Clause 34 - Drunkenness or disorder on licensed premises
Criminal Justice and Police Bill
3:00 pm
Mr Simon Hughes (North Southwark and Bermondsey, Liberal Democrat)
The Minister will remember that exactly the same point was made on the Terrorism Bill and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill in the previous Session. It concerns the shift between the burden of evidence and the burden of proof. I would like to probe him, and I support the amendments. One must ensure a degree of personal liability and knowledge. Otherwise a ridiculous burden is placed on a publican, who must constantly judge between people who may be sober, not quite so sober, slightly less sober, beginning to be slightly drunk, more drunk or very drunk. People could start in one category and quickly move to another. One can go from being merry and pleasant to being not quite so merry, more merry and violent, bothersome and riotous.
Proposed new section 172A(2) would be affected by amendment No. 49. I understand that a publican may be charged with permitting drunkenness. All that must then be proved is that there is some evidence that a person was drunk on the premises. That is a ``how long is a piece of string'' sort of qualification. It is probably not difficult to find a drunken person on any premises containing a significant number of people—one needs only to find a person who looks as if he has been there for a long time.
Under the Bill, the burden of proving that the relevant person and any persons employed by him took all reasonable steps to prevent drunkenness will lie on that person. One has only to put the allegation on the table and it is for the publican, manager or licensee to refute it. I am unhappy with that presumption. I understand the public policy objective of ensuring that landlords keep an orderly house, to use the old phrase, but I would be much happier if, prompted by the amendments, the Minister would look again at the wording, and if he would go further and reconsider the way in which we would have someone convicted. It seems wrong that a conviction should arise because one cannot prove a negative, rather than its being necessary to prove an offence.