Clause 33 - Non-completion of statutory procedure: exclusion of claims
Employment Bill
11:30 am
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 63, in page 37, line 19, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.
Mr Joe Benton (Bootle, Labour)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 59, in page 37, line 19, leave out 'any of'.
No. 46, in page 37, line 30, at end add-
'(4) Nothing in the regulations shall prevent a claim if there are exceptional circumstances which would make preventing a claim to an employment tribunal or preventing a employment tribunal from hearing a claim unjust or inequitable.'.
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
Interestingly, the Trades Union Congress brief on the Bill expresses the view that the Government would table amendments to clause 33. I will be fascinated to learn whether any hon. Members can throw light on what those might have been. I have no information, but I studied the provisional selection list and the blue pages of the Order Paper on Monday morning in eager anticipation of seeing Government amendments. If the Minister intends to table amendments to the clause at a later stage, it would be courteous of him to tell the Committee. It would be odd to consider a clause that the Government already anticipate that they will amend.
Amendment No. 63 will be familiar to those members of the Committee who have been awake throughout the proceedings. It would replace the word ''may'' with ''shall'' in the first line of the clause, and so make it clear that the Secretary of State will use regulation-making powers to make provision for the purpose of excluding claims in cases where statutory procedure has not been complied with. I understand the preference for using the permissive term in the architecture of the Bill, so this is a probing amendment to ensure that the Minister will use its powers. Without wanting to labour a point that has been mentioned many times, the Bill is a package of measures, some of which will help employees to enforce their rights, others of which will help employers to deal with vexatious or unreasonable claims, or with claims that had not complied with procedures that would have dealt with them better than an application to a tribunal.
To put the point bluntly, if there are six clauses, all of which say that the Secretary of State may do something, three of which will greatly benefit the employees and three of which will benefit the employers, there would be a problem if the Secretary of State implemented the three favourable to one side and did not implement the three favourable to the other side. That is why I seek an assurance from the Minister that he intends to use the powers to make provision for excluding a claim where procedures have not been followed.
Amendment No. 59 would mean that the Secretary of State's regulation excluding a claim where procedures had not been followed would have to apply to all the jurisdictions listed in schedule 3, and not to a cherry-picked selection. It may or may not be right for the Secretary of State to select some jurisdictions as appropriate for exclusion of claims where procedure has not been followed, and for others not to be appropriate. If the Committee is to scrutinise the Bill and understand what its intention, the Minister has to come clean about which jurisdictions he would and would not intend to apply the power to. I look forward to hearing the Minister's response, and in particular, to hearing whether he can throw any light on the suggestion in the TUC brief, that there will be Government amendments.
Mr Brian Cotter (Weston-Super-Mare, Liberal Democrat)
Clause 33 gives the Secretary of State the power to regulate to exclude claims to an employment tribunal where there has been a failure to follow any part of the new statutory procedure. We want to promote the use of internal grievance procedures, but we must accept that the use of such procedure is not necessarily appropriate in all cases. We must recognise that fact. We must protect employees who might have a reasonable excuse for not partaking in such an exercise.
The TUC has outlined where internal procedures might be inappropriate in its response to ''Routes to Resolution''.
''We believe that for discrimination cases, it may often be inappropriate for a worker to go through an internal procedure, particularly in a small business where the person hearing the case, may be the perpetrator of the discrimination.
The TUC goes on to point out that , a recent report by the Equal Opportunities Commission, indicated that
''a third of women who had experienced sexual harassment named their line manager as the person responsible, and a third named the director or owner of the organisation.''
In cases where discrimination or intimidation is taking place, particularly in small firms, it would therefore seem inappropriate to expect the employee to go through the statutory procedure with the very person responsible. I am sure that we can all accept that.
Mr Mark Simmonds (Boston and Skegness, Conservative)
I hope that the Committee will forgive my voice today. Does the hon. Gentleman also think it appropriate that in the case of sexual harassment, the position should be mirrored for an employer, if the employer, rather than the employee, had been sexual harassed?
