Schedule 3 - Hunting with Dogs: Prohibition
Hunting Bill
4:00 pm
Mr Edward Leigh (Gainsborough, Conservative)
The Minister refers to the explanatory notes, and I now have them. I return to my point that the Bill must be clear, but we can come back to the argument in a moment. I repeat that, potentially, paragraph 23 is confusing.
I turn to how the courts would deal with the concept of whether the owner or person in control of the dog could conceivably have foreseen that it would chase a rabbit. Much law has been written about that. It is one of the most difficult and complex areas in criminal law and one on which the debate continues to the present.
The general principle is that:
``the court of appeal has endorsed the view that it is only when a consequence is foreseen as virtually certain that intention may be inferred.''
One may assume from that that, in the case about which we are talking, the dog owner or the person in control of the dog would be safe from a potential or successful prosecution because he could not foresee as virtually certain that the rabbit would be killed. However, the Court of Appeal went on to say that
``it did not accept that reference to foresight of a very high degree of probability was a misdirection, because it did not regard the difference of degree, `if there was one', between `virtual certainty' and `very high degree of probability' as sufficient to render the direction a misdirection.''
That may be gobbledegook to some of those in Committee. Let me try to explain it as plainly as I can.
The leading case law on foresight is that of Moloney, but that and subsequent cases
``have left the law in a state of uncertainty. It is unacceptable that, in addition to the clearly established definition of intention in the sense of aim or purpose, the law should permit `intention' to have some other, undefined meaning. Legal concepts must be certain in advance-``
Because of the present confusion in the law, there is no certainty as to how the courts would deal with the concept of foresight. There has been considerable argument one way and another. For instance, I shall quickly refer to ``knowledge''. I shall not go into it in any length, because I know that you, Mr. O'Hara, do not like me to talk about it. The textbook states:
``The first is actual knowledge, which may be inferred from the conduct of the accused. Where a person has actual knowledge of the circumstances in which he is acting, he is said to act intentionally in relation to them. Knowledge in the second degree consists of wilful blindness. Where a person realises the risks that are surrounding a circumstance may exist and deliberately refrains from making enquiries, the results of which he may not care to have, wilful blindness is a species of subjective recklessness with reference to surrounding circumstances and is often called connivance. It is equal in law to actual knowledge and normally suffices even when the statute uses the word knowingly.''
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
On resuming—