless on the seriously prejudicial to the vital interest test? I understand that the Home Office is trying to reduce statelessness but the measure could leave people stateless, although there had been no fraud.

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

We will not be able to deprive UK-born citizens of their nationality if that would leave them stateless, and as I understand it, we will not be able to deprive anyone else of their nationality if that would leave them stateless. We have dealt with the separate point on fraud. No international conventions offer protection to those who acquired their nationality status by fraud. I hope that we would not want to go down that road.

I shall return to the reasonableness test because it deals with points that were made about the phrase

''the Secretary of State thinks''.

We cannot see a distinction in law between ''thinks'' and ''is satisfied that''. The new right of appeal will include a reasonableness test. In 1997, the then Home Secretary announced that the Secretary of State would give reasons for making a decision on nationality cases, although the law did not require that. Those reasons are being given. The measures in the Bill ensure that the law catches up with the practice that has occurred since 1997. An individual will be entitled to an independent appeal and a reasonableness test. There is no difference in law between ''thinks'' and ''is satisfied that''.

We will be able to deprive in the circumstances that I discussed, although such circumstances are fairly unusual and we do not anticipate that they will arise in vast numbers of cases. The measures in the British Nationality Act 1981 that the Bill will replace were never used. There has been only one case of deprivation since 1948. I shall not say that there will not be cases of deprivation in future, but the Bill modernises the new procedure in terms of national security threats and non-state threats, such as those from organisations that are organised globally but are not states. The idea is that we can come out of the Committee and sign up to the European convention

on nationality, including its element of appeals and so forth.

We have roamed over some of the amendments that have not yet been moved but, given everything that I have said, I hope that Committee members will feel more reassured than they were at the beginning of the debate about the intention behind the rewriting of section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981, and its replacement by new section 40A. That will bring us into alignment with new and more modern international thinking with regard to nationality law: it will create a right of appeal for those who are facing deprivation that will include a reasonableness test on the Secretary of State's decision and the understanding that no one will be deprived for reasons of vital interests and so forth, if they would be rendered stateless as a result.

Mr Mark Lazarowicz (Edinburgh North & Leith, Labour/Co-operative)

I am still a little concerned about the explanation that the Minister has given of the operation of clause 4 with regard to people who have acquired citizenship by birth in the UK or by descent. That point was raised by the Immigration Law Practitioners Association. I raise it because the number of people who might fall into the category that could be affected by this power are much more substantial than has, perhaps, been suggested.

Many people in the UK have dual citizenship. Sometimes they have dual nationality. Sometimes they have nationality of another state against their will: millions of people in the UK still have Irish nationality under that country's laws, and that is also true of some citizens of other European countries. I confess that I have a nationality of another state.

I welcome the Minister's assurances that this measure will not be used lightly—and I am sure that there is no intention that it should be used lightly. Nevertheless, it is important to consider not just the way that a liberal Home Secretary would apply the rules, but how—perhaps, in a future Government formed by another party—rules might be applied differently. The full implications of clause 4 might not yet have been thoroughly explored, and perhaps in due course the Minister could consider some way of ensuring that certain categories of people—and in particular those people who have, as it were, acquired UK citizenship automatically—would not be at risk of deprivation in the way that has been suggested. It appears that this measure could apply to people who have been born in the UK, and whose families have had a connection with the UK for several generations.

I do not think that that is what is intended, but as the legislation is currently drafted, that is a possibility, and perhaps the Minister could think again at a later stage about the wording of the clause.

Mr Humfrey Malins (Woking, Conservative)

The Minister has rejected my amendment No. 11, which was part of the first group that was debated. However, you, Mr. Hurst, have said that amendment Nos. 7, 9 and so forth are included in this debate, and with your leave, I would very much like a separate division on amendment No. 7, which might have been possible if it had been debated as part of a separate group.

I have to look at what the Bill says. The Minister might try to impress me by saying that the Home Secretary has to do this or that on appeal, that the court will take into account such matters, and so forth, but the reality is what the Bill says, which is that the Home Secretary may deprive a person if

''the Secretary of State thinks''.

That is what the Bill says. Amendment No. 7, which I am keen to press to a Division if the Government will not accept it, would replace the word ''thinks'' with

''has reasonable grounds for believing'' .