Mr Brian Cotter (Weston-Super-Mare, Liberal Democrat)
Yes, it is absolutely clear that cases such as this are extremely difficult. I recall a similar case during my business life, and it was very difficult. It is a very difficult field indeed. I know that women can speak more strongly on this issue than men because they can feel intimidated by what some people may consider a minor sexual problem with their employer. The amendment reasonably draws attention to that factor, and it is designed to ensure that regulations drawn up by the Secretary of State must be drafted in such a way as not to exclude claims automatically in the exceptional circumstances that I have described.
I urge hon. Members to support the amendment because it would ensure that those who have a genuine grievance but are, through no fault of their own, ''unable''-an appropriate word because it accurately describes the situation such a person would be in-to follow internal procedures are not denied the right to seek redress.
Unlike the Minister, I am not on Neurofen, but I am struggling to deal with things, having had a sleepless night. This is an important issue, and there are difficulties in addressing the problems of those who are involved in the workplace, or in any situation in which sexual harassment occurs, in the manner laid down by the law. I hope that he will give a clear and adequate answer to that point.
Mr Tony Lloyd (Manchester Central, Labour)
All Committee members will sympathise with the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (Brian Cotter) on his sleepless nights. It is a good job that we have not gone back to the old days when Committees regularly sat through the night, which meant that everybody was guaranteed those delights.
Amendment No. 63 provides me with the opportunity briefly to probe the clause's intentions with my hon. Friend the Minister. He will appreciate that with the addition of the word ''shall'' the clause could become draconian. Even with the word ''may'', it would allow, in the far distant future, a Conservative Secretary of State enormous power to drive a coach and horses through the Bill's intentions. It is important for him to flesh out the circumstances in which the Government would make regulations.
The hon. Gentleman has raised examples of cases in which, as my hon. Friend has made clear, the Government do not want to penalise would-be applicants to a tribunal. Because the Committee is being invited to pass this wide-ranging clause without any example regulations, it would help if my hon. Friend were to tell us exactly what his intentions are and how far and wide that will go. That would help to move the debate on and ensure that Committee members such as myself feel more comfortable.
Mr Alan Johnson (Minister of State (Employment and the Regions), Department of Trade and Industry; Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, Labour)
This is an important part of our deliberations. We have set up a system under which every workplace must have grievance and discipline procedures. On the previous clause, we agreed that there should be mitigation for both respondents and applicants who do not use those procedures. Now we are discussing whether claims should enter the employment tribunals system if they have not completed the internal procedure. It is an important area, and I understand hon. Members' concerns, which is why I shall take some time to set out the Government's position.
The Bill presents a mutually supporting package of proposals to encourage the use of internal procedures, and clause 33 is an important part of that because it deals with the admissibility of tribunal applications. Employment tribunals already assess applications against a set of qualifying criteria. Most notably, they can rule applications out of time if they are not submitted within a set period, which will usually be three months. Under clause 33, we intend to establish new admissibility criteria against which tribunal applications will be judged. The criteria will be based on the statutory procedures and will be introduced by regulation under the power conferred on the Secretary of State in subsection (1).
It may help Committee members if I explain how the Government intend to use this power. I hope that I can reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Central and the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. We propose to set admissibility criteria linked to the initial stages of the statutory grievance procedure. The applicant should be required to complete at least step one of the procedure, the sending of the written complaint, before the tribunal can admit an application. In addition, a period-say, four weeks-should elapse after the step one letter has been sent before an application can be admitted. That ensures that the parties have time to begin discussing the grievance, which should ensure that the grievance is at least aired and clarified before an application is made. If the dialogue proved productive, I would expect many potential applicants to defer submitting their tribunal application beyond the end of set period while the procedure was used more fully. Clauses 31 and 32 should also encourage them to do this.
Those two admissibility criteria, the sending of the step one communication and the passing of a set period thereafter, would apply to most jurisdictions mentioned in schedule 3. However, we do not intend that they should apply to unfair dismissal, which must be excluded because dismissals are preceded by employer-driven actions under the statutory dismissal procedure. It would be inappropriate to make tribunal applications by a former employee dependent on the action or inaction of the employer. The hon. Member for Tatton, who is not in his place, raised that point earlier.
