Clause 31 - Director of Public Prosecutions
Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill
11:45 am
Mr Des Browne (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Northern Ireland Office; Kilmarnock and Loudoun, Labour)
I accept the invitation to say a few words. As we might return to the matter in the context of other clauses, I shall try not to widen the debate so that it becomes unmanageable, as the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, perhaps, fears.
The hon. Member for Reigate referred to clause 42(4). A similar provision—clause 42(3)—relates to the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland. To understand the difference between superintendence and direction pre-devolution and post-devolution, one must accept that the decision for there to be no superintendence post-devolution clearly implies an element of independence recommended by the review in respect of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland. One cannot ignore the political position of post-devolution Northern Ireland. The review's recommendations were intended to reflect that reality.
The independence of the Director of Public Prosecutions in post-devolution Northern Ireland will be an attribute that has to be jealously guarded and clearly protected in that very political environment. That is what the provisions seek to do, and that is why there is a difference—it is not an accident. In consultation on the review and on the Government's interpretation of the review in terms of the draft Bill and the implementation plan, there was almost universal approval from Northern Ireland of the structure that had been designed to achieve and protect that element of independence.
The question put by the hon. Member for Reigate then arises: how are the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland and the Advocate-General for Northern Ireland to be accountable to Parliament? The provisions relating to their accountability are set
out separately in the Bill. The consultative relationship between them and the Director of Public Prosecutions is designed not to interfere with the DPP's independence. Therefore, the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question is that their accountability to the Assembly and to Parliament respectively cannot be in contradiction to the independence of the DPP, which is clearly set out in clause 42(1).
No doubt, due to their accountability, the Attorney-General and the Advocate-General will be asked questions that relate to policy decisions that might be made by the DPP. However, neither the Attorney-General nor the Advocate-General will have the power to direct the DPP in relation to that policy.