Clause 2 - Purposes of orders under section 1(1) or 2(1)
Export Control
10:30 am
Mr Gerald Howarth (Aldershot, Conservative)
I welcome you back to the Committee, Mr. Benton, and I thank the Minister for providing us with dummy orders. I am delighted to know that there will be a consultation period, because someone in industry to whom I spoke this morning told me that he and his colleagues would be closeted with their lawyers for a month, pouring over the detailed legislation to understand the full implications of the dummy orders for them.
May I be permitted to single something out in passing, Mr. Benton? I was interested, as you may be, in the definition of a robot, which is:
``A manipulation mechanism, which may be of the continuous path or of the point-to-point variety,''
and ``may use `sensors'''. There is a variety of descriptions, but there is an exception for robots that are
``Mechanically controlled variable sequence manipulation mechanisms which are automated moving devices, operating according to''
programs in which the motions are mechanically
``limited by fixed, but adjustable, stops such as pins or cams''
and in which
``The sequence of motions and the selection of paths or angles are variable within the fixed program patterns.''
Clearly that is a reference to the Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions. I am sure that he will find the dummy orders as interesting to peruse as we have done.
I welcome the consultation period. If the industry takes longer than 12 weeks, I hope that the Minister will be flexible.
I strongly endorse the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury on the amendment. Like him, I have associations with QinetiQ. Its name presumably has something to do with physics. The people in QinetiQ have operated under a very different system, called the Ministry of Defence form 680 procedure. Under that system, if they wish to discuss restricted matters with somebody in another country, they have to obtain permission. They have been able to work with that, and it is an established procedure with an element of flexibility.
I entirely understand my hon. Friend's point that those people who prior to 1 July were part of DERA frequently held discussions with their counterparts, and those in Defence Science and Technology Laboratories—the remaining public sector defence research establishment—will continue to have discussions about sensitive matters with the United States in particular, but also with our allies elsewhere. It is important that the Bill does not obstruct the sharing of important information among scientists who are trying to develop defence equipment for the protection of our own people. It would be a paradox if, at the same time as we are looking for co-operation on a broad scale to defeat terrorism, we were to place in the path of industry and the scientific community impediments to their ability to work together to make the world a safer place. The United Kingdom is a world leader in this area, so we must be careful how we deal with the matter.
This country is participating in a number of joint projects. For example, as part of the joint strike fighter project, BAE Systems is involved in both the Boeing project and the Lockheed Martin project in the United States. We need specific assurances that there will be no attempt, either by the state authorities such as the Crown Prosecution Service or by others seeking to move the law, to inhibit the efficient and proper consultation that must take place among people in this country and people in the United States on one of the most important military projects on the drawing board.
That applies not only to our relations with the United States, but to our relations with our continental partners as well. The Typhoon—formerly and unfortunately known as the Eurofighter, but now with a much better name—is a project being conducted by the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain. Clearly, an exchange of information is necessary for that project. I hope that the Minister can assure us that the Bill is not intended to catch the transmission of information such as my hon. Friend referred to—in particular, oral communications by telephone or communication by e-mail or fax. If the Bill were to do so, it would seriously inhibit the ability of defence manufacturers to work on important joint projects across national boundaries. Future projects may involve the United Kingdom in partnerships not just with the United States or other EU member states, but with countries such as Singapore or Australia or elsewhere where there are not exemptions for EU member states.The point made by my hon. Friend is important.
Thales is another instance relevant to the United Kingdom. It was formerly known as—