The Government are mindful that we do not want to create a complicated admissibility system, which is a point that repeatedly came up in our consultations. We do not want to create scope for additional disputes to arise between the parties, especially by the minority of unscrupulous employers who would want to delay the processing of an application. That would potentially clog up the tribunal system with calls for many more preliminary hearings.
We believe that we will avoid these problems because the two criteria are easy to understand and apply, and it should be simple for applicants, employers and tribunals to verify whether they have been met. Our approach should not affect or restrict access to justice. It merely sets reasonable preconditions for the making of applications to tribunals. These criteria can apply to all situations and should not be difficult to meet.
We recognise, however, that there will be rare cases in which the threat of violence or serious personal harassment may make it dangerous or intimidating for applicants to take step one action before making an application. We therefore intend to use the regulations to define circumstances in which tribunals may admit claims where the two admissibility criteria have not been met.
We therefore agree with the point the Liberal Democrats are making in amendment No. 46 that there should be some flexibility in the admissibility regime to allow for special cases. We hope to define these exemptions as tightly as possible in the regulations to ensure that the tribunals are not forced as a matter of course to hold preliminary hearings on the issue. The ''just and equitable'' formulation in the amendment is too wide.
In developing an admissibility policy, the Government have been concerned to strike a balance between the key aims of ensuring that claims are not unreasonably deterred and making certain that there is communication in the workplace between employees and employers.
Far too often we see claims taken to tribunal where there has been no discussion between the individual and their manager. In 62 per cent. of claims surveyed in 1998, there was no meeting between the parties before the claim was lodged. In 37 per cent. of applications, there was no attempt to resolve the problem before the application was made. The Government intend to change that situation because litigation is an expensive and inflexible route to resolution; problems caught early are easier to resolve.
We will make concerted efforts to publicise the new admissibility criteria, but it is inevitable that some individuals will be unaware of them. There will be cases in which, through lack of awareness, people make inadmissible applications. We are keen to ensure that such individuals are not debarred from taking their grievances through the tribunal system. In most cases, we intend to give them a second chance to submit an application meeting the admissibility criteria. That will involve some extension of the normal time limits for making applications.
The regulations are important and the Government will consult widely on them. I hope that my explanation is sufficient and will mean that the hon. Gentleman will not press the amendment. I guess that amendment No. 63 was intended as a probing amendment. If so, I hope that the explanation that I have given will suffice. If not, I can assure the Committee that the Government fully intend to implement the clause and that the amendment is unnecessary.
Amendment No. 59 seems intended to ensure that the admissibility criteria apply to all jurisdictions listed in schedule 3. It will be apparent from my description of the policy in clause 33 that the Government intend admissibility to apply to grievances and not to claims arising out of the disciplinary process. The reason is quite simple: as discussed already, it would be unfair and unreasonable to make an individual's access to an employment tribunal contingent on a statutory procedure being followed when only the employer can initiate that procedure. Access should depend on an individual's own actions, not on someone else's. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to apply the clause to all jurisdictions in schedule 3. I call on the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
I am grateful to the Minister for his clarification. I do not find anything unreasonable in the principle that he sets out. A provision under clause 31 gives someone a significant financial incentive to comply with the procedure before lodging a claim with the tribunal. As long as tribunals make use of their discretion to go above 10 per cent. and up to 50 per cent. in order to make it clear to applicants that they are expected to use the statutory procedures unless there are clear and good reasons why they should not, that side of things should work very well.
We are discussing an exclusion of the ability to access a tribunal before going through the procedures. Someone might wish to do that for some reason, even though they recognise that they will be taking a financial risk with the size of their award in doing so-they may well be penalised for not having gone through the procedures first. I agree with the Minister that the test should be framed not to exclude claims that reasonably ought to be tested in the tribunal. I am happy with his explanation on that.
I am slightly puzzled by what the Minister said about amendment No. 59. The Minister will correct me if I misinterpret what he said, but I am reading from the TUC brief. I think that he said that in order for a claim to be admissible, the relevant party must first set out in writing the basis of the grievance and then a response would have to be forthcoming. Those would have to be the first two steps. The Minister went on to say that that should not apply to unfair dismissal because-I understand the logic of this-the power lies with the employer to dictate whether the process moves forward.