What is wrong with that? I am sure that we will get the necessary support from Government Back Benchers to carry that through.

The word ''thinks'' is too wide a discretion for the Secretary of State, who might act on uncorroborated information from a foreign Government's intelligence service without further inquiry about its veracity. The danger of not amending the clause is that the word ''thinks'' is likely to be interpreted purely subjectively in any judicial scrutiny of the Home Secretary's discretion. The review in court might have to be satisfied that the Home Secretary had reached the stage where he thought it appropriate to take the decision, and not assess whether his decision was based on reasonable grounds. The power is uncontrollable, which I am unhappy about. Any Government should accept the substitution of the words

''has reasonable grounds to believe''.

If the Home Secretary did not have reasonable grounds to believe, he would have no business depriving anyone of their citizenship. Amendment No. 7 is not a problem for the Government, and I urge them to accept it. If they do not, I shall ask my colleagues to join Government Back Benchers and me in a vote.

Several hon. Members rose—

Mr Alan Hurst (Braintree, Labour)

Order. I confirm that I shall call a separate Division on amendment No. 7.

Mr Neil Gerrard (Walthamstow, Labour)

I ask the hon. Member for Woking not to raise his hopes too high.

It always concerns me to be told that powers are wide-ranging and draconian, but that I should not worry, as they have hardly been used. My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, North and Leith (Mr. Lazarowicz) made the point that one cannot always guarantee who will use the powers or that those who do will take the benign approach that has been used in the past. We should be careful to ensure that everything hangs together. I take the Under-Secretary's point that a reasonable test would be applied, but I have some doubts about whether the clause makes that clear. We know that we will be dealing later with amendments that make significant differences to the appeal system and perhaps to the status of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, to which the clause refers as the body to which one might appeal. We must ensure that whatever decision the Secretary of State takes will be subject to proper scrutiny in an appeal.

Mr Simon Hughes (North Southwark & Bermondsey, Liberal Democrat)

I, too, think that these are major issues, which the Under-Secretary has only partly

addressed. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam and I will return to the matter on Report, but for the moment we will content ourselves with voting with the hon. Member for Woking on amendment No. 7. However, several matters still concern us.

The Under-Secretary said that the test was a reasonableness test. It is not. It is a lesser—''thinking being satisfied''—test, for which the Secretary of State will give reasons. That is different from a reasonableness test. In my experience of recent legislation, the House of Lords has required the Government to change such a position. If the Government do not change the Bill in the House of Commons, the Lords will require them to change it. I do not conceive for a minute that the Bill will be passed in the Lords without the ''reasonable grounds'' test.

I understand the Under-Secretary's point about there being few people whom the Government would consequently make stateless, and that that would be reserved for those who fraudulently obtained citizenship or nationality.

I make very strongly a point—the hon. Member for Edinburgh, North and Leith made this point very well, not least from his personal experience—concerning the many people who have another nationality. Because they would not be made stateless, it might be tempting for the Government, who could ''get away with it'', to take the opportunity to say to those of dual nationality, ''We think that you have done things seriously prejudicial to the UK and therefore we are going to take away your UK citizenship.'' I have to say that in the current climate it looks pretty obvious that that could happen, and I am not the only one who has thought that. I accept that there is an appeal system, which we shall debate, but that is not as good as having adequate tests at the first stage.

Also unsatisfactory is the retrospective possibility of the legislation. I strongly believe that we should never legislate retrospectively. I have been aware of only one occasion while I have been in Parliament when an argument was put that we should override that principle. That was in relation to war crimes prosecutions, over which the reasons were obvious. I do not think that we should otherwise have retrospective legislation. The Government should think again on that.

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

Perhaps I can make another attempt to reassure hon. Members on a couple of points. I am sure that we shall come back to them on Report, and perhaps later, if they remain worried.

On the point about third party fraud, hon. Members must remember that deprivation is a discretionary act. It is hard to imagine a case in which we would wish to penalise by deprivation a person who obtained nationality as a result of a third party's fraud. However, we might well wish to do that if an individual were involved in fraud on their own account. The power is discretionary, and has not been exercised very often in the past.

