New Clause 4 - Reporting of consultation between the ICC and Secretary of State
International Criminal Court Bill [Lords]
10:30 am
Mr John Battle (Minister of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office; Leeds West, Labour)
I apologise, Mr. Cook. I shall try to remember to face you and not the Back Benches.
The hon. and learned Gentleman moved the amendment with refreshing and characteristic frankness, but buried in his wide-ranging comments was a theme that he has consistently presented to the Committee and that goes wider than the Bill: the relationship between the powers of Government and Parliament. He has also consistently raised the way in which we sign up to statutes internationally, procedures by which we might change them before they come before us, and our relationship to them. Those are largely legitimate questions that might be raised elsewhere in the House in the future.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State, following consultation with the ICC, formally to lay before the House of Commons a report on a proposed or actual warrant. As the hon. and learned Gentleman acknowledged, Lord Howell of Guildford introduced an identical provision in Committee in the other place. The premise on which the new clause appears to founded is the Secretary of State's refusing a request for surrender. It is important to mention that, because I cannot emphasise enough the question of complementarity: the court comes into play only if this country refuses—if it is unable or unwilling—to take action.
I assure the Committee that, when appropriate, matters relating to requests from the ICC will be brought to the attention of Parliament in the usual way, without the need for a report to be formally laid before Parliament. That has been the practice on many occasions in the past. It is what happened in the case of General Pinochet: the reasons for the decisions of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary were brought to the attention of the House and the usual procedures were used; private notice questions and other mechanisms were employed. The procedures under the new clause for laying an additional report before Parliament could undermine the effectiveness of a proposed ICC warrant.
I shall give an example from a real case involving a warrant issued by the international criminal tribunal for Rwanda for the arrest of a Rwandan person accused of genocide. We were aware for some months before the warrant was issued that the person was likely to be indicted. Had we been following the procedures proposed in new clause 4, we should have had to lay a report before the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs giving details of the proposed warrant. That report would, no doubt, have excited press interest and examination, greatly increasing the likelihood of the suspect absconding. If the procedure were to become as formalised as is specified in the amendment, it could be self-defeating.
In addition, we should remember the principle of complementarity, which will ensure that the ICC will be able to assume jurisdiction only when a state is found to be genuinely unwilling or unable to conduct an investigation. We do not anticipate being in that position. The Rome statute was the result of delicate negotiation. A balance had to be achieved that would protect our service personnel, but allow the ICC to retain its teeth in relation to states that might try to carry out domestic investigations in bad faith in order to protect their own personnel. The balance is right. We do not need to introduce the new clause and to do so might undermine the procedures that we want to see followed.