However, that power surely lies also with the employer in relation to all other jurisdictions if the requirement is for the first and second steps to have been carried out. As I said, and as I read in the TUC brief, those steps are that a grievance would have to have been put in writing and that a response would have to be forthcoming or a disciplinary procedure set in motion within a specified time scale.
It appears to me that that second step lies in the hands of the employer. I do not, therefore, understand the philosophical distinction between unfair dismissal and the other jurisdictions. If the Minister can explain that, I will be very grateful.
Mr Brian Cotter (Weston-Super-Mare, Liberal Democrat)
I thank the Minister for taking on board what has been suggested. I realise that it is difficult to take account of variable circumstances, especially where sexual allegations of some sort are concerned. I think, however, that it is very important that the suggestion is taken on board and seriously addressed in regulations. Otherwise, a great problem will arise. I welcome the Minister's comments, and will not press the amendment.
Mr Alan Johnson (Minister of State (Employment and the Regions), Department of Trade and Industry; Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, Labour)
I appreciate the points that hon. Members have made.
We do not intend step two of the grievance procedure to be part of the admissibility criteria. We intend step one to be included, which is entirely in the hands of employees. As I said in a previous debate, employers need to know what grievance their employees have before they come to an employment tribunal. By step one, the employee sets out the nature of the grievance. The whole list is set out in schedule 3, including the minimum wage, redundancy pay, discrimination and other things.
After the employee has put the case in writing, we propose to allow a period-we have not decided it definitely, but about four weeks is likely-for the employer to respond rather than sending the letter to the employer and then filling in the IT1. We do not envisage that to include step 2. I hope that that clarifies the point made by the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. The discipline procedure is entirely driven by the employer through statute, so it would be unfair to include discipline in the admissibility criteria. It is quite fair and practicable to include grievances if we follow the first step.
There has not been a debate on whether that is sensible, but most people seem to see the sense in it. The Institute of Directors said that it welcomed the emphasis that the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry placed on using internal procedures before applying for a tribunal. The CBI said that the most crucial element of the package is the proposal that employees must raise grievances with their employer before going to a tribunal. Employers are in no doubt that the clause relates to grievance. If I have clarified that sufficiently for the hon. Gentleman, I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
As I said before, I do not have a problem with the principle at stake here, which I think is perfectly sensible. I was confused because the TUC brief suggested that the TUC is a little confused-employers may understand the matter perfectly well-in talking about a first and second step that will need to have happened. I thought that the Minister mentioned two steps as a prerequisite to accessing the tribunal in such circumstances, but the record will show whether that is correct.
To be absolutely clear, I think that the Minister is now saying that the provision will apply in the case of a grievance procedure, and that the only requirement will be the first step, which is that written notice of the grievance has been given by the employee to the employer. Once that has been done, the employee will have satisfied the requirements for being allowed to apply to the tribunal, notwithstanding the fact that the remainder of the statutory procedure has not been carried out. It is a one-step hurdle, not a two-step hurdle. The Minister nods, so my point is clarified.
I have no problem with what is being sought here, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 61, in page 37, line 27, leave out subsection (2).
This looks like a subsection that definitely needs to be challenged. The Secretary of State will be given a regulation-making power to amend or repeal any enactment. I thought that it was a general principle in this place that we did not give the Secretary of State wholesale power to repeal chunks of primary legislation by regulation.
Following on from the comments of the hon. Member for Manchester, Central in the last debate, we might want to ponder on the possibility that some future Secretary of State might use this regulation-making power to repeal whole swathes of employment protection legislation on the strength of a 90-minute debate in Committee. I take it as a general principle that it is very poor practice to give the Secretary of State unfettered powers to repeal primary legislation by regulation.
If I have misunderstood the power being granted, no doubt the Minister will correct me. My understanding is that the clause will give the Secretary of State the power to repeal any piece of employment-related primary legislation by regulation on the strength of a 90-minute debate in a statutory instrument Standing Committee. I would have to urge my hon. Friends to resist such a power.
Mr Tony Lloyd (Manchester Central, Labour)
I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will be able to assure the Committee that the intent of subsection (2) is nothing like as wide as the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge suggests.