I am not arguing that because that power has not been used in the past it could not be used in the future, and I hope that hon. Members did not think that I was. It is in the Bill and clearly can be used. The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey mentioned retrospectivity and said that retrospective legislation was good when it related to war criminals. In certain circumstances, war criminals might be a category of person whom we would wish to deprive of citizenship, if they had it, using the new powers.

My hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh, North and Leith was worried about—I am sorry, can he remind me what he was worried about?

Mr Mark Lazarowicz (Edinburgh North & Leith, Labour/Co-operative)

The fact that many people in this country have dual nationality and would therefore not be rendered stateless if UK citizenship were withdrawn.

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

I want to put on record that we do not want to go round rendering large numbers of people stateless. We are trying to modernise the way in which that can be done. I ask my hon. Friend to look at the serious nature of the things that new section 40A suggests would have to be proved against a person before they were deprived. They are not small acts or issues of no consequence, but involve serious issues prejudicial to the vital interests of this country. They are not things that one can do by accident one weekend.

I ask my hon. Friend to bear in mind that what we have in new section 40A is a power to deprive people of their nationality, in certain circumstances, if they have behaved in ways that amount to treason, problems for national security or interfering with the vital interest of this country. They are not trivial courses of conduct. We must get that on the record.

Mr Richard Allan (Sheffield, Hallam, Liberal Democrat)

The Under-Secretary, trying to reassure us, has mentioned the draconian powers—I think that those were her words—that already exist in legislation. However, the distinction between the powers that are already there and those that she is proposing is that the existing powers are specific. She referred to a series of instances in which citizenship could be withdrawn. It is natural that there should be concern when we move to something general, such as the phrase ''vital interests'', against which we do not have a yardstick to judge.

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

That phrase is mentioned in the European convention on nationality, and it is in the Bill because it aligns us with that. Of course, behaviour has to be pretty appalling to come up for consideration under that.

On the reasonableness test, the clause introduces for the first time an appeal, which has never previously been the case. When the Secretary of State gives reasons for a deprivation, they will form the basis of the substance of the appeal. Again, it is only since 1997 that those reasons have had to be made public. The Secretary of State cannot make an order on a whim, and he will be subject to judicial oversight when he makes an order. He is not going to be making orders on whims, and whatever the view of the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey on the reasonableness issue, I assure him that there is a reasonableness test that will be significantly better than

current circumstances and that an independent judicial authority will apply. We will return to that issue.

On amendment No. 7, I repeat the Government's view that there is no difference between the Secretary of State ''thinks'' and the Secretary of State

''has reasonable grounds for believing''.

It is implicit in the way in which the appeal will work that the reasonableness test will take place.

Mr Simon Hughes (North Southwark & Bermondsey, Liberal Democrat)

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: No. 7, in page 2, line 40, leave out 'thinks' and insert—

'has reasonable grounds for believing'.—[Mr. Malins.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 5, Noes 10.

Mr Simon Hughes (North Southwark & Bermondsey, Liberal Democrat)

I beg to move amendment No. 49, in page 2, line 41, leave out 'vital interests' and insert 'national security'.

I propose that instead of the vague phrase ''vital interests'', which has very little case law and does not come from British tradition, we use the phrase ''national security'' as the test in new section 40(2). It is well tried and tested, far clearer, more specific and much less general, and is therefore much less worrying. I hope that the Minister will accept it.

Ms Angela Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Wallasey, Labour)

I am afraid that I have to disappoint the hon. Gentleman again. The phrase ''vital interests'' comes from article 8 of the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness 1961 and article 7 of the European convention on nationality 1997. As I

mentioned earlier, if we get the Bill through the Houses of Parliament in its current form we hope to be able to sign and go forward with the European convention on nationality.

National security does not necessarily cover some of the potentially prejudicial activities that are worthy of deprivation, such as those to do with infrastructure, vital economic interests or the general safety of the population. That is a wider definition but one that has an international meaning. It will have an increasingly international meaning as the conventions that I have mentioned, particularly the one on nationality, are recognised, signed and incorporated in international law.

Mr Simon Hughes (North Southwark & Bermondsey, Liberal Democrat)

I am not satisfied—

It being five minutes to Ten o'clock, The Chairman proceeded, pursuant to sessional order D [28 June 2001] and the Order of the Committee [this day], to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 1, in page 4, line 8, at end insert—

'or section 2(2A) of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c.68)'.—[Angela Eagle.]

Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.