Clause 37 - Revocation and suspension of a travel restriction order
Criminal Justice and Police Bill
3:30 pm
Mrs Jackie Ballard (Taunton, Liberal Democrat)
It is no reflection on me that my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey has to leave the Committee at this precise moment.
The clause deals with the revocation and suspension of travel restriction orders. Both the wording of clause 35 and the Minister's response to amendments to it made it clear that the message to the courts is that travel restriction orders for drug traffickers are expected to be the norm rather than the exception. All of us want to eradicate drug trafficking and other forms of trafficking, but the issue is the duration of a travel restriction order and its impact on an offender's choices and life style on completion of a prison sentence.
Amendment No. 163 would delete the phrase
``after the end of the minimum period''.
If it were accepted, a first-time offender who received a four-year sentence—in this context, the minimum sentence—could apply for a revocation order before the two-year period was up, two years being the minimum period for which the travel restriction can be imposed.
Let us consider the first-time offender who is perhaps the na—ve mule to whom we referred earlier—I do not deny that in such a case an offence has none the less been committed—and who since release has led a blameless life for 18 months and secured a job involving overseas travel. If the amendment were accepted, in circumstances where imprisonment had proved successful in terms of rehabilitation it would be possible for that person to pursue their career by travelling overseas.
As it stands, subsection (2) makes it clear to the court that revocation is an exception to the rule. Again, that takes a pessimistic view of the rehabilitative role of a prison sentence. Such a view might reflect the reality of prison life, but it should not be reflected in the aims of the criminal justice system. Amendment No. 164, which would replace subsection (2) with a more positive wording, states:
``The court shall revoke the order unless it considers it is necessary to prevent the offender from committing further similar offences'.
Looking into my crystal ball, I can imagine that the Minister's response will be similar to his response to clause 35 in respect of a court's judging the likelihood of reoffending.
Amendment No. 165 clarifies the circumstances in which suspension can take place by removing the word ``exceptional''. I question how that word is defined. Let us imagine someone who has been served with a four-year travel restriction order, which would mean that he had been a serious offender, who is a United Kingdom citizen both of whose parents live in France—which is not so unusual these days, with free movement throughout the European Union—and who becomes seriously ill during those four years. The first time that the person goes to court to ask for a lifting of the travel restriction order, the court may say, ``Yes, this is an exceptional circumstance involving a seriously ill relative'', but on the second occasion, would that still be an exceptional circumstance? Would the Minister clarify that?
Amendment No. 166 would remove the words ``on compassionate grounds'', because if they remain in the Bill, the court will feel that it can lift the restriction order only in the event of serious illness or death, not for work-related reasons. I fully accept that it would not be inclined to lift the restriction order for a holiday, but if as part of someone's work he was asked to attend a conference in Paris, for example, ``compassionate grounds'' would imply to the court that that was not something on which to exercise its discretion—normally, one considers compassion to relate to illness or death, rather than to professional work.