Mr Alan Johnson (Minister of State (Employment and the Regions), Department of Trade and Industry; Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, Labour)
Absolutely.
Mr Tony Lloyd (Manchester Central, Labour)
My interpretation is that subsection (2) is limited by subsection (1), and, specifically, can only be used in pursuit of primary claims to employment tribunals and the like. It is a wide power even at that, which is why I asked my hon. Friend for clarification earlier on how exactly it would be used. I very much welcome the comment that he put on the record.
I hope that he is able to reassure us further. I know that from his reaction to my comments already that my interpretation is the accurate one, and not that of the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. Nevertheless, it would be helpful if my hon. Friend could set out the Government's intentions. What do they have in mind and are there particular parts of existing legislation that they would seek to repeal?
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's clarification. From the Minister's reaction, the hon. Gentleman's interpretation was clearly right. Does the hon. Gentleman not think, however, that it would have been better if the Minister had used schedule 6, consequential amendments and repeals to spell out precisely what other pieces of legislation needed to be amended in order to give effect to clause 33(1)?
Mr Tony Lloyd (Manchester Central, Labour)
I express affection for all manner of improvements in the way that we announce our legislation. Pre-legislative screening would have been very helpful. The Minister himself would probably agree with that, and that is the direction in which we ought to go. If we were not under the time pressure that our present procedure applies, it would also have been helpful to have had the regulations so that we could examine their full impact. The best that we can do is to ask the Minister to do his best to talk us through them at this stage so that the Committee has an idea of the Government's ambitions and the limitations on those ambitions.
As a general point, Parliament has to be extremely careful in giving power to Secretaries of State to make law by regulation. We need be careful not because that power is extraordinary-it has been used by every Government over time-but because it is intended to give note powers that fundamentally alter the law, but powers that amend the law within the spirit of the Bill involved. Important issues are involved.
The whole Committee is sympathetic to the need to constrain future Secretaries of State. We know not when Ministers will come or go. I wish my hon. Friend the Minister many years in office, but I want to tie him to his own words. If he moves on to pastures greater and better, I hope that he will bequeath to his successors a framework that they can operate.
Mr Alan Johnson (Minister of State (Employment and the Regions), Department of Trade and Industry; Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, Labour)
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Central. I do not understand how anyone could move on to a greater job than being in Standing Committee F to discuss the Employment Bill.
We do not intend to repeal large chunks of employment relations legislation. Use of the power must be related to the admissibility regime in subsection (1). Establishing that regime is a major step and the drafting of the regulations will require carefully attention. We shall consult widely on them before they are introduced.
The admissibility criteria will apply to many, although not all, the jurisdictions in schedule 3 and they will apply to many aspects of employment law. It is not a simple task to apply the admissibility regime to such a diverse set of legal rights and requirements and the criteria may fit more neatly into some parts of the legal framework than others. It is prudent to take the power to make any necessary amendments to ensure that the criteria can be clearly and consistently applied across all jurisdictions. That is why we need the power to amend the specific time limit provisions relating to each jurisdiction to be subject to the regime.
The amendment would remove that essential flexibility from the regulation-making process. I have said several times that the regulations will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. When initially set, they will be subject to the widest consultation and will relate only to clause 33(1) and not to any other part of the Bill. With those assurances, I hope that the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge will withdraw his amendment.
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
The Minister has confirmed, as his hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Central envisaged, that the powers under subsection (2) are more limited than I had thought, and I am glad about that. However, we are discussing a gradual slide down a parliamentary slope. Sooner or later, someone will have to sit down and work out what needs to go into schedules 6 and 7 to amend and repeal other legislation. In general, it is a bad principle to start including a general power to repeal or amend anything instead of working out what needs to be amended or repealed. The issue is not worth going into the trenches for and, because of the timetable, trench warfare is out of fashion in Standing Committees, much to my regret.
The issue is worth noting. Schedules 6 and 7 purport to contain consequential amendments, repeals and revocations, but what is the point of them? Why not have a general power for the Secretary of State to amend, by regulation, anything that needs to be amended to make the implementation of the Bill easier and smoother. I do not like that trend in legislation, and I should have preferred the Minister to have taken the time to decide what he was going to do and then to work out what revocations, repeals and amendments he needed in order to give effect to this part of the Bill.
Having made that point, I shall not press the amendment because the Minister has confirmed that the power will be used narrowly, although that does not make the principle a good one. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
I beg to move amendment No. 62, in page 37, line 30, after 'Service', insert
'and any other organisation representing persons appearing to the Secretary of State to be likely to be affected by the regulations'.
The amendment repeats an argument that we had on another clause. I would like a requirement for the Secretary of State to consult not only ACAS, but users of employment tribunals. There are defined user groups in all regions of England and Wales and it would be relatively simple for the Secretary of State to consult those user groups. I see no reason why good consultative practice in pursuit of open government should not include consulting those user groups as well as ACAS. I am disappointed that last time we debated the matter the Minister was reluctant to include such a requirement in the Bill, but if he were able to assure the Committee that his intention is that in practice those user groups would be consulted, I would be satisfied at this stage.
Mr Alan Johnson (Minister of State (Employment and the Regions), Department of Trade and Industry; Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, Labour)
This is a re-run of a similar amendment, No. 45. ACAS represents major figures from all sides of industry, leading academics and even employment lawyers. It has unrivalled knowledge and expertise to help us to frame these important regulations. We shall, of course, consult other organisations about the regulations in clause 33 before we introduce them. We shall consult widely on other changes to the regulations, but there is a practical problem with the word ''used''. It would require us to consult any organisation that represents people likely to be affected, so it would commit us to wider consultation on every single change in future. People ''likely to be affected'' is so wide-ranging that we would be bound to miss someone and any Government would almost certainly fail to meet a statutory consultative requirement drafted in such terms.
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
Can the Minister satisfy me with a specific undertaking that he would include in consultation the tribunal user groups in each tribunal region?
Mr Alan Johnson (Minister of State (Employment and the Regions), Department of Trade and Industry; Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, Labour)
In terms of the initial application of the regulations, yes. We consulted widely on ''Routes to Resolution'', and we shall consult again on the regulations.
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
The Minister misinterpreted what I said. The requirement under clause 33(3) is that the Secretary of State must consult ACAS before exercising the powers in subsection (1). I am asking if he will also give an undertaking to consult with the tribunal user groups in each region before exercising those powers. I realise that the amendment is widely drafted and may not be appropriate, but I am seeking an assurance from him that the tribunal user groups will be consulted.
Mr Alan Johnson (Minister of State (Employment and the Regions), Department of Trade and Industry; Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, Labour)
I am not trying to be difficult, but I do not like making legislation on the hoof. If I give that assurance, every future consultation, however narrow, small and pedantic, would have to be widened beyond ACAS. ACAS has considerable experience in dealing with employment tribunal users and the employment tribunal judiciary. I do not want to give assurances that would make life more difficult in future, so I am not willing to give the assurance that the hon. Gentleman seeks. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment, and I shall consider what he said to see whether there is a case for stating on Report, without introducing it in legislation, that the user groups should be consulted on every occasion.
Mr Philip Hammond (Runnymede and Weybridge, Conservative)
The Minister is now going too far. I am ready to concede that the amendment is widely drafted and could cause difficulties. I hoped that he would find it easy to put on the record of the Standing Committee, but not to write into the Bill, that the Secretary of State will, in the narrow set of circumstances in which the powers would be exercised under subsection (1), consult with the clearly defined and limited number of tribunal user groups in each of the employment tribunal regions. The user groups will draw their own conclusions from the fact that the Minister has not been able to give that undertaking. They would expect to be consulted and are right to do so because the issue has been raised. So long as the Government propose to allocate sufficient time to the Report stage, I will ask the Minister to deal with such issues then, as well as with the headline issues to which we must return. I offer the Minister the opportunity to say whether that will happen.
During the passage of the Bill, either on Report or in the other place, I hope that the Minister or a colleague of his will give that simple undertaking. That would entirely satisfy me on the point that lies behind this possibly unwisely drafted amendment. In recognising that it is too wide, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.